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ABSTRACT 
 
YOUNG KYUNG DO: Effects of Informal Care on Caregivers’ Labor Market Outcomes and 
Health in South Korea 
 (Under the direction of Edward C. Norton, Ph.D.) 
 
This dissertation investigates the effects of informal care on caregiver’s labor market 
outcomes and health in South Korea. Although dramatic demographic transitions in Asian 
countries have been well documented, less is known about working and caring lives of 
informal caregivers in this region. Embedded in traditional culture perpetuating family-
centered elderly care, informal care still remains invisible as a policy issue. Using newly 
available microdata from the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging, this dissertation not only 
fills the gap in the international literature but also provides evidence to inform current policy 
debates on elderly long-term care in South Korea. Studies on the two distinct but related 
outcomes address methodological issues by controlling for the potential endogeneity of 
informal care, by examining an extensive set of outcome measures, and by employing 
various functional forms of care intensity. Robust findings suggest negative effects of 
intensive caregiving on labor force participation, work hours, and wage rates for female 
caregivers but not for male caregivers. Furthermore, caregivers appear to experience negative 
mental and physical health outcomes. These findings suggest that informal caregiving is 
already an important economic and public health issue in South Korea even before the full 
effects of recent rapid population aging have appeared. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Introduction 
The world population is rapidly aging. In most parts of the world, mortality and 
fertility are decreasing dramatically, and both trends accelerate population aging. In 2000, 
the number of persons aged 60 or over was estimated to be 606 million worldwide. This 
number is projected to grow to 2 billion in 2050 (United Nations, 2002a). In 2047, the 
number of persons aged 60 or over is expected to exceed the number of children under 
the age of 14 for the first time in human history (United Nations, 2007). The phenomenon 
of population aging has been more pronounced in the developed world, and the 
developed world still has higher percentages of older persons. For these reasons, until 
recently discussions have focused on aging in the developed world. The magnitude and 
speed of population aging in the developing world are staggering, however. In the 
developing world, the older population will increase more than four times, from 374 
million in 2000 to 1.6 billion in 2050, and will account for four fifths of the world’s older 
population (United Nations, 2002b). In other words, the largest increases in absolute 
numbers of older persons will occur in the developing world (United Nations, 2002b). 
Furthermore, the speed of aging is much faster in developing countries, particularly in 
East Asia and Southeast Asia (Kinsella and Velkoff, 2002).
In many Asian countries experiencing rapid population aging, elderly care 
emerges as one of the most pressing policy issues. Increases in life expectancy come with 
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increases in life-years in disability in the developing world (Murray and Lopez, 1996, 
Goulding et al., 2003), thus resulting in an increased demand for elderly long-term care. 
Despite this trend, the supply of elderly care by family members is decreasing for a 
number of reasons. Declining fertility rates have already diminished the pool of family 
caregivers. Further reducing the availability of family caregivers is an array of 
socioeconomic changes, such as increased migration, decreasing intergenerational co-
residence, and increasing female labor force participation rates. Without an established 
formal long-term care system (Chan, 2005), the conflict between these opposing forces 
has created insecure prospects for elderly populations and placed heavy strain on their 
families. This conflict raises a critical question on the sustainability of the traditional way 
of elder care, where families were entirely responsible for caring for the elderly. 
As one of the newly industrialized countries in Asia, South Korea has experienced 
dramatic population aging coupled with equally dramatic socioeconomic changes. Life 
expectancy at birth increased from 62.3 in 1971 to 78.6 in 2005, and is projected to 
further increase to 86.0 in 2050 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2006). At the same 
time, the total fertility rate decreased from 4.53 in 1970 to 1.08 in 2005. This rate is 
among the lowest in the world (Korea National Statistical Office, 2006). Because of such 
changes in life expectancy and fertility, South Korea has become one of the fastest aging 
societies in the world. Whereas 115 years (1865-1980) were required in France for the 
percent of population aged 65 and over to rise from 7 percent to 14 percent, only 18 years 
(2000-2018) are expected to be needed for the comparable change to occur in South 
Korea. More strikingly, at current rates only 8 years (2018-2026) will be required for the 
increase from 14 percent to 20 percent (Korea National Statistical Office, 2006). The 
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aged dependency ratio, defined as the number of persons aged 65 or older divided by the 
number of persons aged 15-64, captures part of the socioeconomic effects of the 
population aging. The aged dependency ratio grew from 5.7% in 1970 to 12.6% in 2005, 
and is projected to increase to 72.0% in 2050 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2006). 
This demographic transition reflects an increasing burden on the working-age population 
for the support of the elderly population at the macroeconomic level. The increases in the 
aged dependency ratio also suggest that working-age persons will have to assume a 
greater responsibility for caring for their parents. Thus, the working-age population has 
an increasing dual burden of supporting the elderly population at the macroeconomic 
level and of caring for their own parents in their family lives. This situation implies that 
the working-age population may experience growing conflicts between labor market 
work and informal elderly care.  
From the viewpoint of elderly care, the demographic transition and increasing 
conflicts on the working-age population raise the question of whether the current system 
of elderly long-term care, which is almost entirely dependent on the families, can be 
sustained. This question is particularly salient because South Korea experienced rapid 
industrialization, modernization, and urbanization (Palley, 1992) and compressed 
modernity (Chang, 1999). Intergenerational co-residence is no longer the norm, and the 
number of parents-only or single-parent households has increased. Female labor force 
participation rates have risen steadily. Such socioeconomic transitions changed the 
traditional model of family-centered elderly care in South Korea. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that family-centered elderly care is at risk for many South Korean families. 
Disabled elderly parents are sometimes abandoned or abused, and parental care may 
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become a source of conflicts between siblings (Oh and Warnes, 2001; Lee and Kolomer, 
2005). The elderly suicide rate more than tripled between 1995 and 2005, reaching a 
much higher level than that of Japan (The Hankyoreh, 2008). Middle-income families 
caring for a demented parent for a long period often fall into poverty because their 
income-earners give up work for parental caring and because they paid for expensive 
formal care for at least some period of time. In addition, under the lack of a well-
established formal long-term care system, the current acute care system suffers from 
inappropriate hospital use by long-term elderly patients, referred to as social admission 
(Chang, 2000; Chang et al., 2001). 
Public long-term care insurance starts in South Korea in July 2008. However, the 
introduction of public long-term care insurance is only the beginning of establishing a 
long-term care system. In addition to immediate implementation issues with respect to 
workforce and facilities, many significant challenges lie ahead (Sunwoo, 2004). 
Unfortunately, the current knowledge base in South Korea is inadequate to address some 
of the most critical issues. Given the planned introduction of formal long-term care, many 
of the critical issues involve the interface between informal and formal care or the 
relationship between the private and public sectors (Kwon, 2006; Park, 2007). Despite 
the importance of having a better understanding informal care, informal care has not yet 
received due attention in the policy and research arena in South Korea. One reason is that 
relevant data with rich information on informal care were previously not available from 
well-designed, nationally representative population-based studies. Because informal care 
is not paid, existing administrative data provide little help. Also, informal care is 
embedded in culture and values. Thus informal care is viewed as a family or moral issue 
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rather than a social and policy issue. Policymakers even rely on the cultural tradition of 
filial piety as policy measures to address issues of aged society (Shin and Shaw, 2003), as 
exemplified by the legislation of Promoting and Supporting Filial Piety Act (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 2007). While the tradition of respect and care for elderly parents 
may have been a great asset to complement the current and future formal long-term care 
system, promoting filial piety alone without careful examination to the benefits and costs 
of informal care might deter more effective policy formulation. 
Although informal care was also socially and politically invisible for a long time 
in the Western world (Arno et al., 1999), recent decades have seen critical progress in 
research efforts in the coordination of long-term care, such as the National Long-Term 
Care Demonstration conducted between 1981 and 1985 in the United States (US), also 
known as Channeling (Carcagno and Kemper, 1988). Such studies enabled examining a 
wide range of issues with informal caregiving in the community (Stephens and 
Christianson, 1986) and considering the role of public policy (Doty, 1986). More recent 
years have witnessed further development in quantifying the benefits and costs of 
informal care. For example, in the US and European context, informal care is found to 
substitute for formal long-term care, thereby providing benefits for public long-term care 
financing (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004, 2008; Bolin et al., 2007). Macro-level 
analysis of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
also finds that the availability of informal caregivers is negatively associated with the 
growth in long-term care expenditures (Yoo et al., 2004). On the other hand, costs of 
informal care have been studied as well, particularly with respect to labor market 
opportunity costs (Ettner, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003; Heitmueller and 
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Inglis, 2007; Bolin et al., 2008). A substantial body of literature has examined caregivers’ 
health (Schulz et al., 1995; Walker et al., 1995; Bookwala et al., 2000; Dilworth-
Anderson et al., 2002; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003; Vitaliano et al., 2003) and its 
economic consequences (Van Houtven et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2007). Given the high 
prevalence and enduring health effects of caregiving, caregiving is increasingly 
recognized as a public health issue (Talley and Crews, 2007). Studies on caregivers’ 
labor market outcomes and health have policy implications for helping design better 
benefits for informal caregivers, finding the optimal mix of formal and informal care, and 
even formulating labor market policies. In a recent publication, the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) clearly recognizes informal caregivers as an important issue of the health care 
workforce for the aging population in the US (IOM, 2008).  
With this background, this dissertation studies informal care in South Korea, 
using newly available, nationally representative data from the Korean Longitudinal Study 
of Aging (KLoSA). I examine two distinct but related outcomes of informal caregiving: 
caregivers’ labor market outcomes and health. These two broadly-defined outcomes 
reflect two of the most important consequences of informal caregiving that have been 
relatively well studied in other nations in the previous literature. Further justification for 
examining these two outcomes can be provided from some of the literature. In the 
taxonomy of the hidden costs of informal care, Fast et al. (1999) classify costs to 
informal caregivers into economic and non-economic costs. For economic costs, 
employment-related costs are considered in addition to out-of-pocket costs accompanying 
caregiving, such as incontinence supplies and mobility aids. Non-economic costs consist 
of emotional, physical, and social well-being, which can be encapsulated as health. 
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Moreover, White-Means (1997) examines long-term consequences of caregiving using 
two outcome measures, 1) depletion of financial resources due to accommodation in the 
labor market and 2) depletion of health because of caregiving, suggesting that labor 
market outcomes and health are two of the most important costs to informal caregivers. 
Interestingly, these two broad outcomes are not independent. Negative health effects of 
caregiving further compromise caregivers’ working lives (Burton et al., 2004; Wilson et 
al., 2007). Caregivers with greater concerns for the financial and health impacts of 
caregiving are at an increased risk for depression (Yoon, 2003).  
The results of this dissertation will have important policy implications for South 
Korea. Given that a shrinking working-age population is a major concern in South Korea, 
it is increasingly important that policies take into account the effects of informal care on 
labor market outcomes. Informal caregiving may also have negative health effects on 
caregivers, often referred to as the “hidden patients” (Schulz, 1990). Policies for informal 
caregivers may therefore need to consider more comprehensive support programs that 
take also into account their emotional and physical well-being, than only considering 
primarily economic consequences.  
These policy implications have greater relevance when externalities and equity 
considerations are incorporated. As evident from the dual burden placed on the working-
age population, individual caregivers’ foregone incomes also mean reduced income tax 
revenue, decreased contribution to pension funds, and increased societal expenditures to 
support caregivers out of the labor force (Ettner, 1995; Latif, 2006). Moreover, negative 
health consequences arising from informal caregiving would not only incur caregivers’ 
  8
out-of-pocket health spending but also increase expenditures from the National Health 
Insurance (NHI).  
Equity implications involve at least two dimensions: socioeconomic and gender. 
Given a certain price for formal care, substituting formal care is financially more difficult 
among poor families; thus, they have few choices other than providing informal care at 
the expense of their own employment or health. Thus, informal caregiving can exacerbate 
old-age poverty and income inequality (Harrington Meyer, 1996; Viitanen, 2005). 
Negative health consequences of informal caregiving can further aggravate 
socioeconomic inequalities in health and burden of out-of-pocket spending. Caregiving 
puts disproportionately more women at risk of giving up work for caregiving, settling for 
a less favored employment trajectory, and suffering negative health effects. These effects 
collectively may lead to an increased probability of older women’s living in poverty 
(Wakabayashi and Donato, 2005).  
In addition to such policy implications for South Korea, this dissertation 
contributes to the international literature using data from an Asian country. In a recent 
systematic review of the international literature on informal caregivers’ labor supply 
published in English between 1986 and 2006 (Lilly et al., 2007), thirty-five articles 
included for their final review are all from North America and Europe. The dearth of 
related research from other regions is even more contrasted with the increasingly 
heightened research interest in cultural and institutional differences between the northern 
and southern European countries with respect to family-ties and long-term care 
arrangements (Viitanen, 2005; Crespo, 2006; Bolin et al., 2007; Bolin et al., 2008). 
Crespo (2006) and Bolin et al. (2007, 2008) exploited recently released cross-national 
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data from Europe: the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
This dissertation uses data from the KLoSA, pre-designed to be comparable to the 
SHARE, to provide results from an Asian country, where different cultural norms affect 
individual and family decisions on living arrangements, informal caregiving, and labor 
supply. 
The study on caregiver health effects will also provide results from a less studied 
culture. Different cultures present informal caregivers with different normative and 
institutional contexts for caregiving. South Korea has strong cultural norms for elderly 
support, a large fraction of daughter-in-law caregivers, and minimally available formal 
long-term care. Moreover, symptoms of caregiver health effects could be expressed in 
different ways due to cultural differences in disease manifestations (Kleinman, 1980; 
Kleinman, 1982), such as a higher tendency to somatize emotional conflicts (Rhi, 1983; 
Kim, 1992; Yong & McCallion, 2003) and greater acceptance of medication use for 
health problems. The rich information on individuals’ health in the KLoSA allows for 
examining multiple health outcomes in a population-based survey. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I describe the cultural background on informal 
care in South Korea, review the existing literature separately for each study, and finally 
summarize the significance of this dissertation. 
 
Cultural Background on Informal Care in South Korea 
This section provides a sketch of the cultural background on informal care in 
South Korea, focusing on critical changes to the family. In an agrarian society, the 
Korean extended family served as a production unit as well as a communal living unit. 
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Traditional Korean extended families continued with the eldest son’s marriage and 
intergenerational co-residence with his parents. An eldest son inherited a larger share of 
bequests than his younger siblings, in the form of house, farming land and other real 
estate assets. The disproportionately larger bequest to the eldest son implied that the 
eldest son assumed the greatest role in familial responsibilities, which included co-
residing with, supporting, and caring for elderly parents. Even after the parents died, the 
eldest son’s responsibility persisted in such ways as performing regular memorial 
services for parents and other ancestors, and taking care of major family occasions. 
Daughters typically did not receive bequests from their own parents because they were 
viewed as “a person out of the original family once married” to others’ families. 
However, the daughter-in-law married to the eldest son in a new family played a central 
role in familial responsibilities, including caring for their ill and disabled parent. In a 
sense, the extended Korean family started with a designated future caregiver, daughter-
in-law, for aging parents. Even when the father-in-law was available for caring for his 
disabled wife, the caring responsibility was regarded as more of the responsibility of the 
daughter-in-law (eldest son’s wife), because of the generational and gendered role 
division (Choi, 1993). The material life of traditional Korean families was reinforced by 
filial piety as an essential element of Confucianism. Filial piety served as the major 
principle for the everyday lives of ordinary people, helping keep the family as well as the 
society in harmony (Chee, 2000). Informal caregiving for disabled parents was embedded 
as an inseparable component of old-age support in traditional Korean culture (Sung, 
1990) as in other East Asian cultures (Litwin, 1994; Yeh, 1995; Yamamoto and 
Wallhagen, 1997). 
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Rapid industrialization since the 1960s has dismantled the economic 
infrastructure for family-centered elderly care. Farming as a family business has lost its 
once-dominant role. As a result, family structure experienced substantial changes. 
Younger generations migrated from rural to urban areas for better education and job 
opportunities. Because of the increased migration, more and more eldest sons start their 
own families far away from their parents who remain in rural areas. Therefore, the 
traditional living arrangement of intergenerational co-residence has become a choice 
rather than a norm. In a ten-year period (1984-1994), the proportion of older adults living 
with their child decreased from 78 percent to 54 percent (Institute for Gender Research, 
2001). Daughters-in-law often no longer assume their traditional role of caring for their 
parents-in-law in the historically patrilineal society. Moreover, as South Korea has seen a 
marked improvement in female education levels, female labor force participation rates 
have gradually increased. Increasing divorce rates are also changing a family structure. 
While these socioeconomic changes weakened the link between downstream 
transfers of family wealth to the eldest son and his co-residence, attitudes and behaviors 
surrounding the traditional family have not changed completely. Rather, downstream 
transfers and family relations now take different forms. The most important is to invest in 
children’s human capital. Most parents are willing to pay for their children’s education to 
the highest level possible. For that purpose, parents in rural areas often sell out their 
farming land and livestock. Another common form of downstream transfers is for the 
parents to buy a house for their sons on their marriage. Such downstream transfers often 
leave so little wealth with many parents that they often would not be able to save money 
for their retirement plans. Such saving behavior is probably a legacy of traditional old-
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age support based on intergenerational co-residence. Moreover, the old-age pension 
system did not play a major role until very recently (Ko et al., 2007). Thus, elderly 
people in South Korea are generally poor, unless they co-reside with their children or 
receive substantial financial transfers. For older generations, old-age security was sought 
in their own children, neither in their own savings nor in the society, and older 
generations still have greater expectations about financial support and care from their 
children. While industrialization has changed the economic infrastructure for traditional 
old-age support, the current older generations are not yet ready to be fully independent of 
their children, both financially and physically (Chee, 2000). The two heterogeneous 
cultures collide with each other, creating conflicts between older and younger generations 
(Yoon et al., 2000). 
Although many adult children still co-reside with their elderly parents, older 
generations’ needs for and expectations about support from their children are increasingly 
in disharmony with adult children’s lives. In a family with a single, disabled parent, 
siblings increasingly face a difficult decision about who cares for their disabled parent. 
Still, eldest sons will generally assume the greatest responsibility for parental care. 
Typically, the eldest son had better conditions for parental care than any other sons in the 
past, in part because disproportionately more educational or other types of investments 
were made in the eldest son than in his siblings. Also, at a given point in time, the eldest 
son was likely to have accumulated greater wealth than their younger siblings. However, 
recent surveys from South Korea show changes in attitudes to parental support. There is a 
growing consensus that a “more able” child, not necessarily the eldest son, should take 
care of their parents. Children with higher incomes and spacious houses are increasingly 
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pressured to providing parental care. Furthermore, daughters increasingly play a greater 
role in the care of their own parents. Another emerging attitude is that adult children 
caring for their parents should receive more bequests than other siblings (JOINS, 2007). 
A caregiving sibling may also receive financial transfers from other siblings as a 
compensation for his or her parental caregiving. Such a decision-making process among 
siblings may often lead to a serious family conflict. The bargaining often fails, and the 
disabled parent may not receive any care from their children. Under the lack of culturally 
appropriate formal long-term care system, elderly people institutionalized at facilities 
often carry the stigma of abandonment by children. The attitudes to institutional care, 
however, appear to be changing. In a 2006 survey of the general public (MOHW, 2006), 
68.6 percent of the respondents reported that they would prefer institutional care, while 
31.4 percent preferred home health care. The preference for institutional care was 
stronger among residents of urban areas and high income groups. 
In summary, after industrialization changed the economic infrastructure and hence 
intergenerational co-residence for traditional family-centered elderly care, both older and 
younger generations increasingly face challenges with care for the elderly. 
 
Literature Review 
Effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market outcomes 
Informal caregivers’ labor market outcomes have been a continuing area of 
research in the Western world. In the US, although earlier studies can be traced back to 
the 1980s (Muurinen, 1986), the majority of studies have been published during the past 
twenty years (for a list of articles, see Lilly et al., 2007). The heightened research interest 
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in the US in 1990s reflects continued demographic changes and their implications for 
labor force. As Ettner (1995) points out, economics research had previously been more 
interested in child care and its effect on female labor supply than in elderly parent care, 
which played an increasingly important role with population aging. In more recent years, 
the literature on this issue proliferated from Europe (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; 
Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Heitmueller, 2006; Crespo, 2006; Heitmueller and Inglis, 
2007; Casado et al., 2007; Bolin et al., 2008).  
Two major limitations were identified in earlier empirical work linking caregiving 
and paid work (Ettner, 1995; Stern, 1995; Norton, 2000). First, the issue of the 
endogeneity between caregiving and labor force participation was not addressed 
explicitly; therefore, it was hard to establish the causal effect of caregiving on labor force 
participation. The second major limitation with earlier studies was that they used only 
actual caregiver samples (Stone and Short, 1990; Boaz and Muller, 1992), thus limiting 
the generalizability of study results because of the selection bias (Ettner, 1995; Norton, 
2000). Both limitations are related to the availability of a large sample of potential 
caregivers. Many recent studies from North America and Europe exploit data from large, 
population-based studies and also account for endogeneity (Wolf and Soldo, 1994; Stern, 
1995; Ettner, 1995, 1996; Heitmueller, 2006; Latif, 2006; Crespo, 2006; Bolin et al., 
2008). In the following review, I focus on key findings and major methodological issues 
in these more recent papers. 
Wolf and Soldo (1994) use data from the National Survey of Families and 
Households and find no effect of informal caregiving on the probability of being 
employed or on conditional hours of work among married women in the US, although the 
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authors acknowledge that the binary measure of caregiving may not reflect the wide 
variability of time commitments to care. Ettner (1995) uses data from the 1986-1988 
Survey of Income and Program Participation and employs a three-dummy specification 
of informal caregiving: co-residing with a disabled parent; extra-residential care hours 10 
per week or more; and extra-residential care hours less than 10 hours per week. Co-
residing with a disabled parent is assumed to be the most intensive form of caregiving 
and thus treated as endogenous in addition to the other two dummy variables for extra-
residential care. Using the number of siblings and parental education as instrumental 
variables (IVs), she finds that co-residing with a disabled parent has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of women’s participating in the labor 
force and on work hours. Due to data limitations, parental education, predicting parental 
care needs only indirectly, was used as the instrumental variable. Exploiting better 
measures of parental health status in the 1987 NSHF, Ettner (1996) employs a similar IV 
approach and corroborates her previous results that co-residence with a disabled parent 
and extra-residential caregiving have negative effects on the labor supply, although their 
statistical significance varies. Both studies assume that an adult child co-residing with a 
disabled parent actually provides informal care in the home. 
More recent studies from non-US settings largely attest to the negative effects of 
caregiving on labor supply, although sub-group differences were noted. Viitanen (2005) 
uses panel data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to examine the 
relationship between informal care for the elderly and labor force participation among 
female adults across Europe. Exploiting the panel data, Viitanen (2005) finds substantial 
state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the dynamics of female 
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labor force participation. Sub-group analysis revealed the greatest negative effects on 
middle-aged women and single women. Combining the methodological finding on state 
dependence on labor force participation, the policy implication is that informal caregiving 
could contribute ultimately to old-age poverty among females assuming caregiving 
responsibilities in their midlife. Casado et al. (undated) also use the Spanish subsample of 
the ECHP to examine the effects of informal care on female labor force participation. 
Their study results suggest that labor opportunity costs exist for co-residing caregivers 
but not for extra-residential caregivers. Using the longitudinal nature of the data, they 
also find that only caregiving lasting for more than a year has negative effects on labor 
force participation. 
Several recent studies were conducted in the British context. Heitmueller (2007) 
uses data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and estimates the effects of 
caregiving on labor force participation using both IV and panel data estimation. Results 
from both estimation methods show that the negative effects of caregiving exist only for 
co-residential carers and for caregivers providing more than 20 hours of care per week. In 
a different study using the BHPS, Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) also show that informal 
caregivers face wage penalties even when participating in the labor force, supporting 
previous findings from another UK study (Carmichael and Charles, 2003). 
Release of the SHARE data provided the opportunity to examine the issue of the 
conflicts between caregiving and employment in a multi-national European context. 
Crespo (2006) derives two different but largely comparable samples from the SHARE 
and employs a bivariate probit model to account for the joint decision between care and 
paid work. She focuses on the effect of intensive caregiving on labor force participation 
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of midlife women, and finds substantial negative effects, ranging from approximately 30 
to 50 percentage points, for both the northern and southern European countries. 
Interestingly, accounting for the endogeneity of intensive caregiving produced more 
statistically significant and much stronger negative estimates. If taking on a caregiving 
role reflects the person’s unemployability, correcting for the endogeneity may show less 
significant and smaller effect magnitudes, as postulated in Heitmueller (2007). Bolin et al. 
(2008) also uses data from the SHARE and employs an IV estimation strategy. In their 
model specification, the hypothesis of exogeneity of hours of informal care was not 
rejected in models of employment, conditional hours worked, and conditional hourly 
wage rate. Latif (2006) uses Canadian data from the General Social Survey and also 
employs a similar IV approach. Test results indicated that caregiving was not endogenous 
in the probit model of employment and conditional ordinary least squares (OLS) models 
of the number of work hours. Caregiving, defined as a binary variable, was found to 
decrease work hours statistically significantly for employed women, but not for men. 
Probit estimates of the effect of caregiving were not statistically significant. 
Co-residence deserves some additional consideration for empirical work (Lilly et 
al., 2007) particularly for studies in South Korea and many other Asian countries. 
Intergenerational household formation that well precedes caregiving may involve 
different implications from co-residence triggered by caregiving. Previous studies have 
suggested that co-residential caregivers are more likely to be out of the labor force than 
extra-residential caregivers (Ettner, 1995, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 2003), while 
the opposite was also found (White-Means, 1997). It is not very clear, however, what co-
residence captures in the empirical work in the literature.  
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Co-residential care is often used as a proxy for more intensive care than extra-
residential care (Ettner, 1995, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 2003), because co-
residence may reflect care recipient’s higher care needs and caregiver’s higher time 
commitment to informal care. In White-Means (1997), co-residence concerns the 
structure of informal care and is included as a control variable in the regression models. 
However, co-residence itself is potentially endogenous to labor force participation. 
Several papers examined the issue of endogeneity of co-residence in the context of 
elderly care. Pezzin et al. (1996) recognize that the choice of a certain type of living 
arrangement may be determined by the mix of formal and informal care, which in turn 
can be affected by publicly provided formal care. In a later work, Pezzin and Schone 
(1999) find that both co-residence and informal caregiving are less likely to occur among 
adult daughters with higher time demands for other activities, such as number of children. 
Their findings suggest that informal caregiving and intergenerational co-residence are 
different modes of assistance to elderly parents, and that publicly provided formal care 
could affect both co-residence and caregiving decisions. Pezzin et al. (1996) propose that 
the total effect of publicly provided formal care on informal care can be decomposed into 
two components: the direct effect (change in care hours) and the indirect effect (change in 
the probability of choosing a particular living arrangement). Stern (1995) also 
acknowledges the potential endogeneity between adult children’s informal caregiving and 
their distance characteristics and labor force participation. 
Taken together, this literature suggests that, when estimating the effect of 
informal caregiving on caregivers’ labor force participation, not only adult children’s 
informal caregiving but also co-residence is potentially endogenous to their labor force 
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participation. Nevertheless, the endogeneity of co-residence preceding parent care has not 
been carefully examined in the existing empirical work on caregiver’s labor force 
participation. 
 
Effects of informal care on caregivers’ health 
A large body of multidisciplinary literature has studied the effects of informal 
caregiving on caregivers’ health (for reviews or meta-analysis with different focuses, 
Schulz et al., 1990; Schulz et al., 1995; Walker et al., 1995; Bookwala et al., 2000; Yee 
and Schulz, 2000; Dilworth-Anderson et al., 2002; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003; 
Vitaliano et al., 2003; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2006; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2007). The 
literature examined psychological and physical health outcomes. Psychological outcomes 
include caregiver burden, psychological distress, strain, stress, general subjective well-
being, quality of life, and depressive symptoms (Bookwala et al., 2000; Pinquart and 
Sörensen, 2003; Schulz et al., 1995). Physical health outcomes include self-rated health, 
symptom checklists, and chronic conditions as well as health care utilization (Schulz et 
al., 1995; Bookwala et al., 2000; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003). Studies also examined 
physiological and clinical outcomes, such as immune functioning, cardiovascular 
functioning, and blood pressure (Schulz et al., 1995; Vitaliano et al., 2003). As a natural 
extension, mortality was also studied (Schulz and Beach, 1999). 
Although considerable heterogeneity exists in the literature, meta-analyses and 
well-designed reviews provide several generalizable and robust findings. First, caregivers 
experience poorer psychological health such as depressive symptoms than non-caregivers 
do (Schulz et al., 1995; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003). Second, for physical outcomes, the 
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risk of caregiving is slightly greater (Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003; Vitaliano et al., 2003) 
or much less conclusive (Schulz et al., 1995). Third, studies have noted many important 
sub-group differences by caregiver’s gender and age, particularly by whether the 
caregiver has dementia-related stressors of the care recipient (Schulz et al., 1995; 
Pinquart and Sörensen, 2007). 
Given the aims of the current study, the remaining literature review focuses on 
three issues: (1) external validity of studies on caregiving health effects and; (2) selection 
into caregiving; and (3) culture and caregiving health effects. 
Lack of external validity has been mentioned as a major limitation of the 
caregiving literature (Schulz, 1990). Many studies use non-representative samples in 
specific caregiving settings (Barer and Johnson, 1990; Schulz, 1990; Walker et al., 1995; 
Dilworth-Anderson et al., 2002; Pinquart and Sörensen, 2003). Moreover, studies often 
lack comparison groups (Vitaliano et al., 2003). These issues are often aggravated by 
inconsistent measurement of health outcomes. Taken together, these problems led to the 
difficulty in drawing generalizable policy conclusions on caregiving health effects. One 
alternative is to use data from large, population-based surveys, although this approach 
raises different issues such as lack of important variables and less detailed information on 
caregiving contexts (Schulz, 1990). Therefore, it is important to balance and compromise 
between internal and external validity (Schulz, 1990). 
Selection into caregiving is another methodological problem concerning internal 
validity, compared with external validity. In their critical review of the caregiving 
literature, Barer and Johnson (1990) point out that self-selected samples are 
overrepresented in the literature. Schulz (1990) also suggests that health status may 
  21
determine who will provide informal care in the family. The selection hypothesis 
explains why observed health effects of caregiving might be small (Schulz, 1990). While 
well acknowledged, this methodological challenge has been rarely addressed in the 
literature. In a recent study on dementia caregivers’ drug use, Van Houtven et al. (2005) 
test for the potential endogeneity of care intensity using an instrumental variable method 
and find no evidence of endogeneity between care intensity and number of drug use 
among dementia caregivers. 
Culture plays an important role in explaining caregiving health effects (Dilworth-
Anderson and Gibson, 2002; Dilworth-Anderson et al, 2004). Cultural beliefs exert their 
influence in at least three ways (Dilworth-Anderson et al, 1999). First, cultural beliefs 
“set the stage for caregiving” (Dilworth-Anderson et al, 1999). Through collective 
responses at the family and societal levels, cultural beliefs affect attitudinal and 
behavioral patterns affecting care. In South Korea, cultural beliefs have influenced 
intergenerational co-residence, the gendered pattern of care, the stigma associated with 
institutional care, and even the underdevelopment of a formal long-term care system. 
Second, cultural beliefs are also internalized at the individual level. A caregiver’s view 
on filial piety and familial obligations is not only an individual characteristic but also a 
reflection of dominant cultural beliefs. Different views on caregiving responsibilities may 
lessen or worsen negative health effects of caregiving (Youn et al., 1999; Knight et al., 
2002). In this respect, daughter-in-laws are of special interest in South Korea and other 
Asian countries (Harris and Long, 1993; Kim and Lee 2003; Kim, 2001; Zhan and 
Montgomery, 2003; Lee et al., 2007), because their view on caregiving to their in-laws 
can influence caregiver health effects. Third, cultural beliefs may also affect responses to 
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feelings about caring, such as intrusion and burden (Dilworth-Anderson et al., 1999). 
More generally, culture may modify symptom expression and clinical manifestations of 
psychiatric and mood disorders (Kirmayer, 1989), as has been elucidated by Kleinman’s 
works on somatization of depression in Chinese culture (Kleinman, 1977; Kleinman, 
1982; Kleinman, 2004). Studies also found that Koreans are less likely to report 
depressive symptoms as "depressed mood" and "thoughts of death," but instead more 
likely to complain about "low energy" and "concentration difficulty" (Chang et al., 2008), 
and that they are more likely to somatize emotional distress (Pang, 2000). Hwabyung, a 
Korean culture-bound syndrome (Pang, 1990; Simons and Hughes, 1993), is in fact the 
most common form of somatization among Koreans (Yong and McCallion, 2003). Due to 
the elusive nature and diverse symptom expressions of somatization, patients with 
hwabyung often seek medical care for their physical symptoms, such as epigastric pain 
and palpitation, rather than for emotional problems. Yong and McCallion (2003) examine 
hwabyung in the context of caregiver stress.  
This review of the literature indicates that balancing external validity and internal 
validity, accounting for the possibility of selection into caregiving, and exploring cultural 
dimension in caregiver health effects may yield fruitful research contributions. 
 
Significance 
Although dramatic demographic transitions in Asian countries have been well 
documented, less is known about the working and caring lives of informal caregivers in 
the region. Some exceptions come with Japan’s introduction of long-term care insurance, 
including Oural et al. (2007), Shimizutani et al. (2008), and Hanaoka and Norton (2008). 
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Using newly available, rich microdata from South Korea, this dissertation fills the gap in 
the literature. By studying the effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market 
outcomes and health, this dissertation makes several research contributions. 
 
Study on the effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market outcomes  
1. Using data from the KLoSA, this study provides results from a less-studied Asian 
country, thereby adding to the growing body of international literature. 
2. By deriving additional subsamples of adult children from the KLoSA, this study 
examines gender and age group differences in the effects of informal caregiving on 
caregivers’ labor market outcomes. 
3. Accounting for cultural background on intergenerational co-residence and informal 
caregiving, this study treats both co-residence and informal caregiving as potentially 
endogenous to labor supply. I test for the endogeneity using bivariate probit models 
and instrumental variables models. A strong filial bond and lack of substitutable 
formal long-term care in South Korea allow for using parent’s functional limitations 
as excellent IVs for adult children’s informal care. 
4. In examining labor supply both at the extensive and intensive margin, this study 
considers various functional forms of informal care hours, thus allowing for checking 
for robustness and threshold effects. 
 
Study on the effects of informal care on caregivers’ health 
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1. This study provides results with good external validity on caregiver health effects 
from an Asian country, by using a nationally-representative sample, exploring 
multiple health outcomes, and examining various functional forms of informal care. 
2. This study tests for the possibility of selection into caregiving using IV methods. 
Parents-in-law’s functional limitations provide conceptually plausible IVs. 
3. This study examines a spectrum of psychological and physical health outcomes, 
including outpatient care use and prescription drug use. This allows for checking for 
robustness and exploring different patterns by study outcome. 
 
In addition to these research contributions, this dissertation aims to inform current 
policies on long-term care in South Korea. Although public long-term care insurance was 
introduced in South Korea in July 2008, surprisingly little research has paid attention to 
the majority of long-term care workforce. With the implementation of the public long-
term insurance program and ongoing data collection through the KLoSA, this dissertation 
will also serve as a baseline study that will facilitate examining policy effects of the 
public long-term care insurance in the near future. 
 
   
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
 
Informal Care and Caregivers’ Labor Market Outcomes 
Economic models of supply of informal care can be modified to explain informal 
caregivers’ decision regarding labor force participation (Norton, 2000). The hallmark of 
such economic models is that the provision of informal care requires a trade-off with 
work and leisure. Thus, one important area for empirical work is to examine the effect of 
informal caregiving on labor force participation, which has been done in the US (for a 
summary, see Norton, 2000). Recent papers on the empirical question provide a 
summarized list of the effects of informal caregiving on labor force participation 
(Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007). 
The full effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes consist of two 
main effects: substitution effect and income effect (Carmichael and Charles, 2003; 
Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007). Through the substitution effect, caregivers are less likely 
to be in the labor force, because the reservation wage increases for the remaining hours 
after informal care is given. Through the income effect, caregivers are more likely to 
remain in the labor force, because fewer working hours and greater expenditures due to 
caregiving will reduce their disposable incomes and induce them to maintain their income 
source in the labor market (Figure 2.1). Caregivers will choose not to work only when the 
substitution effect exceeds the income effect. Thus, caregiving may not necessarily deter 
labor force participation and may even increase the likelihood of being in the labor force, 
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providing an interesting empirical question. It seems plausible that the relative 
magnitudes of the substitution and income effects vary depending on the intensity of 
informal care. More intensive caregivers, for example, who provide 40 hours of care per 
week, would find it hard to maintain their paid work even with decreased work hours 
because the substitution effect will dominate the income effect. On the other hand, less 
intensive caregivers still might be able to combine work and care (Ettner, 1995; 
Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Less intensive caregivers may have even higher labor 
market attachment than otherwise similar non-caregivers. Therefore, there may be some 
threshold for care intensity below which no significant negative effect exists and above 
which the substitution effect dominates the income effect (Carmichael and Charles, 1998).  
Figure 2.2 presents hypothesized relation between care intensity and labor market 
attachment, which is determined mainly by the combination of the income effect and 
substitution effect at a given level of care intensity. Labor market attachment is likely to 
differ by gender. In many societies, including South Korea, the income effect of informal 
caregiving is likely to be higher among men than among women. Furthermore, compared 
with women, men may also be affected to the lesser extent by the substitution effect of 
caregiving. As a result, women are likely to have lower labor market attachment at a 
given level of caregiving and also a lower threshold level of informal care, above which 
labor market attachment is low enough for the caregiver to choose to leave the labor force.  
While this hypothesized gender difference may be true of independent men and 
women at a societal level, the division of labor between married men and women serves 
as an institutional setting that further polarizes the direction of the countervailing effects 
of informal caregiving on labor market attachment. Once the caring responsibility falls on 
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a married adult child, specialization may take place within the nuclear family. The 
woman of the nuclear family, whose time costs are typically lower than her husband’s, 
may then decide to leave the labor force for care of her parent-in-law or parent. For the 
man, the caring responsibilities may require even higher earnings than before because his 
wife does not bring income any longer. Therefore, in a household providing parental care, 
the man may be more likely to stay in the labor force because of the income effect, 
whereas negative effects of caregiving on labor market attachment will concentrate on the 
woman. Even though the man shares the responsibility of caring for his mother with his 
wife, the presence of his wife as the primary caregiver or at least an additional caregiver 
will considerably lessen the substitution effect of his caregiving.  
The burdensome nature of caregiving and its workplace consequences suggest 
some additional effects. A respite effect exists when caregivers use work to take a break 
from caregiving (Stone and Short, 1990; Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003; 
Heitmueller, 2006). Furthermore, informal caregivers may experience discrimination in 
wage or promotion because they may require higher flexibility and show less reliability 
than other employees (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2006; 
Heitmueller, 2006). Even without obvious and perceived discrimination effects, 
caregivers themselves might prefer job opportunities with less demanding responsibilities 
and more flexible work arrangements so that they may continue to combine work and 
caring (Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Moreover, caregivers may be less likely to invest 
in career development necessary for better job placements in their future career. Even 
previous caregiving history may negatively affect labor market opportunities for persons 
who want to return to the labor force. Labor market decisions are made throughout the 
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life-course (Henz, 2004). Given such multiple and long-term effects of caregiving, Lilly 
et al. (2007) propose that future research needs to look at labor market adjustments 
within the caregiving trajectory. One research question is whether caregivers may earn 
less than their otherwise similar counterparts even when participating in the labor force 
and working for the same hours. 
In addition, caregiving may have negative effects on other critical human capital 
for the labor market, mainly health. That is, caregiving may also have indirect effects on 
labor market outcomes through its detrimental health effects such as depression among 
dementia caregivers (Wilson et al., 2007). In this scenario, health status is a mediating 
variable for the effect of caregiving on labor market outcomes. Therefore, estimates on 
non-health (direct) effects of caregiving will depend on the extent to which a statistical 
model accounts for caregiver’s health status. 
The effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes will be estimated as 
the sum of the counteracting effects. However, estimating the effects in empirical work is 
not simple. The existing literature provides several reasons why caregiving might be 
endogenous to labor market outcomes in standard statistical models.  
Caring responsibilities may occur disproportionately more in disadvantaged 
families (Heitmueller, 2006). This argument is closely related to the phenomenon of 
familial aggregation in disease and disability from the literature on socioeconomic 
inequalities in health. That is, families with a disabled person are more likely to have 
individuals with already fewer employment opportunities. In this argument, 
socioeconomic status is an omitted factor that affects both caregiving and labor market 
outcomes. If the empirical model does not control adequately for family-level 
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socioeconomic status, the estimate on the effect of caregiving will overstate the true 
effect on labor market outcomes. However, even if family-level socioeconomic status is 
controlled for, one should consider three typical types of potential endogeneity issues for 
linking caregiving and labor market outcomes. 
First, caregiving may be correlated with unobserved ‘unemployability’ 
(Heitmueller, 2006), causing the typical source of endogeneity bias due to omitted 
variables. That is, self-selection into caregiving may be more likely among individuals 
with poorer prospects for employment. A similar yet not identical argument can also be 
made. Individuals with high opportunity cost of time are less likely to quit working to 
provide informal care, because they would prefer to substitute formal care for informal 
care (Heitmueller, 2006). Hence, caring responsibilities may fall on individuals with 
lower opportunity costs of time, or lower ‘ability’ (Heitmueller, 2006). 
Second, current employment can be “a sign of revealed preference for market 
rather than home production” (Ettner, 1995). Family members who are not currently 
working are more likely to take on the caring role. In a typical cross-sectional study, this 
issue of reverse causality or simultaneity is hard to address. Reverse causality may also 
arise because labor market situation can affect caregiving decisions (Heitmueller, 2006). 
The discrimination effect can also lead to this endogeneity bias. Rather than continue 
combining work and caring responsibilities, the caregiver experiencing wage penalties 
may stop working altogether. Such individuals will then show longer caring hours and 
higher rates of unemployment in the data. Consequently, the negative effect of caregiving 
will be overstated. 
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Third, measurement error for the amount of caregiving may also introduce 
endogeneity bias. Measurement of informal care hours in general presents a great 
challenge (Van den Berg and Spauwen, 2006), and the metric of hours of informal care 
does not adequately capture the intensity or quality of informal care (Van Houtven and 
Norton, 2008). Given that, a caregiver or a care recipient may self-adjust the quality of 
care and then report informal care hours differently depending on the care quality and 
possibly on the caregiver’s revealed commitment to caregiving. If a caregiver’s being in 
the labor force is perceived as lower commitments to caregiving by the care recipient, 
then the care recipient may under-report hours of informal care actually received. On the 
other hand, co-residing caregivers out of the labor force may over-report their actual care 
hours, not only because it is hard to tease out informal care hours from their living with 
the disabled care recipient but also because their higher commitments to caregiving may 
make them believe they are providing more hours of care than they actually provide. This 
second possibility, non-random measurement error, causes another source of endogeneity 
bias. If over-reporting of care hours occurs among caregivers out of the labor force, this 
endogeneity bias from measurement error will overstate the effect of caregiving on labor 
market outcomes. Despite their different pathway, these reasons all lead to the argument 
that not controlling for the endogeneity may overestimate the potential negative effect of 
informal caregiving on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. 
In addition to this basic framework, some further considerations are relevant to 
the cultural and institutional setting in South Korea. First, the endogeneity of informal 
caregiving may be weakened. As described in cultural background, traditional cultural 
norms dictate who provides parental care in the family based on birth order and gender 
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— the eldest son and his wife in the co-residential household. Moreover, the lack of 
culturally acceptable and substitutable formal care does not allow for many strategic 
decisions regarding informal care between parents and adult children. Together, informal 
caregiving may be determined largely exogenously at the population level in South Korea. 
With changing social norms, this exogeneity may not be the case any longer, particularly 
for younger generations as opposed to older generations. 
Second, informal caregiving may be correlated with higher unobserved ability and 
employability. The previous literature implicitly assumed that adult children maximize 
one utility function for the extended family. In such a unitary household model, 
specialization occurs between siblings so that a sibling with lower ability is more likely to 
assume the caring role to their disabled parent. Such a unitary household model ignores 
that married adult children also consider the utility of their own nuclear families. 
Furthermore, family pressure for parent care is on the shoulder of better-off and more 
able children, who have a spacious house with extra room for the disabled parent. It 
follows that caregiving may not necessarily be correlated with unemployability, lower 
ability, or lower opportunity cost of time. In other words, the “marginal caregiver,” who 
is most likely to vary in their decisions on informal care with potential caregiving 
responsibilities, may be different from what has been typically postulated in the previous 
literature. 
Finally, co-residence needs special consideration. In traditional Korean extended 
families, decisions on intergenerational co-residence typically precede decisions on 
parental care. Then, one natural question is whether co-residence to begin with, rather 
than informal caregiving, is endogenous to labor force participation, particularly for the 
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daughter-in-law in multi-generation household. An adult child’s decisions on 
intergenerational living arrangements and on his or her labor market outcomes may not 
be independent (Figure 2.1). Adult children who are less willing to work outside the 
home or less able to find a market job may decide to co-reside with their parents or 
parents-in-law. Although co-residence may generally require higher commitments to 
parents and home, co-residence will not necessarily affect negatively adult children’s 
labor market outcomes. Elderly parents are increasingly an important source of child care 
in South Korea, supporting their daughter’s or daughter-in-law’s employment. Women 
with higher attachments to the labor force may prefer to co-reside because their elderly 
parents can help her with child care and other household work. This phenomenon is also 
observed in Japan (Sasaki, 2002). Therefore, co-residence is potentially endogenous to 
labor market outcomes, particularly for younger generations. If an adult child’s co-
residence follows her decision on informal caregiving, either by moving in or having her 
parents move in, co-residence may reflect a structure for caregiving or care intensity, as 
implicitly postulated in much of the previous literature. In that case, controlling for the 
endogeneity of informal care would be sufficient. On the other hand, informal caregiving 
superimposed on intergenerational co-residence raises a methodological challenge that 
both variables are potentially endogenous. 
This conceptual framework provides several testable hypotheses. First, through 
decreasing labor market attachment, increasing care intensity decreases caregivers’ 
probability of labor force participation as well as participants’ labor market outcomes, 
including hours worked, income, and wage rate  Second, the negative effects of informal 
caregiving have a threshold of care intensity, below which no worse labor market 
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outcomes are observed. Third, gender differences exist for the negative effects. The 
conceptual framework also guides the empirical work. The endogeneity between informal 
caregiving and labor market outcomes must be accounted for. However, the pattern of 
potential endogeneity bias may be different in South Korea from what has been typically 
postulated in the literature. Third, co-residence is another potential endogenous variable 
in empirical studies linking informal care and labor market outcomes. 
 
Informal Care and Caregivers’ Health 
The conceptual framework of this study builds on several theoretical components 
in the caregiving literature (Figure 2.3). Schulz et al. (1995) suggest that three factors of 
caregiving may cause negative health effects, which I define broadly as poorer health and 
increased health care use. First, performing caregiving tasks can exert negative effects on 
health through increased emotional stress and physical strain. Second, caregiving 
inevitably involves observing a loved one’s decline and anticipatory bereavement, which 
itself may affect the caregiver’s psychological health. Third, the caregiver’s 
psychological well-being can be influenced by the care recipient’s affect (the 
phenomenon of contagion), particularly because functionally disabled care recipients are 
often depressed (Schulz et al., 1995). Caregivers’ increased use of health care services 
such as drugs may reflect poor psychological and physical health effects of caregiving. 
Caregiving may, however, have positive health effects (Walker et al., 1995; 
Beach et al., 2000; Tarlow et al., 2004). Caregiving may also reduce access to health care 
(Kim et al., 2004; Chaix et al., 2006), thus showing lower health care use than otherwise 
would be expected at least in the short run. Although positive aspects of caregiving 
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should be acknowledged, intensive caregiving undertaken over a long period of time 
most likely have greater negative effects rather than positive effects.  Compared with 
more intensive caregiving, less intensive caregiving is less likely to have negative health 
effects. Therefore, observed health effects of caregiving will be the net effects taking into 
account these effects with opposing directions. 
Caregiver health effects are a complex phenomenon (Beach et al., 2000) and may 
involve a variety of factors, including caregiver, care recipient, relational, and contextual 
factors. Besides care intensity, the observed health effects of caregiving may vary along 
several dimensions. In this study, I focus on three dimensions. First, caregiver health 
effects may vary depending on the nature of an outcome measure under study. Given the 
phenomenon of contagion or the psychological effect regarding expected bereavement of 
care recipient, caregivers’ psychological health outcomes can be negatively affected by a 
low level of care intensity (Figure 2.4). By contrast, physical health outcomes, including 
health care use, are likely to take more care intensity to present their manifestations. 
Consequently, psychological health effects of caregiving are less likely to have a 
threshold, compared with psychological health effects. 
Second, I hypothesize that the caregiver-recipient relationship may moderate 
positive and negative health effects. For example, because daughter-in-laws do not have 
blood-ties to the frail elderly in their married families, daughter-in-law caregivers may 
experience contagion of affect less than otherwise similar daughter caregivers. Likewise, 
beneficial effects of caregiving may also be smaller among daughter-in-law caregivers.  
Depending on the caregiver-recipient relationship, the effects of caregiving on health 
outcomes may be heterogeneous. 
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Third, as discussed in the literature review, culture plays an important role in 
caregiver health effects by affecting institutional settings, by shaping beliefs and attitudes 
to caregiving, and even by influencing symptom manifestations. Although this study does 
not aim to be cross-cultural, acknowledging the far-reaching effects of culture on 
caregiver health effects could provide useful guidance to the empirical research and 
interpretations of the results. 
Figure 2.3 also suggests that informal caregiving and negative health outcomes 
could be correlated with increased vulnerability, limited resources, and baseline health 
status. In linking caregiving and negative health outcomes, such potential confounders 
should be considered as demographic characteristics, education, and assets. One 
particularly important factor to be controlled for is health status. Health status may affect 
one’s probability of assuming caregiving responsibilities (selection into caregiving) and 
how much care is provided. However, health status is not easily observed in typical 
population-based survey data. 
Based on this conceptual framework, I test for the main hypothesis that informal 
caregiving has negative effects on caregivers’ health in South Korea. I examine potential 
differences in caregiver health effects by outcome, care intensity, and caregiver-recipient 
relationship. In the empirical work, I carefully account for the potential endogeneity 
between caregiving and negative health outcomes.  
 
Summary of Testable Hypotheses 
H1: Informal caregiving has negative effects on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. 
  36
H1a: Informal caregiving decreases the probability of caregivers’ participating in the 
labor force, with a greater magnitude among women than among men. 
H1b: For labor force participants, informal caregiving reduces worked hours, paid 
income, and wage rate, with a greater magnitude among women than among men. 
H1c: Compared with otherwise similar non-caregivers, less intensive caregivers 
experience no worse labor market outcomes (threshold effect).  
 
H2: Informal caregiving has negative effects on caregivers’ health. 
H2a: Informal caregiving has negative effects on caregivers’ psychological and physical 
health. 
H2b: Informal caregiving increases caregivers’ outpatient care use and prescription drug 
use. 
H2c: Compared with otherwise similar non-caregivers, less intensive caregivers 
experience no worse outcomes (threshold effect). 
H2d: The effects of informal caregiving on caregivers’ health differ among spousal care, 
own parental care, and parent-in-law care. 
 
Although I test for these hypotheses in the two separate studies, the conceptual 
frameworks share several key features, including possible threshold effect of care 
intensity and the issue of endogeneity. This focus is important because the empirical 
work primarily aims to provide policy-relevant results by estimating the causal effects of 
informal care by different levels of care intensity. 
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual framework for the effects of informal care on labor market outcomes 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Hypothesized relation between labor market attachment and care intensity by gender 
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Figure 2.3. Conceptual framework for caregiver health effects 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Hypothesized relation between caregiver health and care intensity by outcome type 
 
   
CHAPTER 3: DATA
 
Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA) 
The KLoSA is a nationally representative study of non-institutionalized South 
Korean adults aged 45 or older in fifteen large administrative areas (Seoul Metropolitan 
City, six other Metropolitan Cities, and eight Provinces, excluding Jeju Province for the 
sake of survey convenience). This original study population is followed up every two 
years, with an Off-Year Survey planned in intervening years. In its first wave survey 
conducted between July and December 2006, 10,254 individuals in 6,171 households (1.7 
per household) were interviewed face-to-face using the Computer-Assisted Personal 
Interviewing (CAPI) method. 
In designing the KLoSA, great efforts were made to exploit the previous 
experience of existing aging panel studies in other countries. In fact, the KLoSA was pre-
designed to improve international comparability with other panel studies on aging, 
especially with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the US and the SHARE (Smith, 
2006; Boo & Chang, 2006). Overall survey themes of the KLoSA are consistent with 
those of the HRS and SHARE, including questionnaires on demographics, family and 
family transfers, health, employment, income, assets and debts, expectation and life 
satisfaction. One major difference between the KLoSA and other comparable studies is 
that the age criterion for target population of the KLoSA is 45, not 50. This lower age 
criterion was adopted for the purpose of better capturing increasingly unstable 
  40
employment status among Korean adults of mid-40s and its effects on their retirement 
decisions. 
One of the great strengths of the KLoSA for the current study is its detailed 
information on the survey respondents as well as their children, siblings, and parents. 
This detailed information allows for a close look at the provision and receipt of informal 
care within a family. Furthermore, one could easily generate important family-level 
variables based on the current information, and also construct another study sample, for 
example, a sample of KLoSA respondents’ adult children. 
The major limitation of the data is that, despite its name, the KLoSA is not a 
longitudinal study as of 2008. This limitation precludes opportunities to raise more 
interesting questions and to better address some of the key methodological issues.  
 
Sample Selection 
I exploit the original KLoSA dataset in two ways. First, I view KLoSA 
respondents as potential care recipients. KLoSA respondents were asked to give 
information on all their living children, including informal care provided. I use KLoSA 
respondents’ responses to construct the sample of adult children, which I will call the 
Adult Child sample throughout this paper. Second, I view KLoSA respondents as 
potential caregivers for their family members. I will call this sample of original KLoSA 
respondents as the Respondent sample. The study on caregivers’ labor market outcomes 
uses both samples, while the study on caregiver health effects uses only the Respondent 
sample. Table 3.1 presents an overview of sample selection, and Table 3.2 provides key 
variables to be used for each study and sample. 
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Constructing the Adult Child sample serves several purposes for the study on 
caregivers’ labor market outcomes. First, the Adult Child sample and the Respondent 
sample have different relative advantages, which arise from two different ways of 
exploiting rich information on KLoSA respondents. When using the Adult Child sample, 
I can take advantage of rich information on their parents (KLoSA respondents), such as 
number of functional imitations. There are some disadvantages with using the Adult 
Child sample. All information is collected indirectly, through responses from their 
parents. Therefore, only informal care provided to KLoSA respondents can be known, 
and care provided to other elders is not known. Moreover, variables are composed of 
easily observable information, such as education level and whether or not the adult child 
is currently working. On the other hand, the Respondent sample has rich information on 
potential caregivers themselves but less detailed information on family members. For 
example, the Respondent sample allows for using variables such as hours of work and 
paid income, while providing an indicator variable of whether or not each family member 
has any Activity of Daily Living (ADL) limitation but not number of ADL or 
Instrumental Activity of Daily Living (IADL) limitations. Therefore, the Adult Child 
sample and the Respondent sample are complementary. Crespo (2006) takes a similar 
approach to construct two complementary samples using the SHARE. 
Second, the Adult Child sample also allows for examining relatively younger 
potential caregivers who are not covered in the Respondent sample. This advantage 
provides an opportunity to examine potential age group differences. Third, because part 
of the Adult Child sample also covers the same age group (45-64) as the Respondent 
sample, it allows me to check for robustness of study results. 
  42
I apply different exclusion criteria for each study. For the study on caregivers’ 
labor market outcomes, I exclude individuals aged 65 or older (both the Adult Child 
sample and the Respondent sample) to focus on typical working-age populations in South 
Korea. In addition, I exclude persons aged less than 25 in the Adult Child sample because 
many individuals under 25 may be still in college or mandatory military service. I divide 
the Adult Child sample into two subsamples: Younger Adult Child subsample and 
Midlife Adult Child subsample. I use forty-five as the cutoff age to create these two 
subsamples so that both the Midlife Adult Child sample and the Respondent sample can 
have the same age group of 45-64. For the study on caregiver health effects, I exclude 
individuals with any ADL limitation because their health status is not representative for 
potential caregivers in the study sample and because they are very unlikely to be 
caregivers. 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Labor market outcomes  
The Adult Child sample only provides information on whether or not an 
individual is “currently working for the purpose of bringing in income” as reported by his 
or her parents. In the Respondent sample, I take advantage of rich information on labor 
market outcomes, including the type of work (employed, self-employed, and unpaid 
family work), work hours, income and wage (Table 3.3). 
I use such diverse labor market outcomes for two main reasons. First, by not 
depending solely on the outcome of labor force participation, this study aims to provide a 
fuller understanding of the labor market effects of informal caregiving. Caregivers may 
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leave the labor force (adjustment at the extensive margin), or may reduce their market 
work (adjustment at the intensive margin) while still being in the labor force. A more 
complete understanding of the complex labor market effects of informal care is also 
critical for policy purposes. Second, the structure of labor market in South Korea has a 
relatively large proportion of self-employed or unpaid family workers outside of 
employment, particularly among midlife women. To account for this feature, I construct 
three different outcomes to capture adjustments at the extensive margin. For each of the 
three variables, I also create an outcome variable capturing adjustments at the intensive 
margin. 
Specifically, I define Any work to include self-employed and unpaid family 
workers in addition to employed workers. I consider weekly hours worked as the 
outcome of interest for those in Any work. The definition of Any paid work does not 
include unpaid family workers. For those in Any paid work, I examine monthly income 
earned. There are 58 self-employed individuals that reported a deficit for their business. I 
treat their income as 0. Finally, Any employed work is defined as 1 if an individual is 
employed and 0 if not. For the employed, I consider hourly wage rate, which is calculated 
using the formula, (monthly income)/(weekly hours worked/4). All the variables are 
based on responses for their current primary job. To account for the right-skewed 
distribution of the three intensive-margin outcomes, I convert them into logged values by 
taking the natural logarithm of (1+unit value).  
 
Dependent variable: Caregiver health outcomes  
I use multiple caregiver health outcomes available in the KLoSA. This choice of 
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outcome measures is informed by Schulz (1990) and additional sources (Haley et al., 
1987; Pang, 2000; Yong and McCallion, 2003) (Table 3.4). In total, I investigate six 
groups of outcomes. Below I describe how I define dependent variables for each outcome 
group, starting with outcomes of more psychological nature toward outcomes of physical 
nature and health care use. 
• Satisfaction with quality of life and with health 
• Depressive symptomatology 
• Pain affecting daily activities 
• Self-rated health 
• Outpatient care use  
• Prescription drug use  
 
Satisfaction with quality of life and with health 
Based on the following questions in the KLoSA, I define two continuous 
variables with possible values from 0 to 100. 
Please answer how much you are satisfied with the followings compared to your 
contemporaries. 0 means absolutely dissatisfied and 100 means absolutely 
satisfied. (A visual analogue scale with 10 points interval is shown.) 
 In overall, how satisfied are you with your quality of life (or how happy you 
feel)?  
 How satisfied are you with your health?  
 
Depressive symptomatology 
 
Given the challenge of detecting depression in the general population using a 
survey questionnaire, I employ multiple ways of measuring depressive symptoms. One 
way is to define a person as being depressed if the response to the following question is 1 
or 3. This also is one of two ways the KLoSA defines depression in its data. 
 Have you ever had feelings of being sad, blue, or depressed for two weeks or 
more during the past year?  
① Yes  
③ Did not feel depressed because I was taking anti-depressant medication 
⑤ No 
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Only those who answered in 1 or 5 to the question above were asked to answer 
the following questions from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) 
scale (Andersen et al., 1994). The CES-D scale has been widely used as a screening tool 
for depression among diverse populations, including Koreans (Cho and Kim, 1998). For 
each of the ten questions, respondents were asked to choose one of the four items below. 
There are two ways to use the results. One is to obtain the weighted sum (Andersen et al., 
1994). The fifth and eighth questions involve positive symptoms and thus should be 
reverse-coded. For example, if a person gives ① Very rarely to the eight negative 
symptoms and ④ Almost always to the two positive symptoms, then the weighted 
summary score is calculated as 0=0×10, the lowest possible score. The highest possible 
score is 30=3×10.  
In addition to using the weighted sum as a continuous variable, an alternative way 
is to use a cutoff to create a dichotomous variable. Summary score of 10 or higher has 
been suggested as a screening tool (Andersen et al., 1994; Irwin et al., 1999; Cheng and 
Chan, 2005; Jang et al., 2005)). Another way is to count the number of responses having 
non-zero values and to create a dichotomous variable 1 if the number is 4 or higher. This 
is a second way that the KLoSA provides a variable of being depressed in the general 
population. Although the CES-D scale has been found to be valid in several previous 
studies from South Korea, it is not known yet whether the scale can be applied to screen 
depression in the current KLoSA sample. Given this, I use the three dependent variables 
to check for the sensitivity of results. 
 
Next I will ask about how you felt and behaved during the last week. Please think 
of how often you felt or behaved like followings.  
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 During the last week, how often did you lose interest in most things?  
 During the last week, how often did you have trouble concentrating?  
 During the last week, how often did you feel depressed?  
 During the last week, how often did you feel tired out or low in energy?  
 How was your last week? How often did you feel pretty good?  
 During the last week, how often were you afraid of something?  
 During the last week, how often did you have trouble falling asleep? 
 How often did you feel you were overall satisfied last week?  
 How often did you feel alone last week?  
 How often have you felt down on yourself, no good or worthless last week?  
 Very rarely (less than one day) ①  
 Sometimes (1② -2 days)  
 Often (3③ -4 days)  
 ④ Almost always (5-7 days) 
 
Pain affecting daily activities 
 
Caregiving often involves physical efforts and may produce pains. Moreover, 
individuals with psychological distress often present with physical symptoms, known as 
somatization. After KLoSA respondents were asked about pain for various body parts, 
they were asked to answer the following question. Based on the response, I generate a 
binary variable of whether a person has pain affecting daily activities. 
 Does the pain make it difficult for you to do daily activities?  
 
Self-rated health 
Self-rated health is measured using a five-category ordinal scale on the following 
question.  
 Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?  
 
To account for differences in response patterns from other countries, KLoSA 
respondents were also asked to answer an alternative question with a different five-
category ordinal scale (very good, good, fair, poor or very poor). I only use responses 
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from the question above, because there was greater distributional variation than for the 
alternative question. In addition to using the ordinal variable, I create a binary variable of 
whether a person reports fair to poor self-rated health.  
 
Outpatient care use  
I generate two variables on outpatient care use. First, I define a binary indicator 
variable of Any outpatient care use=1 if the respondent reported visiting a doctor’s office, 
including emergency room, hospital outpatient office, and an oriental clinic, at least once 
in the past 12 months. I do not include hospitalization, dental visit, or public health clinic 
visit for outpatient care use. Second, only for those with Any outpatient care use=1, I 
create a continuous variable of total out-of-pocket spending during the period. For this 
question, KLoSA respondents were asked not to include the amount covered by private 
insurance plan or other family members such as children or parents. Because the 
distribution of out-of-pocket spending showed the typical right-skewed pattern, I take its 
natural logarithm. 
 
Prescription drug use 
 
For outpatient care use, I create two variables on prescription drug use. The 
binary indicator variable of Any prescription drug use is created using the survey 
question “In the past 12 months, have you regularly taken prescription medication?” The 
continuous variable of logged out-of-pocket spending on prescription drug use is based 
on the question, “About how much have you paid out-of-pocket for these prescriptions 
last year?”  
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Key independent variable: Informal care 
In the Adult Child sample, I use KLoSA respondents’ responses to calculate care 
hours provided by each adult child in the past month. In the KLoSA survey, respondents 
were asked to provide up to three persons who most often helps with their ADLs and 
IADLs, as shown in Q1 below. For each child providing any informal care, I calculate the 
number of care hours during the last month as the product of Q2 and Q3. In the survey, 
interviewers were directed to enter 1 for less than an hour of care in Q3. If both parents 
reported receiving care from one of their children, I sum up the number of care hours for 
both parents at the child-observation level. This calculation process can be expressed 
as∑ ×
i
ii QQ )32( , where i can take on 2 only if both parents appear as KLoSA 
respondents. Resulting values indicate how many hours of informal care a child provided 
to his or her parent(s) during the past month. I convert weekly hours of care by using the 
formula of weekly care hours = monthly care hours/(30.4×7). 
Q1. Who most often helps you with (dressing, washing, bathing, eating, getting 
out of bed, using toilet, controlling urination and defecation, grooming, doing the 
chores, preparing hot meals, doing laundry, going out, using transportations, 
shopping, managing money, making phone calls, taking medications)?  (Select 
from the list displayed by CAPI)  
02 Spouse  
03 Mother  
04 Father  
05 Mother-in-law  
06 Father-in-law  
07 ~ 16 Children 
27 ~ 40 Sibling  
47 Brother-in-law, sister-in-law  
48 Spouse of child  
49 Grandchild  
50 Other relative  
55 Helper or other non-relative 
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Q2. During the last month, on about how many days did [helper’s name chosen 
from Q1] help you? ______days  (range: 1~31)           
 
Q3. On the days [helper’s name chosen from Q2] helps you, about how many 
hours per day is that? _______ hours  (range: 1~24)  
 
For the Respondent sample, I first calculate the sum of ADL care hours provided 
to spouse, parents, parents-in-law, children, siblings, or other relatives, using responses to 
Q4 through Q7. For IADL care, respondents were asked Q8 to Q10 (IADL equivalent to 
Q5 to Q7 for ADL), but were not requested to first identify a family member with IADL 
limitations as they were for Q4. (Information on IADL limitations of family members is 
not available in the KLoSA.) In case response to Q7 or Q10 was given in months, 
KLoSA interviewers were instructed to enter 4 for 1 month, 26 for 6 months, and 52 for 1 
year, respectively. The product of Q6 and Q7 (Q9 and Q10) gives the number of hours of 
ADL (IADL) care provided to a particular person indicated in Q5 (Q8) during the past 12 
months. I add the number of ADL and IADL care hours for a family member at the 
respondent-observation level. I also sum up care hours provided to more than one person 
at the respondent-observation level. Numerically, this calculation equivalent 
to∑ ×+×
i
iiii QQQQ )10976( , where i takes on the number in Q4. The number tells how 
many hours of informal care a respondent provided for any family member during the 
past 12 months. Dividing the number by 52, I obtain averaged weekly hours of care 
during the past 12 month. 
Q4. Are there any members of your family over the age 10 (spouse, parents, 
parents of spouse, siblings and/or children) who are unable to carry out activities 
of daily living (ADL)? Activities of daily living refer to everyday routines such as 
eating, dressing, bathing or using the toilet, etc. Please identify all members of 
family with ADL difficulties. (Select from the list displayed by CAPI)  
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02 Spouse  
03 Mother  
04 Father  
05 Mother-in-law  
06 Father-in-law  
07 ~ 16 Children  
27 ~ 40 Sibling  
47 Brother/sister-in-law of spouse  
48 Son/daughter-in-law  
49 Grandchildren  
50 Other relatives  
 
Q5. Did you provide (names listed in Q4) any help with activities of daily living 
during the past 12 months (not calendar year)? If so, who was helped? (Select 
from the list displayed by CAPI) 
 
Q6. During the past 12 months (not calendar year), roughly how many hours per 
week did you help out [name chosen from Q5]? _____hours per week  
 
Q7. How many weeks did you provide such care to [name chosen from Q5] 
during the past 12 months? ______weeks 
 
Q8. Did you help any of your family members (spouse, parents, parents of spouse, 
siblings and/or children) who are not living with you with other things such as 
household chores, errands, transportation, grocery shopping, financial 
management, etc.? If you did, who was helped? Please identify all family 
members whom you helped out during the past 12 months. (Select from the list 
displayed by CAPI)  
 
Q9. During the past 12 months (not calendar year), roughly how many hours per 
week did you help out [name chosen from Q8]? _____hours per week 
  
Q10. How many weeks did you provide such care to [name chosen from Q8] 
during the past 12 months? ______weeks 
 
 
In both Adult Child and Respondent samples, I take the natural logarithm of 
(1+weekly care hours) to account for the right skewedness in distribution. In addition, I 
create two dummy variables representing less intensive care and more intensive care with 
the omitted reference category being no care. I consider three cutoffs to less intensive and 
more intensive care for both samples. Previous studies have used the definition of 
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intensive care as care of more than 10 to 20 hours per week (Carmichael and Charles, 
1998). I use 10, 15, and 20 hours per week for cutoff points in the Respondent sample. 
For the Adult Child sample, I use lower cutoff points: 5, 7.5, and 10 hours per week 
considering the distribution of parental care hours.  
 
Instrumental variables 
Depending on the endogenous variable and sample used for each study, I consider 
different sets of instrumental variables (IVs). Rationales for using these IVs will be 
described in the following method section. Here I focus on how I define the variables. 
Below I describe three sets of IVs used in the study on caregivers’ labor market outcomes, 
and another one set of IVs for the study on caregiver health outcomes. 
 
IVs for co-residence in the Adult Child sample in the study on labor market outcomes 
To predict the probability of co-residence using exogenous determinants, I use 
three IVs: number of brothers, number of sisters, and whether the child is the eldest son 
in the family. All these numbers are calculated based on the number of living siblings. To 
be clear, the eldest son is defined as the oldest son only among sons, not taking into 
account daughters. For example, if there is only one son and many older daughters, then 
the son is defied as the eldest son. Therefore, the probability of being the eldest son 
among men could be greater than 50%.  
 
IVs for informal care in the Adult Child sample in the study on labor market outcomes 
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For the Adult Child sample, rich information on their parents (KLoSA 
respondents) allows me to exploit detailed information on their functional limitations. If 
both parents have functional limitations, I sum up their number of ADL/IADL limitations 
at the child-observation level. Because ADL and IADL limitations may need quite 
different nature of informal care, I use them separately. Furthermore, effects of IADL 
limitations on the demand for informal care are unlikely linear. Thus, I use categorized 
variables for IADL limitations. If these assumptions are supported by the data, the IVs 
should have high explanatory power in the first-stage regressions of informal care hours. 
The results in the method section suggest that these assumptions are indeed reasonable. 
Based on the assumptions, I use three IVs: 1) number of parent(s)’ ADL limitations (0-
14), 2) whether parent(s) have 1-4 IADL limitations (binary), and 3) whether parent(s) 
has 5-20 IADL limitations (binary). 
 
IVs for informal care in the Respondent sample in the study on labor market outcomes 
For the Respondent sample, information on functional limitations of family 
members is less detailed than for the Adult Child sample. As described earlier, only 
whether each family member has any ADL limitation is available. Three IVs for the 
Respondent sample are all binary indicator variables: 1) whether parent(s) have any ADL 
limitation, 2) whether parent(s)-in-law have any ADL limitation, and 3) whether any 
sibling or relative has any ADL limitation. 
 
IVs for informal care in the study on caregiver health outcomes 
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Because IVs should predict informal care but should not directly affect 
psychological and physical health outcomes of the caregiver, more conceptually plausible 
sources of IVs come from functional limitations of parents-in-law having no blood-tie 
with the caregiver. Thus, I use a different set of IVs from those in the Respondent sample 
in the study on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. Specifically, I consider 1) whether the 
father-in-law has any ADL limitation, 2) whether the mother-in-law has any ADL 
limitation, and 3) whether parent(s) have any ADL limitation. 
 
Other explanatory variables 
In addition to these key study variables described so far, statistical models 
account for individual’s demographic and socioeconomic factors, parental characteristics, 
health status, variables on medical security, and region of residence. Lists of study 
variables and their summary statistics are presented in Tables 3.15-3.18 by study and 
sample to be used. 
Demographic and socioeconomic factors include age, marital status, number of 
children, education level, house ownership, and household assets. Household assets are 
first calculated as the total sum of present values for detailed items of financial and real 
estate assets. These items include own house; real estate, such as land, rental real estate, a 
partnership, or money owed to you on a land contract or mortgage except your current 
home; cash over 500,000 Korean won, bank savings, stocks/trusts/mutual funds, bonds, 
insurance, private money lending, mutual savings club, etc.; money in installment 
deposits, certificates of deposits, and other savings accounts; stocks and mutual funds 
bonds; personal loans to be repaid; saved through traditional private savings club (Gye);  
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vehicles for transportation; any other assets, such as valuables, paintings, antiques, and 
golf membership. I aggregate the sum of assets at the household level, and categorize all 
households into quintiles, thus creating four dummy variables on the lowest to the second 
highest quintiles. These variables are used as parental characteristics for the Adult Child 
sample. 
Variables on parental characteristics include whether both parents live together, 
parent’s house ownership, and parent’s education level. For parent’s education level, I 
take any higher education level between father and mother. I include these parental 
characteristics for two main reasons. First, parental characteristics may affect the amount 
of informal care provided by children. If both parents live together, their children will be 
far less likely to provide informal care and, if ever, less amount of care. Parents having a 
house and higher education levels may capture their socioeconomic status, thereby 
affecting their health status and care needs. Second, these parental characteristics may 
also influence children’s labor market outcomes. Parent’s education level could capture 
unobserved educational investment to children during childhood, which may persist 
through adulthood. Therefore, parental characteristics are expected to serve as important 
control variables in both first- and second-stage regressions in the structural equation 
models of caregiver’s labor market outcomes. 
Because health status may affect individual labor market outcomes, I include two 
indicator variables of poor self-rated health and of disability. For the study on caregiver 
health effects, comprehensive measures of health constitute study outcomes. Thus, I only 
consider disability and 13 disease indicators available in the KLoSA (Table 3.18). In the 
models on health care use, I add variables on medical security. The statutory medical 
  55
security system in South Korea consists of the NHI and two types of the MedicalAid 
system for people outside of the NHI. MedicalAid beneficiaries pay lower out-of-pocket 
spending for health care services than their NHI counterparts. Among MedicalAid 
beneficiaries, those on Type I pay less than those on Type 2. I also include an indicator 
variable of having voluntary private health insurance. 
Region of residence can be a potential confounder for labor market outcomes, 
health and health care use. In the Respondent sample, I use fourteen dummy variables 
representing each large administrative area with the omitted category being Seoul 
Metropolitan City. However, because individuals in the Adult Child sample do not 
necessarily live in their parent’s region of residence, I only use three broad dummy 
variables: Seoul Metropolitan City (omitted category), Non-Seoul Metropolitan City, and 
Province. 
 
Sample Description 
To provide an overview of the study samples, I present several tables and figures 
for key characteristics of the KLoSA population. Figure 3.1 presents proportion of adults 
with functional limitations by age group. With aging, the proportion of having functional 
limitations increase, with the highest observed for the age group 80+. Twenty eight 
percent of people aged 80 or older have any ADL limitation and 55 percent any 
ADL/IADL limitations. Figure 3.2 shows that older elderly are more likely to live alone 
or live with non-spouse family member. When focusing on the elderly with any ADL 
limitation (Table 3.5), 85.5 percent receive any informal care in the past month. For the 
60-69 age group, spouses seem to be the dominant caregiver type. Among the elderly 
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aged 80 or older, adult children appear to be caregivers for the elderly. In both age groups, 
the proportion of living with spouse or living with non-spouse family member is over 70 
percent. 
Next, I present descriptive statistics regarding informal care in a great detail in 
three ways. First, I provide the overall distribution of weekly care hours in the Adult 
Child sample (Tables 3.6-3.7) and the Respondent sample (Tables 3.8-3.9, Figures 3.3-
3.5). Second, as a suggestive rationale for the validity of IVs, I present bivariate analyses 
between informal care and IVs (Tables 3.10-3.12). Third, I provide tables of bivariate 
analyses between informal care and outcomes of interest (Tables 3.12-3.14). 
In the Adult Child sample aged 25-44, 448 observations (2.73%) were reported to 
provide any parental care in the past month (Table 3.6). Of the parental caregivers, the 
median of weekly care hours is 2.30 (25 percentile: 0.46, 75 percentile: 6.90). Table 3.7 
provides distribution of care hours when the parental caregivers are divided into two 
groups of less intensive caregivers and more intensive caregivers. Three cutoff points are 
used. Even at the cutoff of 5 hours per week, 311 adult children are classified as less 
intensive caregivers, while 137 as more intensive caregivers. In the group of less 
intensive caregivers, the interquartile range suggests that the majority of less intensive 
caregivers provide very little care. As the cutoff point is raised to 10 hours per week, the 
interquartile range is 0.46 to 4.6, showing that still relatively little care is provided by the 
defined group of less intensive caregivers. 
In the Respondent sample aged 45-64, 315 observations (3.07%) were found to 
have any informal care hours. Among these caregivers, the median of weekly hours of 
informal care is 15.23, with the interquartile range being from 3.23 to 40.38 (Table 3.8). 
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Because weekly hours of informal care are calculated from average hours of care per 
week and number of weeks of care in the past 12 months, I also examine the interquartile 
distribution of each variable (Table 3.8, Figures 3.3-3.5). The median of weekly care 
hours is 21, while the absolute majority of caregivers reported that they provided care for 
52 weeks, the whole 12-month period (Table 3.8, Figure 3.5). Table 3.9 presents the 
distribution of calculated weekly care hours and original components when caregivers in 
the Respondent sample are classified into less intensive and more intensive caregivers. 
Even at the cutoff of 5 hours per week, caregivers classified as most intensive caregivers 
provide care for the entire year (25 percentile is 52 weeks). These statistics suggest that 
the main component of more intensive caregiving is not the duration but number of care 
hours per week. 
Tables 3.10-3.11 present bivariate analyses of informal care (and labor market 
outcomes) and functional limitation of family members, which I consider to be a source 
of IVs. Ideally, family members’ functional limitation should be highly correlated with 
informal care but should not show high correlation with labor market outcomes. Family 
members’ functional limitation is indeed highly correlated with informal care provision 
in all the subsamples. The correlation between family members’ functional limitation and 
labor market outcomes are largely statistically insignificant in the Respondent sample, 
while mostly statistically significant in the Adult Child sample. The bivariate results for 
the Adult Child sample do not necessarily preclude the use of parental ADL/IADL status 
as IVs in instrumental variable estimation because the correlation could be controlled for 
using observable covariates. 
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Results of bivariate analyses between informal care (and caregiver health 
outcomes) and parental (including parents-in-law’s) ADL status suggest that parental 
ADL status is highly correlated with informal care provision (Table 3.12). For all the 
main health outcome measures as well as most of the indicators for health status, the 
correlation is not statistically significant at the 5% level, which is promising in terms of 
instrument validity. For variables on other characteristics, the correlation is mostly 
statistically insignificant with a few exceptions (age, education level, and private health 
insurance enrollment). Differences in education level and rates of private health insurance 
enrollment between the two groups could be explained by the difference in mean age. 
In bivariate analyses between informal care and labor market outcomes for each 
subsample (Tables 3.13-3.14), labor market outcomes are generally poorer for more 
intensive caregivers, particularly among women. However, some labor market outcomes 
are even better for less intensive caregivers than for non-caregivers. These observed 
differences could be due to the effect of caregiving as well as observed and unobserved 
differences between the counterparts. Summary statistics of caregiver health outcomes 
and other variables by caregiving status are provided in Table 3.18. Although some 
outcomes appear to be poorer in the caregiver group compared with the other two groups, 
no consistent pattern is observed across health outcomes. 
Tables 3.15-3.17 present summary statistics of study variables for the study on 
caregivers’ labor market outcomes. Between Table 3.14 and Table 3.15, several 
interesting findings emerge. First, labor force participation rates show considerable 
gender differences. While men’s labor force participation rates are over 80% for both 
samples (83.2% in the Younger Adult Child sample and 86.3% in the Midlife Adult Child 
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sample), women’s labor force participation rates are 43.6% among the age group of 25-
44 and 27.8% in the age group of 45-64. Second, midlife adult children show higher 
proportions of providing any parental care than younger adult children do, which is not 
surprising given that parents of midlife adult children have parents with higher 
proportions of having any ADL/IADL limitation. Third, these two tables also provide a 
snapshot of striking socio-demographic transitions South Korea has experienced in the 
past decades. The average number of brothers and sisters dropped, and the number of 
adult children’s own children decreased. The high rates of college education are 
remarkable in the Adult Child sample versus the Respondent sample, particularly among 
women. Forty-four percent of women aged 25-44 received any college education, 
compared with 14.1% in women aged 45-64. 
Stark gender differences are observed in labor market outcomes (Table 3.16). 
Women are less likely to be in any type of work including unpaid work for family 
business, but they appear to work the same hours once they are in the labor force. Gender 
differences are even more striking when looking at the figures for paid work. Women are 
far less likely to be in paid work (28.9%), while most men appear to be in paid jobs. 
Moreover, women are paid much less than men are, when compared between only paid 
work samples. However, it should be noted that women of this age group have much 
lower education levels than men. Women are more likely to provide informal care than 
men (3.5% vs. 2.2%). Women also provide more hours of care than men. The mean of 
weekly hours of informal care is 36.6 for women and 20.0 for men. Female caregivers are 
more likely to be more intensive caregivers than male caregivers are. 
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For the study on caregiver health effects, summary statistics are presented by 
potential and actual caregiver status (Table 3.18). Compared with the non-caregiver 
group having any family ADL limitation, the actual caregiver group shows higher 
proportions of ADL limitation among spouse and mother-in-law. While the average age 
is higher in the caregiver group, their health status does not necessarily appear to be 
worse. 
Figures 3.6-3.9 provide distributions of selected health outcomes by caregiver 
status. In the histograms, compared with the non-caregiver group, the caregiver group has 
lower bars for satisfaction score (Figure 3.6), higher bars for poor self-rated health 
(Figure 3.7), and higher bars for higher CES-D score (Figure 3.8). Distribution of out-of-
pocket spending from prescription drug is less clear (Figure 3.9). 
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Table 3.1. Overview of sample selection by study 
Study Effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market outcomes 
Effects of 
informal care on 
caregiver health 
Adult Child sample 
Sample name 
Younger Adult 
Child sample 
Midlife Adult 
Child sample 
Respondent 
sample 
Respondent 
sample 
Source data 
KLoSA respondents’ children  
(N=20,156)  
 
KLoSA respondents (≥ 45) 
(N=10,254) 
 
Exclusion criteria     
Age 
(# of dropped obs.)  
 
If under 25 or 
unknown 
(3,088) 
If 65 or older or 
unknown 
(221) 
If 65 or older 
(4,155) 
 
 (Not applied)  
 
 
Functional limitation 
(# of dropped obs.) (Not applied) (Not applied) (Not applied) 
If any ADL 
limitation 
(488) 
Missing values for 
other study variables 
(# of dropped obs.) 
(65) (5) (12) 
Study sample used 
25 ≤ Age < 44 
Total: 11,146 
Male: 5,776 
Female: 5,370 
45 ≤ Age < 65 
Total: 5,636 
Male: 2,910 
Female: 2,726 
45 ≤ Age < 65 
Total: 6,094 
Male: 2,728 
Female: 3,366 
45 ≤ Age 
Total: 9,754 
 
 
Note: Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (2006) 
 
 
Table 3.2. Overview of key variables by study 
Study Effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market outcomes 
Effects of 
informal care on 
caregiver health 
Sample name Younger Adult Child sample 
Midlife Adult 
Child sample 
Respondent 
sample 
Respondent 
sample 
Dependent variable Labor force participation (LFP) 
Six labor 
market 
outcomes 
Six groups of 
caregiver health 
outcomes 
Key independent variable Continuous variable of logged weekly informal care hours Dummy variables: Less intensive care & More intensive care (ref. No care) 
Source of identifying 
instrumental variables ADL/IADL limitations of parents  ADL limitations of family members 
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Table 3.3. Dependent variables in the study of labor market outcomes 
Adjustments Adult Child sample Respondent sample 
Extensive margin 
(y=1 if yes,  
   =0 if no) 
Any work Any paid work Any employed work 
Definition Employed Employed Employed 
 Self-employed Self-employed - 
 
Labor force 
participation 
 
Working for the 
purpose of 
bringing in income 
Unpaid family 
worker - - 
Intensive margin 
(ln(y),conditional) Not available 
Weekly hours 
worked 
Monthly income 
earned 
Hourly wage  
rate 
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Table 3.4. Health outcomes in the study of caregiver health effects 
Outcomes studied in the literature Caregiver health outcomes  available in the KLoSA (2006) Variable type  
Enduring outcomes (Schultz, 1990)   
Symptom reports   
Depression Depressive symptoms (CES-D) 10-item list 
Anxiety N/A  
Anger N/A  
Fatigue N/A  
Poor health Self-rated health  5-scale ordinal 
Pre-clinical disease   
Hypertension (Available, but not used)  
Blood Measures 
Clinical chemistries 
Lipids 
N/A  
Atherosclerosis N/A  
Pulmonary function N/A  
Compromised immune function N/A  
Clinical disease   
Depression Feeling depressed for two weeks or more 
during the past year or being on anti-
depressant medication 
Binary 
Infectious disease N/A  
Heart disease (Available, but not used)  
Health Care Utilization   
Drugs Regular prescription drug use 
Any use 
Out-of-pocket costs if any 
 
Binary 
Continuous 
Health care services Outpatient care use  
(including oriental clinic use) 
Any use 
Out-of-pocket costs if any 
 
 
Binary 
Continuous 
Life satisfaction (Haley et al., 1987)   
Life satisfaction Satisfaction with quality of life 
Satisfaction with health 
Continuous 
Continuous 
Somatization (Pang, 2000; Yong and 
McCallion, 2003) 
  
Body pain Pain affecting daily activities Binary 
Note: N/A=not available in the KLoSA, thus not used in the present study 
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Figure 3.1. Proportion of adults with functional limitations by age group 
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 Data: KLoSA (2006) respondents, weighted. 
 
Figure 3.2. Distribution of marital and co-residential status by age group  
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 Data: KLoSA (2006) respondents, weighted. (% within age group) 
 1: Married and co-residing with any other household member;  2: Living with spouse;  
 3: Living with at least one non-spouse family member; 4: Single-person household 
 
Table 3.5. Marital/co-residential status and informal care for elderly with any ADL limitation  
Age group 60-69 70-79 80+ Total 
Living with spouse 79.3% 61.2% 34.6% 57.1% 
Living with non-spouse family member 44.5% 52.8% 73.0% 57.7% 
Received any informal care in the past month 76.8% 85.4% 89.0% 85.5% 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 60 or older, weighted. Responses are not mutually exclusive. 
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Table 3.6. Quartile distribution of calculated weekly care hours among parental caregivers in the 
Adult Child sample 
 25 percentile Median 75 percentile 
Calculated weekly care hours 0.46 2.30 6.90 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44 who were reported to provide any parental 
care in the past month (n=448, 2.73% of 16,399), unweighted. 
 
 
Table 3.7. Categorization of care intensity among parental caregivers using different cutoff points 
in the Adult Child sample  
 Less intensive care More intensive care 
Panel A: cutoff at 5 hours per week Less than 5 hours 5 hours or more 
Number of observations 311 137 
Calculated weekly care hours [0.23, 0.92, 2.30] [6.9, 13.8, 27.6] 
Panel B: cutoff at 7.5 hours per week Less than 7.5 hours 7.5 hours or more 
Number of observations 354 94 
Calculated weekly care hours  [0.46, 1.2, 3.5] [13.8, 20.7, 35.7] 
Panel C: cutoff at 10 hours per week Less than 10 hours 10 hours or more 
Number of observations 366 82 
Calculated weekly care hours [0.46, 1.3, 4.6] [13.8, 20.7, 46.1] 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44 who were reported to provide any parental 
care in the past month (n=448, 2.73% of 16,399), unweighted. Brackets contain 25 percentile, median, and 
75 percentile within each category. 
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Table 3.8. Quartile distribution of calculated weekly care hours and elements among caregivers in 
the Respondent sample 
 25 percentile Median 75 percentile 
Calculated weekly care hours 3.23 15.23 40.38 
Reported care hours per week 10 21 70 
Reported number of weeks in past 12 months 20 52 52 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents who reported providing any informal care in the past 12 months (n=315, 
3.07% of the total KLoSA sample), unweighted. 
 
Figure 3.3. Histogram of weekly care hours calculated for the past 12 months 
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(b) Logged hours of informal care 
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Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents who reported providing any informal care in the past 12 months (n=315, 
3.07% of the total KLoSA sample). Three lines show 25 percentile, median, and 75 percentile. 
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Figure 3.4. Histogram of weekly care hours reported for the caregiving period 
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Note: KLoSA (2006) respondents who reported providing any informal care in the past 12 months (n=315, 
3.07% of the total KLoSA sample). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Histogram of number of weeks reported as caregiving duration 
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Note: KLoSA (2006) respondents who reported providing any informal care in the past 12 months (n=315, 
3.07% of the total KLoSA sample). 
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Table 3.9. Categorization of care intensity among caregivers using different cutoff points 
 Less intensive care More intensive care 
Panel A: cutoff at 5 hours per week Less than 5 hours 5 hours or more 
Number of observations 93 222 
Calculated weekly care hours (hours) [0.6, 1.5, 2.9] [14, 28, 70] 
Reported weekly hours cared  (hours) [2, 5, 10] [20, 35, 84] 
Reported number of weeks cared  (weeks) [4, 12, 26] [52, 52, 52] 
Cared for more than one person (%) 8.60 13.96 
Panel B: cutoff at 10 hours per week Less than 10 hours 10 hours or more 
Number of observations 123 192 
Calculated weekly care hours (hours) [0.8, 2.2, 4.8] [20, 35, 76.7] 
Reported weekly hours cared  (hours) [3, 7, 13] [20.5, 40, 90.5] 
Reported number of weeks cared  (weeks) [7, 16, 42] [52, 52, 52] 
Cared for more than one person (%) 12.20 12.50 
Panel C: cutoff at 15 hours per week Less than 15 hours 15 hours or more 
Number of observations 154 161 
Calculated weekly care hours (hours) [1.1, 3.1, 7.7] [22.2, 40, 92.3] 
Reported weekly hours cared  (hours) [4, 10, 14] [30, 60, 102] 
Reported number of weeks cared  (weeks) [10, 24, 52] [52, 52, 52] 
Cared for more than one person (%) 11.69 13.04 
Panel D: cutoff at 20 hours per week Less than 20 hours 20 hours or more 
Number of observations 170 145 
Calculated weekly care hours (hours) [1.3, 3.9, 10] [30, 48.5, 100] 
Reported weekly hours cared  (hours) [4, 10, 18] [35, 70, 114] 
Reported number of weeks cared  (weeks) [10, 25, 52] [52, 52, 52] 
Cared for more than one person (%) 11.18 13.79 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents who reported providing any informal care in the past 12 months (n=315, 
3.07% of the total Respondent sample). Brackets contain 25 percentile, median, and 75 percentile within 
each category. 
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Table 3.10. Informal care and labor force participation rates in the Adult Child sample, by gender 
and parental ADL/IADL status 
 Male Female 
Any ADL/IADL limitation of parents? No Yes p value  No Yes p value 
Panel A: Younger Adult Child sample (aged 25-44)     
Number of observations 4,760 1,038  4,382 1,008  
Parental informal care       
Provided any parental care (%) 0.0 9.8 <0.001 0.0 10.3 <0.001 
Categorization of care intensity       
No parental care (%) 100.0 90.2  100.0 89.7  
Less than 5 hours per week (%) 0.0 7.9 <0.001 0.0 7.2 <0.001 
More than 5 hours per week (%) 0.0 1.9  0.0 3.1  
Labor force participation rate (%) 82.7 85.3 0.044 45.1 37.1 <0.001 
Panel B: Midlife Adult Child sample (aged 45-64)     
Number of observations 1,821 1,098  1,672 1,068  
Parental informal care       
Provided any parental care (%) 0.0 14.3 <0.001 0.0 8.0 <0.001 
Categorization of care intensity       
No parental care (%) 100.0 85.7  100.0 92.0  
Less than 5 hours per week (%) 0.0 9.6 <0.001 0.0 4.8 <0.001 
More than 5 hours per week (%) 0.0 4.7  0.0 3.2  
Labor force participation rate (%) 86.1 86.7 0.667 30.9 23.1 <0.001 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-64, unweighted. 
 
 
Table 3.11. Informal care and labor market outcomes in the Respondent sample, by gender and 
family member ADL status 
 Male Female 
Any ADL limitation of family member? No Yes p value  No Yes p value 
Number of observations 2,559 171 - 3,150 219 - 
Informal care       
Provided any informal care (%) 0.4 28.1 <0.001 1.6 31.1 <0.001 
Categorization of care intensity       
No informal care (%) 99.6 71.9  98.4 68.9  
Less than 10 hours per week (%) 0.2 16.4 <0.001 0.4 17.4 <0.001 
More than 10 hours per week (%) 0.2 11.7  1.2 13.7  
Labor market outcomes       
Any work (%) 74.8 77.8 0.377 34.4 40.2 0.085 
Weekly work hours (hours) 48.7 49.0 0.841 48.9 46.1 0.202 
Any paid work (%) 73.9 76.6 0.440 28.5 34.2 0.072 
Monthly income (10K KRW) 222.2 200.7 0.419 108.4 96.9 0.268 
Any employed work (%) 40.1 37.4 0.497 17.5 20.5 0.247 
Hourly wage rate (10K KRW) 1.26 1.54 0.026 0.61 0.57 0.680 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, unweighted.  
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Table 3.12. Informal care, health outcomes and other characteristics, by parental ADL status 
Any ADL limitation of parent-in-law or parent? No  (n=9,473) 
Yes  
(n=291) p value 
Informal care    
Provided no informal care 98.1% 60.8%  
Provide care less than 10 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 0.6% 19.6% <0.001 
Provide care 10 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 1.3% 19.6%  
Outcome measures    
Satisfaction with health and quality of life    
Score of satisfaction with QOL (0-100) 62.2 62.6 0.605 
Score of satisfaction with health (0-100) 57.1 59.5 0.407 
Depressive symptomatology    
Feeling depressed for two weeks or more during the 
past year or being on anti-depressant medication 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
11.1% 13.1% 0.284 
aCES-D score (0-30) 7.2 7.0 0.298 
aCES-D number of items checked  ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 37.8% 36.3% 0.610 
aCES-D score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.8% 19.0% 0.455 
Body pain    
Having pain affecting daily activities (1=yes, 0=no) 25.0% 22.7% 0.372 
Self-rated health    
Ordered categories 
1 Excellent  
2 Very good  
3 Good  
4 Fair  
5 Poor 
2.1% 
11.1% 
35.7% 
27.8% 
23.3% 
2.8% 
12.7% 
35.4% 
26.1% 
23.0% 
 
0.837 
Fair to poor (1=yes, 0=no) 51.0% 49.1% 0.528 
Outpatient care use    
Any outpatient care use in the past 12 months 
(1=yes, 0=no) 62.3% 66.7% 0.133 
Total out-of-pocket costs for outpatient care if any 24.4 24.0 0.983 
Prescription drug use    
Any regular prescription drug use in the past 12 
months (1=yes, 0=no) 41.0% 35.7% 0.074 
Total out-of-pocket costs for drugs use if any 33.0 33.9 0.932 
Other explanatory variable    
Female (1=yes, 0=no) 56.4% 55.3% 0.718 
Age (year) 61.2 55.1 <0.001 
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 78.6% 83.8% 0.032 
Education    
Elementary school (1=yes, 0=no) 46.1% 30.6%  
Middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 16.5% 18.2% <0.001 
High school (1=yes, 0=no) 27.0% 35.4%  
College or higher (1=yes, 0=no) 10.4% 15.8%  
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)    
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 19.5% 18.6%  
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.1% 21.3%  
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.3% 16.2% 0.205 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.1% 19.2%  
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.0% 24.7%  
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Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 77.1% 74.2% 0.252 
Medical security    
Statutory    
National Health Insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 94.4% 94.9%  
MedicalAid Type 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 3.4% 2.4% 0.542 
MedicalAid Type 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 2.2% 2.7%  
Voluntary private health insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 33.1% 49.5% <0.001 
Disability and health condition indicator    
Disability diagnosed 5.3% 7.2% 0.155 
Hypertension diagnosed 26.8% 24.1% 0.290 
Diabetes diagnosed 11.7% 8.2% 0.072 
Cancer diagnosed 2.3% 2.7% 0.599 
Chronic lung disease diagnosed 2.2% 1.0% 0.187 
Liver disease diagnosed 1.5% 3.4% 0.011 
Heart disease diagnosed 4.6% 4.8% 0.881 
Stroke diagnosed 2.4% 2.7% 0.699 
Psychiatric problem diagnosed 2.0% 2.1% 0.905 
Arthritis diagnosed 16.1% 12.0% 0.063 
Injured due to traffic accident 9.3% 12.0% 0.116 
Fall in the last two years 3.7% 5.5% 0.106 
Prostate disease diagnosed 2.6% 2.7% 0.863 
Urinary incontinence experienced 8.5% 10.3% 0.279 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation, unweighted. aThe number 
of observations used is fewer because these questions excluded people who chose “Did not feel depressed 
because I was taking anti-depressant medication” in the first question on depressive symptomatology.
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Table 3.13. Labor force participation rates in the Adult Child sample, by gender and care intensity 
 Male Female 
Panel A: No care vs. any care hour None Any None Any 
Younger Adult Children, LFP rate (%)  83.2 82.4  43.6 41.3 
Midlife Adult Children, LFP rate (%) 86.6 82.2  27.8 31.8 
Panel B: cutoff at 5 hours per week None Less More None Less More 
Younger Adult Children, LFP rate (%)  83.2 85.4 70.0 43.6 46.6 29.0 
Midlife Adult Children, LFP rate (%) 86.6 83.8 78.8 27.8 29.4 35.3 
Panel D: cutoff at 10 hours per week None Less More None Less More 
Younger Adult Children, LFP rate (%)  83.2 85.7 54.5 43.6 44.7 26.3 
Midlife Adult Children, LFP rate (%) 86.6 85.6 64.0 27.8 32.8 29.6 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-64, unweighted. 
 
 
Table 3.14. Labor market outcomes in the Respondent sample, by gender and care intensity 
  Male   Female  
Panel A: No care vs. any care hour None Any None Any 
Any work (%)  75.1 67.8 35.0 29.7 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 51 49 46 
Any paid work (%)  74.3 66.1 28.9 27.1 
Monthly income, 10K KRW (mean) 221 226 109 73 
                                            (median) 200 170 90 58 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 33.9 17.8 15.3 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.81 0.61 0.45 
                                              (median) 1.00 1.76 0.45 0.38 
Panel B: cutoff at 10 hours per week None Less More None Less More 
Any work (%)  75.1 78.8 53.8 35.0 42.0 20.6 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 53 47 49 44 50 
Any paid work (%)  74.3 78.8 50.0 28.9 40.0 17.6 
Monthly income, 10K KRW (mean) 221 244 190 109 68 82 
                                            (median) 200 200 150 90 58 62 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 36.4 30.8  17.8 24.0 8.8 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.98 1.55  0.61 0.47 0.41 
                                              (median) 1.00 2.14 1.37  0.45 0.36 0.39 
Panel C: cutoff at 20 hours per week None Less More None Less More 
Any work (%)  75.1 73.2 55.6 35.0 38.2 18.0 
Weekly work hours, hours (mean) 49 53 45 49 46 47 
Any paid work (%)  74.3 73.2 50.0 28.9 33.8 18.0 
Monthly income, 10K KRW (mean) 221 233 202 109 69 84 
                                            (median) 200 200 100 90 55 70 
Any employed work (%) 40.0 34.1 33.3  17.8 19.1 10.0 
Hourly wage rate, 10K KRW (mean) 1.26 1.89 1.61  0.61 0.46 0.42 
                                              (median) 1.00 1.76 1.54  0.45 0.35 0.44 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, weighted. KRW is Korean Won. 
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Table 3.15. Summary statistics of the Younger Adult Child sample, by gender 
Male (N=5,776)  Female (N=5,370) Variables 
Mean/Freq, SD/%  Mean/Freq, SD/% 
Labor force participation (1=yes, 0=no) 4,805 83.2%  2,344 43.6% 
Informal care (provided to own parents)      
Any informal care (1=yes, 0=no) 102 1.8% 104 1.9% 
Weekly care hours if any 7.4 25.0 10.8 29.9 
Parent(s)’ functional limitations       
Any ADL/IADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 1,030 17.8%  1,007 18.8% 
ADL limitations sum (number:0-14) 0.2 1.0  0.2 1.0 
Any ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 302 5.2%  305 5.7% 
IADL limitations: 0 (1=yes, 0=no) 1,008 17.5%  979 18.2% 
IADL limitations: 1-4 (1=yes, 0=no) 716 12.4%  699 13.0% 
IADL limitations: 5-20 (1=yes, 0=no) 292 5.1%  280 5.2% 
Co-residence with parent(s) (1=yes, 0=no) 1,586 27.5%  895 16.7% 
Sibling characteristics      
Number of brothers 1.2 1.0  1.4 0.9 
Number of sisters 1.3 1.2  1.5 1.3 
Being eldest son in family (1=yes, 0=no) 2,963 51.3%  - - 
Other child characteristics      
Age (year) 35.2 5.5  35.1 5.6 
Education      
Less than middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 79 1.4%  158 2.9% 
Any middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 246 4.3%  309 5.8% 
Any high school (1=yes, 0=no) 2,024 35.0%  2,405 44.8% 
Any college (1=yes, 0=no) 3,219 55.7%  2,377 44.3% 
Any graduate school (1=yes, 0=no) 208 3.6%  121 2.3% 
Marital status      
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 3,372 58.4%  3,934 73.3% 
Widow/separated/divorced (1=yes, 0=no) 141 2.4%  108 2.0% 
Never married (1=yes, 0=no) 2,263 39.2%  1,328 24.7% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 1,635 28.3%  798 14.9% 
Number of own children 1.0 1.0  1.3 1.0 
Other parental characteristics      
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 4,064 70.4%  3,764 70.1% 
At least middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 2,940 50.9%  2,774 51.7% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 4,576 79.2%  4,268 79.5% 
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)      
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 1,152 19.9%  1,056 19.7% 
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 1,500 26.0%  1,361 25.3% 
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 1,235 21.4%  1,114 20.7% 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 976 16.9%  963 17.9% 
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 913 15.8%  876 16.3% 
Region      
Seoul Metropolitan City (1=yes, 0=no) 873 15.1%  802 14.9% 
Non-Seoul Metropolitan (1=yes, 0=no) 1,644 28.5%  1,478 27.5% 
Provincial (1=yes, 0=no) 3,259 56.4%  3,090 57.5% 
Note: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44, unweighted. 
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Table 3.16. Summary statistics of the Midlife Adult Child sample, by gender 
Male (N=2,910)  Female (N=2,726) Variables 
Mean/Freq, SD/%  Mean/Freq, SD/% 
Labor force participation (1=yes, 0=no) 2,512 86.3% 757 27.8% 
Informal care (provided to own parents)     
Any informal care (1=yes, 0=no) 157 5.4% 84 3.1% 
Weekly care hours if any 7.7 14.00 14.5 32.8 
Parent(s)’ functional limitations     
Any ADL/IADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 1,098 37.7% 1,064 39.0% 
ADL limitations sum (number: 0-14) 0.7 1.9 0.7 1.8 
Any ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 464 15.9% 464 17.0% 
IADL limitations: 0 (1=yes, 0=no) 1,088 37.4% 1,046 38.4% 
IADL limitations: 1-4 (1=yes, 0=no) 532 18.3% 499 18.3% 
IADL limitations: 5-20 (1=yes, 0=no) 556 19.1% 547 20.1% 
Co-residence with parent(s) (1=yes, 0=no) 611 21.0% 122 4.5% 
Sibling characteristics     
Number of brothers 1.8 1.2 2.0 1.1 
Number of sisters 1.8 1.3 2.1 1.5 
Being eldest son in family (1=yes, 0=no) 1,612 55.4% - - 
Other child characteristics     
Age (year) 51.0 4.9 50.8 4.8 
Education     
Less than middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 360 12.4% 646 23.7% 
Any middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 399 13.7% 541 19.8% 
Any high school (1=yes, 0=no) 1,214 41.7% 1,141 41.9% 
Any college (1=yes, 0=no) 865 29.7% 385 14.1% 
Any graduate school (1=yes, 0=no) 72 2.5% 13 0.5% 
Marital status     
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 2,659 91.4% 2,499 91.7% 
Widow/separated/divorced (1=yes, 0=no) 148 5.1% 162 5.9% 
Never married (1=yes, 0=no) 103 3.5% 65 2.4% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 1,930 66.3% 785 28.8% 
Number of own children 2.0 0.9 2.1 0.9 
Other parental characteristics     
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 1,105 38.0% 1,048 38.4% 
At least middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 631 21.7% 576 21.1% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 2,237 76.9% 2,025 74.3% 
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)     
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 685 23.5% 742 27.2% 
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 749 25.7% 700 25.7% 
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 500 17.2% 453 16.6% 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 462 15.9% 399 14.6% 
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 514 17.7% 432 15.8% 
Region     
Seoul Metropolitan City (1=yes, 0=no) 452 15.5% 406 14.9% 
Non-Seoul Metropolitan (1=yes, 0=no) 753 25.9% 714 26.2% 
Provincial (1=yes, 0=no) 1,705 58.6% 1,606 58.9% 
Note: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64, unweighted. 
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Table 3.17. Summary statistics of the Respondent sample, by gender 
Male (N=2,728)  Female (N=3,366) Variables 
Mean/Freq, SD/%  Mean/Freq, SD/% 
Labor market outcomes      
Any work (1=yes, 0=no) 2,035 74.9%  1,169 34.8% 
Weekly hours worked if any 48.7 16.8  48.7 19.6 
Any paid work (1=yes, 0=no) 1,950 74.1%  951 28.9% 
Monthly income (10K Korean Won) if any 220.8 291.4  107.4 85.6 
Any employed work (1=yes, 0=no) 1,044 38.3%  582 17.3% 
Hourly wage rate (10K Korean Won) if any 1.27 1.00  0.61 0.56 
Informal care      
Any informal care (1=yes, 0=no) 59 2.2%  118 3.5% 
Informal care hours per week if any 20.0 33.3  36.6 49.3 
Provide care less than 10 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 33 55.9%  50 42.4% 
Provide care 10 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 26 44.1%  68 57.6% 
Provide care less than 15 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 38 64.4%  62 52.5% 
Provide care 15 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 21 35.6%  56 47.5% 
Provide care less than 20 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) 41 69.5%  68 57.6% 
Provide care 20 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) 18 30.5%  50 42.4% 
Parent(s)’ functional limitations      
Parent(s)’s ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 96 3.5%  97 2.9% 
Parent(s)-in-law’s ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 17 0.6%  42 1.2% 
Sibling or relatives’ ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) 60 2.2%  83 2.5% 
Co-residence with parent(s) (1=yes, 0=no) 470 17.2%  368 10.9% 
Other own characteristics      
Age (year) 54.1 5.8  53.9 5.9 
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 2,531 92.8%  2,837 84.3% 
Education      
Elementary school  (1=yes, 0=no) 505 18.5%  1,299 38.6% 
Middle school  (1=yes, 0=no) 510 18.7%  739 22.0% 
High school  (1=yes, 0=no) 1,127 41.3%  1,079 32.1% 
College (1=yes, 0=no) 586 21.5%  249 7.4% 
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)      
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 455 16.7%  617 18.3% 
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 438 16.1%  606 18.0% 
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 570 20.9%  692 20.6% 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 648 23.8%  731 21.7% 
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 617 22.6%  720 21.4% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 2,108 77.3%  2,572 76.4% 
Disability (1=yes, 0=no) 207 7.6%  121 3.6% 
Poor self-rated health (1=yes, 0=no) 409 15.0%  781 23.2% 
Other parental characteristics      
Both parents live together (1=yes, 0=no) 266 9.8%  388 11.5% 
Parent(s) owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 466 17.1%  593 17.6% 
Parent(s) no formal education (1=yes, 0=no) 1,317 48.3%  1,658 49.3% 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, unweighted. 
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Table 3.18. Summary statistics of the Respondent sample, by potential/actual caregiver status 
Potential/actual caregiver status 
Non-
caregiver 
without 
family ADL 
limitation  
(n=8,983) 
Non-
caregiver 
with any 
family ADL 
limitation  
(n=474) 
Caregiver 
(n=297) 
Outcome variable    
Satisfaction with health and quality of life    
Score of satisfaction with QOL (0-100) 62.58 59.87 56.33 
Score of satisfaction with health (0-100) 57.55 53.67 52.49 
Depressive symptomatology    
Feeling depressed for two weeks or more during the 
past year or being on anti-depressant medication 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
10.6% 17.3% 16.5% 
aCES-D score (0-30) 7.16 7.70 8.34 
aCES-D number of items checked  ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 37.1% 42.1% 52.2% 
aCES-D score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.2% 25.8% 30.6% 
Body pain    
Having pain affecting daily activities (1=yes, 0=no) 24.0% 34.6% 35.7% 
Self-rated health    
Ordered categories 
1 Excellent  
2 Very good  
3 Good  
4 Fair  
5 Poor 
2.2% 
11.4% 
36.5% 
27.6% 
22.3% 
1.1% 
8.2% 
26.0% 
29.3% 
35.4% 
2.7% 
10.1% 
28.3% 
27.3% 
31.7% 
Fair to poor (1=yes, 0=no) 50.0% 64.8% 58.9% 
Outpatient care use    
Any outpatient care use in the past 12 months 
(1=yes, 0=no) 62.0% 67.3% 67.7% 
Total out-of-pocket costs for outpatient care if any 24.83 18.93 20.18 
Prescription drug use    
Any regular prescription drug use in the past 12 
months (1=yes, 0=no) 40.3% 47.0% 45.8% 
Total out-of-pocket costs for drugs use if any 33.35 27.10 33.55 
Informal care (Explanatory variable of main interest)    
Weekly hours of informal care - - 35.37 
Provide care less than 10 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 38.7% 
Provide care 10 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 61.3% 
Provide care less than 15 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 48.1% 
Provide care 15 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 51.9% 
Provide care less than 20 hrs week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 53.5% 
Provide care 20 hrs or more per week (1=yes, 0=no) - - 46.5% 
ADL limitation of family member    
Spouse ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) - 6.3% 38.0% 
Father ADL (1=yes, 0=no) - 8.2% 6.7% 
Mother ADL (1=yes, 0=no) - 22.6% 21.5% 
Father-in-law ADL (1=yes, 0=no) - 3.0% 3.4% 
Mother-in-law ADL (1=yes, 0=no) - 4.6% 10.4% 
Sibling or other relative ADL (1=yes, 0=no) - 47.0% 10.4% 
Child’s ADL limitation (1=yes, 0=no) - 11.4% 11.8% 
Other explanatory variable    
Female (1=yes, 0=no) 56.0% 59.3% 64.0% 
Age (year) 61.1 60.3 62.0 
Currently married (1=yes, 0=no) 78.6% 78.9% 84.2% 
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Education    
Elementary school (1=yes, 0=no) 45.5% 48.3% 47.1% 
Middle school (1=yes, 0=no) 16.4% 17.9% 18.2% 
High school (1=yes, 0=no) 27.5% 24.1% 24.2% 
College or higher (1=yes, 0=no) 10.6% 9.7% 10.4% 
Total assets quintile (1: lowest, 5: highest)    
Quintile 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 19.2% 21.1% 23.6% 
Quintile 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.0% 22.8% 20.5% 
Quintile 3 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.3% 18.1% 19.9% 
Quintile 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.3% 19.0% 16.5% 
Quintile 5 (1=yes, 0=no) 20.3% 19.0% 19.5% 
Owns a house (1=yes, 0=no) 77.3% 74.5% 72.7% 
Medical security    
Statutory    
National Health Insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 94.8% 92.1% 87.9% 
MedicalAid Type 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 3.1% 4.9% 8.4% 
MedicalAid Type 2 (1=yes, 0=no) 2.1% 3.0% 3.7% 
Voluntary private health insurance (1=yes, 0=no) 33.4% 36.7% 33.7% 
Disability and health condition indicator    
Disability diagnosed 5.3% 7.0% 6.1% 
Hypertension diagnosed 26.5% 31.4% 27.3% 
Diabetes diagnosed 11.6% 11.0% 10.4% 
Cancer diagnosed 2.2% 2.5% 3.7% 
Chronic lung disease diagnosed 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 
Liver disease diagnosed 1.5% 2.1% 3.0% 
Heart disease diagnosed 4.5% 7.2% 6.1% 
Stroke diagnosed 2.4% 3.2% 2.7% 
Psychiatric problem diagnosed 1.9% 1.7% 3.4% 
Arthritis diagnosed 15.5% 22.4% 18.9% 
Injured due to traffic accident 9.0% 13.9% 12.5% 
Fall in the last two years 3.5% 7.8% 5.7% 
Prostate disease diagnosed 2.5% 3.6% 3.7% 
Urinary incontinence experienced 8.2% 11.6% 14.8% 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation, unweighted. aThe number 
of observations used is fewer because these questions excluded people who chose “Did not feel depressed 
because I was taking anti-depressant medication” in the first question on depressive symptomatology. 
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Figure 3.6. Distribution of score of satisfaction with quality-of-life by caregiver status 
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Figure 3.7. Distribution of self-rated health by caregiver status 
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Figure 3.8. Distribution of CES-D score by caregiver status 
0
.1
.2
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Non-caregivers Caregivers
D
en
si
ty
Summary CES-D score (30: most depressed)
(Curve: normal distribution, Line: 10)
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Distribution of log of out-of-pocket costs for prescription drug use if any 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
 
Methods to Estimate Effects on Caregivers’ Labor Market Outcomes 
How to test the hypothesis 
To test the hypothesis, I estimate the following model in general form by gender. 
sissisisisi XCORESIDEICLMO εμδγβ ++++=   Eq. (1) 
where subscript s denotes sibling group, subscript i individual, LMOsi labor market 
outcomes of individual i from a sibling group s, ICsi informal care, and CORESIDEsi a 
binary variable of whether the adult child co-resides with his or her parent(s). ICsi may 
take on logged weekly hours of informal care or a set of two dummy variables for less 
intensive and more intensive care. Xsi is a vector of other explanatory variables, μi 
sibling-group fixed effects, and εsi the error term. This model estimates β, γ, and δ for 
respective variable(s). The coefficient of main interest is β. I test the hypothesis by 
checking the statistical significance of estimated coefficient(s) β. 
 
Overview of the estimation strategy 
The conceptual framework indicates that this statistical model may suffer from 
the identification problem for the following reasons. First, informal caregiving occurs 
more often among socially disadvantaged families, whose adult children have lower 
prospects for employment and thus are more likely to provide care. If the statistical 
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model cannot control for important family characteristics using a given set of control 
variables, informal caregiving is correlated with unobserved family characteristics. 
0),( ≠ssiICCorr μ  
Second, informal caregiving may be correlated with unobserved ability or employability 
at the individual level. 
0),( ≠sisiICCorr ε  
Third, an adult child’s decision on co-residence is made jointly with his or her decision 
on work. Moreover, co-residing adult children may have different levels of employability 
to begin with. 
0),( ≠sisiCORESIDECorr ε  
I address these statistical issues in the following order. I first estimate a sibling-
level fixed effects model of labor force participation. Because the Adult Child sample 
consists of siblings nested within each family that has the same parent(s), fixed effects 
estimation can exploit within-sibling group variation as identifying information (Norton 
and Van Houtven, 2006). However, this estimation depends on a rather strong 
assumption that, within each sibling group, caregiving responsibilities fall on one or more 
siblings in a random fashion. In other words, in a given family, informal care should be 
decided exogenously. 
0)|,( =ssisiICCorr με  
This assumption fails if family members make decisions on who provides care 
based on their ability or employability, which is not observable in the data. (This 
assumption still might be valid if parental caregiving responsibilities fall entirely on the 
eldest son and daughter-in-law.) To overcome this limitation, I made an attempt to 
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estimate an instrumental variable-fixed effects (IV-FE) model. For this estimation to be 
successful, identifying information must be available that predicts informal caregiving 
within each family. Unfortunately, family-level variables cannot be used in this way 
because such variables do not have any variation within families (thus, sibling groups). 
Moreover, most individual characteristics are likely correlated with unobserved ability or 
employability. Therefore, it is difficult to find valid IVs, particularly given that the Adult 
Child sample provides less detailed information for the individuals. One plausible 
possibility is to use geographic proximity between extra-residential daughters and their 
parents (Latif, 2006; Bolin et al., 2008). However, it should be acknowledged that 
geographic proximity may also be an endogenous child characteristic (Stern, 1995). 
Although it is less likely than in other societies for married daughters in South Korea to 
choose their location based on their work or parental care, it is still possible. Moreover, 
variables of geographic proximity were found to have very low explanatory power, 
precluding the use of IV-FE model. Therefore, I estimate the standard fixed effects 
model. In addition to the fixed effects logit model, I also estimate a linear probability 
model. Again, the results should be interpreted only tentatively depending on the 
assumption mentioned above. 
The statistical model in Eq. (1) raises another major challenge for the empirical 
analysis because not only IC but also CORESIDE are potentially endogenous to LMO. 
The statistical model could be estimated validly if appropriate instruments were available 
that predict both IC and CORESIDE but do not directly affect LMO. Theoretically, such 
instrumental variables might be available from family-level (parent-level or sibling-level) 
characteristics because both informal caregiving and intergenerational co-residence are 
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just different forms of intergenerational relations to elderly parents. However, I do not 
estimate the model using an IV method for two endogenous explanatory variables for the 
following reasons. First, in many Korean extended families, co-residence may have long 
continued when informal caregiving occurs. In such cases, decisions on informal 
caregiving are made in the given living arrangement of intergenerational co-residence. 
Therefore, it would not make much sense to treat co-residence and informal caregiving as 
decisions that necessarily happen at the same time horizon in a given cross-sectional 
dataset. Second, this conceptual issue also leads to the difficulty of implementing an IV 
approach practically, because it is hard to find instrumental variables that have strong 
predictive power for both co-residence and informal caregiving. In fact, when both 
sibling-level and parent-level variables were included in the first-stage models of co-
residence and informal caregiving, sibling-level variables (e.g., number of brothers, 
number of sisters, and being the eldest son in the family) showed strong predictive power 
for co-residence but only weak associations for informal caregiving. By contrast, parent-
level variables (e.g., parents’ ADL or IADL limitations) were found to be strong 
predictors for informal caregiving but not for co-residence. 
As an alternative approach, I follow a staged analysis plan (Figure 4.1). As 
postulated in the conceptual framework, the endogeneity between co-residence and labor 
force participation matters only when co-residence precedes the decision on informal 
caregiving. Thus, I test for the endogeneity of co-residence with regard to labor force 
participation by gender and age group. Based on the results, I proceed to estimate the 
model using the standard IV approach. Specifically, if the sample of a specific gender/age 
group shows that decision on co-residence is made jointly with decision on labor force 
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participation, I estimate the model separately for co-residential and extra-residential 
subsamples. For some gender/age group, co-residence may be found to be exogenous to 
labor force participation, which is probably more likely among older generations as 
described in the cultural background. In that gender/age group, I include co-residence as 
another exogenous control variable in the model, assuming that co-residence might have 
only additive effects to the main effect of informal caregiving on labor force 
participation. 
For the Adult Child sample, the dependent variable is a binary variable of whether 
or not the adult child is currently working. I conduct probit regression analyses as well as 
IV probit estimation. The data in the Respondent sample allow for additionally 
examining adjustments in the intensive margin. Considering the labor market structure in 
South Korea, I examine possible adjustments in the intensive margin in three ways. First, 
given any work, does informal caregiving affect weekly hours worked? Second, given 
any paid work, excluding the group involved in unpaid help for family business, does 
informal caregiving affect his or her monthly income? Third, given any employed work, 
further excluding the self-employed group, does informal caregiving affect hourly wage 
rate? For these three analyses, I employ the two-part model framework, where the 
second-part model uses observations with any positive outcomes. Because these 
dependent variables are continuous variables, I estimate IV two-stage least square (IV-
2SLS) models to correct for the potential endogeneity of informal caregiving hours. 
Unlike many labor economics applications, I use the two-part model (Bolin et al., 2008), 
mainly because the main interest here lies in actual labor market outcomes among labor 
force participants rather than potential outcomes. 
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Testing for endogeneity between co-residence and labor force participation 
To test for the endogeneity of co-residence by gender and age group, I use four 
subsamples derived from the Adult Child sample, excluding observations whose parent(s) 
have any ADL/IADL limitation. For each subsample, I estimate a bivariate probit model. 
 22* εδγ ++= XCORESIDELFP      Eq. (2) 
 31* εφδ ++= IVXCORESIDE      Eq. (3) 
where LFP* and CORESIDE* are latent variables for the indicator variable of LFP (1 if 
LFP*>0, otherwise 0) and for the indicator variable of CORESIDE (1 if CORESIDE*>0, 
otherwise 0). X denotes the same variables as in Eq. (1), and IV is instrumental variables 
used for the CORESIDE equation. If the two decisions on co-residence and on labor force 
participation are independent, the two probit equations can be estimated separately. If the 
two decisions are not independent, estimating Eq. (2) alone will produce inconsistent 
coefficient estimates. In that case, consistent estimates can be obtained by estimating the 
two equations jointly in a bivariate probit model. A formal test on whether the two 
decisions are independent or not can be conducted by examining a likelihood-ratio test of 
whether rho, the correlation coefficient between ε2, and ε3, is statistically different from 
zero or not. 
To estimate the bivariate probit model efficiently, IVs are needed. Two basic 
conditions for such IVs are similar to those required for IVs in the usual IV approach. 
Applied to the current bivariate probit model, first, IVs should have good predictive 
power for CORESIDE, and second, IVs should not be directly correlated with LFP. 
Sibling-level variables are a source of potentially promising IVs. Because of the diffusion 
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of responsibilities (Schulz, 1990), number of brothers and number of sisters will have the 
effect of decreasing one’s probability of co-residing with his or her parents, but these 
variables are unlikely to directly affect one’s probability of participating in the labor 
force. For the same reason, being the eldest son in the family (for men only) is another 
potential IV. Based on these rationales, I use number of brothers and number of sisters 
for female subsamples and all three IVs for male subsamples. 
Because these analyses are pre-analyses conducted before the main analyses, I 
present the results in this section. The results presented in Tables 4.1-4.3 show that the 
IVs indeed meet the two requirements. In the first and fourth columns of Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2, estimated coefficients of the IVs and their standard errors show that IVs are all 
individually statistically significant, except for the number of sisters in the Respondent 
sample. Moreover, Wald tests in Table 4.3 show that the IVs are jointly statistically 
significant. Interestingly, it is among older males (the Respondent sample), who are 
probably more influenced by traditional cultural norms, that being the eldest son in the 
family shows a large positive coefficient but number of sisters is not statistically 
significant. Tests of exclusion restrictions follow Rashad and Kaestner (2004). The 
results in Table 4.3 suggest that the IVs can be validly excluded from the main equation. 
Finally, the likelihood-ratio tests of rho=0 indicate that the endogeneity of co-residence 
varies by age group, but not by gender. For both male and females in the Younger Adult 
Child sample, the test on rho suggests that co-residence is endogenous to labor force 
participation, while the same test for the Midlife Adult Child sample does not. Again, this 
difference may reflect the current transition in cultural norms that take place between 
older and younger generations in South Korea. In current older generations, co-residence 
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tended to be pre-determined exogenously, that is, regardless of their decisions on work or 
other opportunities. By contrast, for younger generations, their decision on co-residence 
is made in conjunction with their work decisions. Because the estimated coefficients for 
CORESIDE are not of main interest for the current study, I describe the estimation results 
only briefly. Co-residence decreases the probability of labor force participation among 
both males and females in the Younger Adult Child sample (−0.767 in 3rd and −0.738 in 
6th columns of Table 4.1). By contrast, co-residence increases the probability of labor 
force participation among women in the Midlife Child sample (see 0.648 in 5th column of 
Table 4.2). 
From these results, I follow a decision rule for proceeding to the main analysis 
(Figures 4.1-4.2). Because co-residence appears to be endogenous among younger 
generations, I conduct separate analyses of the Younger Adult Child sample by co-
residence status. The exogeneity of co-residence is not rejected for the Midlife Adult 
Child sample. Based on this finding, I do not conduct separate analyses by co-residence 
status for older generation samples (the Midlife Child sample and also the Respondent 
sample), but add to the model another control variable of whether the person co-resides 
with his or her parent or not. 
 
Instrumental variable estimation 
Although the sibling-level fixed effects estimation may deal with one source of 
endogeneity, the conceptual framework indicates that informal care still is potentially 
endogenous to caregivers’ labor market outcomes because of unobserved heterogeneity at 
the individual level. Therefore, conventional multiple regression analyses may not fully 
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control for the potential omitted variable bias in making causal inference on the effects of 
informal care on labor market outcomes. 
To address this methodological challenge, this study employs an IV approach. To 
do so, it is critical to find good instruments, variables that have strong explanatory power 
for the endogenous explanatory variable in the first-stage equation and that can also be 
validly excluded from the main equation. These two conditions can be checked formally 
using respective statistical tests.  
In this study, family members’ functional limitation provides potentially 
promising IVs because family members’ functional limitation will increase the possibility 
of providing informal care but will not directly affect adult children’s decisions on labor 
force participation (Ettner, 1995; Bolin et al., 2008). Because the KLoSA data provide 
variables on functional limitations of family members, I do not rely on other proxies to 
predict parental care needs or parental ability to substitute formal care, such as parental 
education (Ettner, 1995). 
Tables 4.4-4.10 show the results of first-stage regressions and specification tests 
of IVs for selected subsamples. I present results of specification tests for two different 
ways of defining the intensity of informal care: 1) a continuous variable of ln(1+weekly 
care hours) (Tables 4.4-4.6, Tables 4.8-4.9) and 2) a set of two dummy variables 
representing less intensive care and more intensive care (Tables 4.5-4.7, Table 4.10). 
Overall, IVs meet the requirements of good explanatory power and exclusion restrictions. 
Interestingly, F-statistics for joint significance of the IVs are very large, all exceeding 40. 
This is not surprising from the high correlations between family members’ functional 
limitation and informal care in bivariate analyses.  
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Figure 4.1. Diagram for estimation strategy for the Adult Child sample 
A. As a pre-analysis, examine the endogeneity of co-residence by gender and age group 
using bivariate probit models exploiting sibling characteristics as instruments. 
 
 
B. Apply a decision rule for each gender/age group 
1. If co-residence is found to be endogenous to labor force participation, conduct 
stratified analysis by co-/extra-residential status. 
2. If the exogeneity of co-residence is not rejected, consider co-residence as another 
observable control variable. 
 
C. For the main analysis, employ the instrumental variable approach using functional 
limitations of family members as identifying instruments. 
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Table 4.1. Probit and bivariate probit regression of LFP in the Younger Adult Child sample, by 
gender 
  Male   Female  
 
Co-reside 
Probit 
LFP 
Probit 
LFP 
BVP 
Co-reside 
Probit 
LFP 
Probit 
LFP 
BVP 
Co-reside with parent(s)  −0.210 −0.767  0.094 −0.738 
  (0.055)** (0.230)**  (0.069) (0.216)** 
Child’s characteristics       
Age (year) −0.198 0.559 0.500 −0.143 0.041 −0.009 
 (0.053)** (0.056)** (0.063)** (0.072)* (0.051) (0.052) 
Age-squared/100 0.003 −0.008 −0.007 0.002 −0.001 0.000 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (ref. Any 
graduate)       
Less than middle school 0.476 0.012 0.058 −0.133 −0.262 −0.235 
 (0.238)* (0.232) (0.229) (0.343) (0.184) (0.183) 
Any middle school 0.248 −0.164 −0.123 0.110 −0.028 0.010 
 (0.178) (0.164) (0.162) (0.251) (0.152) (0.151) 
Any high school 0.479 0.333 0.391 0.312 −0.076 −0.022 
 (0.130)** (0.127)** (0.126)** (0.172) (0.127) (0.125) 
Any college 0.435 0.270 0.325 0.262 0.28 0.318 
 (0.125)** (0.120)* (0.120)** (0.165) (0.124)* (0.122)** 
Marital status (ref. Married)       
Widow/separat/divorced 1.224 −0.491 −0.288 1.745 0.635 0.890 
 (0.134)** (0.146)** (0.165) (0.157)** (0.140)** (0.148)** 
Never married 1.326 −0.572 −0.35 2.081 0.819 1.186 
 (0.075)** (0.082)** (0.120)** (0.106)** (0.077)** (0.110)** 
Owns a house −0.023 0.593 0.580 0.195 0.484 0.490 
 (0.063) (0.077)** (0.076)** (0.103) (0.056)** (0.056)** 
Number of own children 0.016 −0.032 −0.026 0.086 −0.094 −0.082 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.028)** (0.028)** 
Parents’ characteristics       
Currently married −0.380 −0.017 −0.070 −0.241 −0.105 −0.126 
 (0.055)** (0.061) (0.063) (0.079)** (0.049)* (0.049)* 
At least middle school −0.115 0.000 −0.008 0.014 −0.052 −0.035 
 (0.054)* (0.057) (0.056) (0.075) (0.049) (0.048) 
Owns a house −0.138 0.008 −0.013 0.145 −0.107 −0.100 
 (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.142) (0.086) (0.085) 
Total assets quintile (ref. 5)       
Quintile 1 (lowest) −0.488 −0.055 −0.126 −0.156 −0.199 −0.236 
 (0.120)** (0.125) (0.125) (0.167) (0.105) (0.104)* 
Quintile 2 −0.413 0.056 −0.009 −0.272 −0.018 −0.062 
 (0.078)** (0.086) (0.088) (0.105)** (0.071) (0.071) 
Quintile 3 −0.149 0.005 −0.018 −0.218 −0.026 −0.060 
 (0.074)* (0.081) (0.080) (0.098)* (0.068) (0.068) 
Quintile 4 −0.010 0.042 0.038 −0.125 −0.091 −0.115 
 (0.075) (0.083) (0.082) (0.094) (0.069) (0.068) 
Region (ref. Seoul)       
Non-Seoul Metropolitan −0.187 −0.061 −0.094 −0.198 0.08 0.032 
 (0.070)** (0.079) (0.079) (0.090)* (0.068) (0.068) 
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Provincial −0.409 −0.095 −0.170 −0.478 0.048 −0.040 
 (0.066)** (0.074) (0.079)* (0.086)** (0.063) (0.067) 
Instrumental variables (IVs)  
for co-residence       
Number of brothers −0.117   −0.215   
 (0.032)**   (0.043)**   
Number of sisters −0.051   −0.197   
 (0.020)*   (0.029)**   
Being eldest son in family 0.164   −   
 (0.055)**      
Constant 2.860 −8.768 −7.556 1.323 −0.912 0.074 
 (0.933)** (0.984)** (1.139)** (1.228) (0.913) (0.935) 
rho (ρ) − − 0.336 − − 0.492 
Likelihood-ratio  test of 
rho=0 − − 
chi2(1) 
= 3.86* − − 
chi2(1) 
=12.59** 
N 4,746 4,746 4,746 4,363 4,363 4,363 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44, excluding observations with any parental 
ADL/IADL limitation. BVP=bivariate probit, LFP=labor force participation Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 4.2. Probit and bivariate probit regression of LFP in the Midlife Adult Child sample, by 
gender 
  Male   Female  
 
Co-reside 
Probit 
LFP 
Probit 
LFP 
BVP 
Co-reside 
Probit 
LFP 
Probit 
LFP 
BVP 
Co-reside with parent(s)  −0.063 0.140  0.648 0.827 
  (0.104) (0.433)  (0.178)** (0.524) 
Child’s characteristics       
Age (year) −0.128 0.452 0.463 0.371 0.400 0.396 
 (0.165) (0.173)** (0.173)** (0.320) (0.176)* (0.177)* 
Age-squared/100 0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003) (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Education (ref. Any 
graduate)       
Less than middle school −0.141 −1.133 −1.121 −0.01 −0.797 −0.789 
 (0.254) (0.503)* (0.504)* (0.637) (0.456) (0.456) 
Any middle school −0.055 −0.867 −0.865 −0.456 −0.917 −0.905 
 (0.247) (0.502) (0.502) (0.642) (0.455)* (0.456)* 
Any high school 0.042 −0.86 −0.861 −0.026 −0.911 −0.903 
 (0.226) (0.493) (0.493) (0.608) (0.449)* (0.449)* 
Any college −0.079 −0.771 −0.765 −0.181 −0.575 −0.565 
 (0.225) (0.493) (0.493) (0.609) (0.451) (0.451) 
Marital status (ref. Married)       
Widow/separat/divorced 0.871 −0.893 −0.943 1.319 0.25 0.214 
 (0.153)** (0.152)** (0.182)** (0.184)** (0.151) (0.181) 
Never married 1.159 −1.052 −1.117 1.837 0.235 0.165 
 (0.198)** (0.204)** (0.241)** (0.279)** (0.232) (0.303) 
Owns a house −0.129 0.66 0.664 0.092 0.713 0.712 
 (0.089) (0.092)** (0.092)** (0.156) (0.074)** (0.074)** 
Number of own children 0.093 −0.036 −0.041 −0.059 −0.068 −0.066 
 (0.047)* (0.051) (0.053) (0.088) (0.045) (0.045) 
Parents’ characteristics       
Currently married −0.392 −0.08 −0.060 −0.621 −0.068 −0.062 
 (0.091)** (0.098) (0.106) (0.191)** (0.080) (0.081) 
At least middle school −0.432 −0.048 −0.029 0.194 −0.195 −0.197 
 (0.109)** (0.117) (0.125) (0.191) (0.096)* (0.097)* 
Owns a house −0.473 0.086 0.107 −0.324 −0.506 −0.503 
 (0.147)** (0.151) (0.157) (0.261) (0.127)** (0.128)** 
Total assets quintile (ref. 5)       
Quintile 1 (lowest) −1.385 −0.025 0.043 −0.678 −0.452 −0.445 
 (0.177)** (0.184) (0.234) (0.305)* (0.154)** (0.155)** 
Quintile 2 −1.033 0.266 0.315 −0.659 −0.059 −0.053 
 (0.125)** (0.144) (0.177) (0.233)** (0.117) (0.118) 
Quintile 3 −0.458 0.085 0.108 −0.209 −0.174 −0.172 
 (0.121)** (0.147) (0.155) (0.222) (0.128) (0.128) 
Quintile 4 −0.085 0.004 0.006 −0.008 −0.028 −0.029 
 (0.120) (0.149) (0.149) (0.220) (0.128) (0.128) 
Region (ref. Seoul)       
Non-Seoul Metropolitan −0.108 −0.320 −0.307 0.002 0.440 0.443 
 (0.120) (0.146)* (0.149)* (0.202) (0.129)** (0.129)** 
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Provincial −0.135 −0.384 −0.37 −0.144 0.431 0.435 
 (0.110) (0.135)** (0.139)** (0.186) (0.122)** (0.122)** 
Instrumental variables (IVs)  
for co-residence       
Number of brothers −0.137   −0.176   
 (0.038)**   (0.066)**   
Number of sisters −0.053   −0.144   
 (0.030)   (0.055)**   
Being eldest son in family 0.451   −   
 (0.087)**      
Constant 3.244 −8.409 −8.753 −10.009 −8.562 −8.486 
 (4.333) (4.576) (4.612) (8.366) (4.558) (4.562) 
rho (ρ) − − −0.1227 − − −0.0933 
Likelihood-ratio  test of 
rho=0 − − 
chi2(1) 
= 0.23 − − 
chi2(1) 
=0.13 
N 1,812 1,812 1,812 1,662 1,662 1,662 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64, excluding observations with any parental 
ADL/IADL limitation. BVP=bivariate probit, LFP=labor force participation Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Tests of instrumental variable strength and exclusion restrictions for bivariate probit 
 Younger Adult Child sample Midlife Adult Child sample 
 Male Female Male Female 
Wald test of IV strength chi2(3)=49.77** chi2(2)=57.09** chi2(3)=60.43** chi2(2)=12.35**
Test of exclusion 
restrictionsa 
Number of brothers 
Number of sisters 
Being eldest son in family 
chi2(1)=0.40 
chi2(1)=1.38 
chi2(1)=0.18 
chi2(1)=1.40 
chi2(1)=3.32 
- 
chi2(1)=0.97 
chi2(1)=0.00 
chi2(1)=0.06 
chi2(1)=0.00 
chi2(1)=1.40 
- 
Good IVs? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR  test of rho=0 chi2(1)=3.86* chi2(1)=12.59** chi2(1)=0.23 chi2(1)=0.13 
Conclusion: Co-residence is 
endogenous to LFP? Yes Yes No No 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44 (the Younger Adult Child sample) and adult 
children aged 45-64 (the Midlife Adult Child sample), excluding observations with any parental 
ADL/IADL limitation. IV is instrumental variable. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. aMethod follows Rashad and 
Kaestner (2004). 
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Figure 4.2. Overview of the empirical analysis on caregivers’ labor market outcomes 
 
 
 
Notes: LFP=labor force participation, All analyses are conducted separately by gender. 
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Table 4.4. First-stage regression (OLS) of logged weekly care hours in the Younger Adult Child 
sample, by gender and living arrangement 
Male Female 
Independent variables Extra- 
residential 
Co-
residential 
Extra- 
residential 
Co-
residential 
Identifying instruments     
Parent(s)’  ADL limitations sum (0−14) 0.001 0.047 −0.009 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.013)** (0.003)** (0.024) 
Parent(s)’  IADL limitations: 1−4  0.031 0.179 0.036 0.322 
(ref. None) (0.004)** (0.026)** (0.007)** (0.045)** 
Parent(s)’  IADL limitations: 5−20  0.034 0.697 0.167 1.310 
 (0.008)** (0.060)** (0.014)** (0.148)** 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) −0.004 −0.022 0.001 −0.036 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.006) (0.037) 
Age-squared/100 0.006 0.038 −0.002 0.055 
 (0.004) (0.029) (0.009) (0.057) 
Education (ref. Any graduate school)     
Less than middle school −0.017 −0.037 0.000 0.510 
 (0.012) (0.091) (0.020) (0.183)** 
Any middle school −0.012 0.103 0.004 −0.036 
 (0.008) (0.071) (0.018) (0.143) 
Any high school 0.001 0.026 0.004 0.072 
 (0.006) (0.054) (0.016) (0.085) 
Any college 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.068 
 (0.006) (0.052) (0.016) (0.081) 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced 0.003 −0.008 −0.010 −0.059 
 (0.009) (0.046) (0.018) (0.087) 
Never married −0.001 0.070 0.000 −0.274 
 (0.004) (0.035)* (0.009) (0.071)** 
Owns a house −0.005 0.047 0.012 0.045 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.006)* (0.067) 
Number of own children 0.003 −0.010 −0.004 −0.040 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.028) 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married −0.008 −0.083 0.000 −0.190 
 (0.003)** (0.021)** (0.005) (0.042)** 
At least middle school −0.002 0.005 0.000 0.056 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.005) (0.038) 
Owns a house −0.001 −0.036 0.012 −0.103 
 (0.005) (0.041) (0.009) (0.073) 
Constant 0.088 0.332 −0.033 0.984 
 (0.058) (0.336) (0.111) (0.619) 
Adj. R-squared 0.029 0.247 0.045 0.305 
N 4,190 1,586 4,475 895 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** 
p<0.01. Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are included but not shown. 
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Table 4.5. First-stage regression of care intensity in the Midlife Adult Child sample, female 
Specification of dependent variable Continuous: OLS A set of two dummy variables: LPM 
Dependent variable 
 
Independent variables 
y: ln(1+weekly 
hours of parental 
care) 
y: 1 if 0 < weekly 
hours of care < 5 
(vs. 0 if none) 
y: 1 if weekly 
hours of care ≥ 5 
(vs. 0 if none) 
Identifying instruments    
Parent(s)’  ADL limitations sum (0−14) 0.017 0.006 0.003 
 (0.005)** (0.002)** (0.001) 
Parent(s)’  IADL limitations: 1−4  0.084 0.048 0.018 
(ref. None) (0.018)** (0.007)** (0.005)** 
Parent(s)’  IADL limitations: 5−20  0.122 0.032 0.030 
 (0.023)** (0.009)** (0.007)** 
Co-reside with parent(s) 0.602 0.033 0.177 
 (0.035)** (0.013)* (0.010)** 
Demographics and socioeconomics    
Age (year) −0.022 0.009 −0.010 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.008) 
Age-squared/100 0.023 −0.009 0.011 
 (0.027) (0.010) (0.008) 
Education (ref. Any graduate school)    
Less than middle school 0.012 0.004 0.001 
 (0.099) (0.038) (0.029) 
Any middle school 0.008 0.013 −0.003 
 (0.098) (0.038) (0.029) 
Any high school 0.016 0.009 0.001 
 (0.097) (0.037) (0.029) 
Any college 0.062 0.009 0.017 
 (0.098) (0.037) (0.029) 
Marital status (ref. Married)    
Widow/separated/divorced 0.027 0.002 0.014 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.009) 
Never married −0.230 −0.027 −0.067 
 (0.048)** (0.018) (0.014)** 
Owns a house 0.031 0.016 0.004 
 (0.015)* (0.006)** (0.004) 
Number of own children −0.011 −0.001 −0.003 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Parents’ characteristics    
Currently married −0.041 −0.015 −0.008 
 (0.015)** (0.006)** (0.005) 
At least middle school −0.006 0.008 −0.005 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) 
Owns a house −0.032 −0.012 −0.008 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant 0.545 −0.242 0.255 
 (0.744) (0.285) (0.223) 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.037 0.141 
N 2,726 2,726 2,726 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** 
p<0.01. Parental total assets dummies and region dummies are included but not shown. 
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Table 4.6. Specification tests for instrumental variables for logged weekly care hours in the Adult 
Child sample 
Sample and  model Strengths of instruments 
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
a
Younger Adult Child sample (aged 25-44)    
Extra-residential     
Male (n=4,190) F(3, 4167) = 39.78*** 
chi2(2)  
= 3.025 
chi2(1)  
= 0.08 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Female (n=4,475) F(3, 4452) = 72.05*** 
chi2(2)  
= 2.660 
chi2(1)  
= 1.30 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Co-residential     
Male (n=1,586) F(3, 1563)  = 159.26*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.448 
chi2(1)  
= 2.99 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Female (n=895) F(3, 2000)  = 98.02*** 
chi2(2)  
= 3.371 
chi2(1)  
= 0.69 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Midlife Adult Child sample (aged 45-64)    
Male (N =2,910) F(3, 2886) = 71.04** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.213 
chi2(1)  
= 7.24** 
Good IVs 
IV probit 
Female (N =2,726) F(3, 2702) = 38.75** 
chi2(2)  
= 1.800 
chi2(1)  
= 5.56* 
Good IVs 
IV probit 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01.  *** p<0.001.  aDecisions are 
based on statistical significance of p<0.05. The instruments used were (1) Sum of parent(s)’ ADL 
limitations; (2) Having parents’ IADL limitations between 1 and 4 (yes=1, no=0); and (3) Having parents’ 
IADL limitations between 5 and 20 (yes=1, no=0). 
 
 
Table 4.7. Specification tests for instrumental variables for two dummy variables of care intensity 
in the Adult Child sample 
Sample and  model 
Strengths of instruments 
• 1 if 0 < care hours < 5 
• 1 if care hours ≥ 5 
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
a
Younger Adult Child sample (aged 25-44)    
Male (N=5,776) • F(3, 5752)= 150.41*** • F(3, 5752)= 71.27*** 
chi2(1)  
= 1.536 
chi2(2)  
= 1.09 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Female (N=5,370) • F(3, 5346)= 132.23*** • F(3, 5346)= 78.96*** 
chi2(1)  
= 1.378 
chi2(2)  
= 0.79 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Midlife Adult Child sample (aged 45-64)    
Male (N=2,910) • F(3, 2886)= 61.96*** • F(3, 2886)= 42.38*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.043 
chi2(2)  
= 6.92** 
Good IVs 
IV probit 
Female (N=2,726) • F(3, 2702)= 31.34*** • F(3, 2702)= 20.78*** 
chi2(1)  
= 1.056 
chi2(2)  
= 6.30* 
Good IVs 
IV probit 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** p<0.001. aDecisions are based 
on statistical significance of p<0.05. The instruments used were (1) Sum of parent(s)’ ADL limitations; (2) 
Having parents’ IADL limitations between 1 and 4 (yes=1, no=0); and (3) Having parents’ IADL 
limitations between 5 and 20 (yes=1, no=0).
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Table 4.8. First-stage regression of logged weekly care hours in the Respondent sample, by 
gender and dependent variable 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Any work Hours if work Any work Hours if work 
Identifying instruments     
Any ADL limitation of parents 0.798 0.588 0.596 0.695 
 (0.035)** (0.034)** (0.056)** (0.062)** 
Any ADL limitation of parent-in-laws 0.621 0.399 1.349 0.977 
 (0.081)** (0.073)** (0.085)** (0.102)** 
Any ADL limitation of sibling/relative 0.173 0.144 0.215 0.093 
 (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.060)** (0.070) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Co-reside with parent(s) 0.078 0.058 0.097 0.108 
 (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.031)** (0.034)** 
Age (year) 0.018 0.013 −0.050 0.022 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.043) 
Age-squared/100 −0.014 −0.010 0.049 −0.018 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.040) 
Currently married −0.010 0.020 0.025 −0.016 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school 0.001 0.000 0.038 −0.013 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.052) 
Middle school −0.015 −0.004 0.035 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.042) (0.050) 
High school −0.004 −0.011 −0.001 −0.028 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.038) (0.046) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  0.047 0.004 0.074 0.018 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.050) (0.062) 
Quintile 2  0.026 −0.011 0.040 −0.013 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.043) 
Quintile 3  0.025 0.008 0.024 0.007 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.039) 
Quintile 4  −0.007 −0.030 0.010 −0.012 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.038) 
Owns a house  0.047 0.024 0.016 0.037 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.039) (0.047) 
Disability 0.000 −0.055 0.073 0.033 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.050) (0.076) 
Poor self-rated health 0.026 0.004 0.023 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) 
Constant −0.564 −0.430 1.283 −0.653 
 (0.643) (0.641) (0.910) (1.146) 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.18 
N 2,728 2,035 3,366 1,169 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. *** 
p<0.001. Whether both parents live together, whether parent(s) owns a house, whether parent(s) no formal 
education, and region dummies are included but not shown. 
  99
Table 4.9. Specification tests for instrumental variables for logged weekly care hours in the 
Respondent sample 
Sample and  model Strengths of instruments 
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
a
Male (N =2,728)     
Any work   F(3, 2693) = 196.26*** 
chi2(2) 
= 0.029 
chi2(1) 
= 2.14 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours) 
if any 
F(3, 2000) 
= 114.88*** 
chi2(2) 
= 1.826 
F(1, 2001) 
= 0.39 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any paid work F(3, 2693) = 196.26*** 
chi2(2) 
= 0.536 
chi2(1) 
= 2.10 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(monthly income)  
if any 
F(3, 1915) 
= 115.49*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.944 
F(1, 1916) 
= 0.39 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work F(3, 2693) = 196.26*** 
chi2(2) 
= 0.489 
chi2(1) 
= 0.26 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
F(3, 1009) 
= 59.34*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.087 
F(1, 1010) 
= 0.20 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Female (N =3,366)     
Any work  F(3, 3331) = 128.63*** 
chi2(2) 
= 4.156 
chi2(1) 
= 2.23 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours)  
if any 
F(3, 2234) 
= 74.51*** 
chi2(2) 
= 0.803 
F(1, 1135) 
= 1.87 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any paid work  F(3, 3331) = 128.63*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.671 
chi2(1) 
= 2.14 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(monthly income)  
if any 
F(3, 916) 
= 61.92*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.095 
F(1, 917) 
= 0.39 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work F(3, 3331) = 128.63*** 
chi2(2) 
= 4.133 
chi2(1) 
= 0.14 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
F(3, 547) 
= 40.65*** 
chi2(2) 
= 2.382 
F(1, 548) 
= 0.25 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. *** p<0.001.  aDecisions are based on statistical 
significance of p<0.05. The instruments used were (1) whether parent(s) have ADL limitation; (2) whether 
parent(s)-in-law have any ADL limitation; and (3) whether any sibling or other relatives any ADL 
limitation. 
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Table 4.10. Specification tests for instrumental variables for two dummy variables of care 
intensity in the Respondent sample 
Sample and  model 
Strengths of instruments 
• 1 if 0 < care hours < 10 
• 1 if care hours ≥ 10 
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
a
Male (N =2,728)     
Any work   • F(3, 2693)= 130.38*** • F(3, 2693)= 113.05*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.005 
chi2(2)  
= 2.38 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours) 
if any 
• F(3, 2000)= 122.23*** 
• F(3, 2000)= 45.74*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.276 
F(2, 1999)  
= 0.48 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any paid work • F(3, 2693)= 130.38*** • F(3, 2693)= 113.05*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.314 
chi2(2)  
= 2.30 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(monthly income)  
if any 
• F(3, 1915)= 121.76*** 
• F(3, 1915)= 45.62*** 
chi2(1)  
= 2.154 
F(2, 1914)  
= 0.66 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work • F(3, 2693)= 130.38*** • F(3, 2693)= 113.05*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.029 
chi2(2)  
= 0.52 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
• F(3, 1009)= 56.71*** 
• F(3, 1009)= 30.83*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.329 
F(2, 1008)  
= 0.56 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Female (N =3,366)     
Any work  • F(3, 3331)= 168.28*** • F(3, 3331)= 90.08*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.223 
chi2(2)  
= 5.07† 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(weekly work hours)  
if any 
• F(3, 1134)= 64.62*** 
• F(3, 1134)= 45.56*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.606 
F(2, 1133)  
= 0.29 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any paid work  • F(3, 3331)= 168.28*** • F(3, 3331)= 90.08*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.357 
chi2(2)  
= 3.02 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(monthly income)  
if any 
• F(3, 916)= 59.25*** 
• F(3, 916)= 34.70*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.682 
F(2, 915)  
= 0.51 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Any employed work • F(3, 3331)= 168.28*** • F(3, 3331)= 90.08*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.245 
chi2(2)  
= 2.13 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(hourly wage rate)  
if any 
• F(3, 547)= 66.91*** 
• F(3, 547)= 10.97*** 
chi2(1)  
= 0.396 
F(2, 546)  
= 0.57 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. aDecisions are based on statistical significance of † p <0.1. 
*** p<0.001.  The instruments used were (1) whether parent(s) have ADL limitation; (2) whether parent(s)-
in-law have any ADL limitation; and (3) whether any sibling or other relatives any ADL limitation. 
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Methods to Estimate Effects on Caregivers’ Health 
How to test the hypothesis 
This study estimates the following model in its general specification
 εδβ ++= XICOutcomesHealth _     Eq. (4) 
where Health_Outcomes takes an outcome from the six groups of outcome variables. IC 
may take on 1) logged weekly hours of informal care, 2) a set of two dummy variables 
for less intensive care and more intensive care, or 3) a set of three variables for spouse 
care, parent care, and parent-in-law care. X is a vector of other explanatory variables. The 
coefficient β is of main interest. 
To test the hypotheses H2a to H2c, I check the sign and statistical significance of 
estimated coefficient(s) β. For favorable health outcomes, I expect β to have negative 
signs. For unfavorable outcomes, I expect statistically significant and positive coefficient 
estimates of β. To test the hypothesis H2d, I run an F-test of whether the three coefficient 
estimates are statistically different from each other. 
 
Overview of the estimation strategy 
Depending on the nature of an outcome measure, I employ different estimation 
methods, including ordinary least squares, probit, and ordered probit estimation. I also 
use the two-part model framework for two expenditures variables: logged out-of-pocket 
costs for outpatient care use and logged out-of-pocket costs for prescription drug use. 
Again, I test for potential endogeneity between informal care and caregiver health 
outcomes. One exception is the ordered probit model of self-rated health, for which a 
canned statistical program is not available.  
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Testing for and controlling for selection into caregiving 
To address the potential endogeneity issue, I use the IV method as in the study on 
caregivers’ labor market outcomes. In this study, good instruments should predict the 
main explanatory variable(s) on informal care, but should not directly affect a health 
outcome measure being studied. This second condition requires exercising great caution 
in using functional limitations of blood-tie family members as IVs, compared with the 
study on caregivers’ labor market outcomes. This is because blood-tie family members’ 
functional limitations may affect the caregiver’s psychological and physical health 
outcomes. Suppose, for example, a daughter whose diabetic mother had cerebral stroke 
and is now bedridden due to post-stroke disability. Given the genetic nature of diabetes, 
the daughter may be more likely to report poorer self-rated health, suffer more depressive 
symptoms and take more prescription drugs. Moreover, having a disabled mother around 
might directly affect the daughter’s emotional well-being. Therefore, I begin with only 
two instrumental variables, any ADL limitation of father-in-law and any ADL limitation 
of mother-in-law, which are less likely to suffer from such issues of instrument validity. 
The basic assumption here is that parents-in-law’s ADL limitation will not directly affect 
the caregiver’s health other than through the daughter-in-law’s informal caregiving.  
While acknowledging the aforementioned conceptual issue with using functional 
limitations of blood-tie family members as IVs, I include another instrumental variable, 
any ADL limitation of parent(s), for the following reasons. First, parents’ ADL limitation 
may be only poorly indicative of the current health status of adult children that are likely 
more than 20 years younger than their parents. In fact, the set of the three IVs passed 
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overidentification tests in all statistical models used. Second, there must be at least three 
IVs to be able to conduct the overidentification test when the functional form of informal 
caregiving takes on two dummy variables (less intensive, more intensive). Third, using 
more IVs creates more variation in the predicted values for the endogenous variable, thus 
allowing for increasing the efficiency of the IV estimation. Table 4.11 presents results of 
two selected first-stage regression models, and Table 4.12 provides a summary of the 
results of specification tests. As expected, IVs have high statistical significance 
individually (Table 4.11) and jointly (2nd column of Table 4.12). Furthermore, tests of 
exclusion restrictions show that IVs are valid in all models (3rd column of Table 4.12). 
Endogeneity is detected in only two conditional regression models of health care use (4th 
column of Table 4.12). 
 
Other methodological issues 
Because this study uses cross-sectional data, it is not possible to tell whether the 
thirteen common diseases in the data preceded informal caregiving or arose during the 
course of caregiving. In the first case, omitting the disease indicators will lead to omitted 
variable bias. On the other hand, if one or more of the thirteen diseases occurred after 
caregiving was initiated, including all common disease indicators in the model might lead 
to underestimate the total effect of informal caregiving, only by capturing the direct 
effects not mediated by the disease indicators. This concern is particularly salient when 
disease conditions such as heart diseases are included in the model. In that case, the 
estimated coefficient on informal caregiving will not be able to capture the possible 
negative effects of caregiving on heart diseases. Weighing the relative merits of each 
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option, I conduct all statistical analyses both with and without the thirteen disease 
indicators. 
Of the control variables included in the health care use models, voluntary private 
health insurance raises another concern for potential endogeneity issue. While in general 
health insurance status is endogenous in models of health care use, the current 
institutional setting around health insurance in South Korea lowers the possibility of 
endogeneity. The majority of private health insurance plans purchased are of 
supplemental type, which compensates enrollees for part of large out-of-pocket 
expenditures not paid by the National Health Insurance (NHI). Insurance coverage is 
mostly designed for critical illnesses and inpatient care. Furthermore, most outpatient 
care use and regular prescription drug use are covered relatively well by the NHI. People 
are unlikely to buy private health insurance based on expected outpatient or prescription 
drug use. Thus, I treat voluntary health insurance as an exogenous explanatory variable in 
the models of health care use.  
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Table 4.11. First-stage regressions of logged weekly hours of informal care 
Independent var. (1) (2) 
Identifying instruments   
Any ADL limitation of father-in-law 0.389 1.163 
 (0.105)** (0.256)** 
Any ADL limitation of mother-in-law 1.478 1.598 
 (0.071)** (0.129)** 
Any ADL limitation of parent(s) 0.736 0.719 
 (0.034)** (0.063)** 
Demographics   
Female 0.051 0.066 
 (0.012)** (0.023)** 
Age (year) 0.000 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.011) 
Age-squared/100 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
Currently married 0.072 0.088 
 (0.015)** (0.023)** 
Education (ref. College)   
Elementary school  -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.040) 
Middle school 0.009 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.042) 
High school -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.040) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)   
Quintile 1 0.059 0.060 
 (0.026)* (0.047) 
Quintile 2 0.042 0.080 
 (0.018)* (0.032)* 
Quintile 3 0.032 0.028 
 (0.017) (0.031) 
Quintile 4 0.020 0.060 
 (0.016) (0.030)* 
Owns a house 0.011 -0.030 
 (0.021) (0.039) 
Disability diagnosed -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.023) (0.034) 
Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.088 
N 9,732 3,898 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. (1) First-stage regression 
for the main regression model of any regular prescription drug use, (2) First-stage regression for the main 
regression model of logged total out-of-pocket costs if any regular prescription drug use. Both models were 
estimated including 13 disease indicators variables and 14 regional dummy variables (not shown in the 
table).  
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Table 4.12. Specification tests for instrumental variables for logged weekly care hours 
Model Strengths of instruments 
Test of 
exclusion 
restrictions 
Exogeneity 
test  Conclusion
a 
Satisfaction     
Satisfaction with QOL F(3, 9709) = 323.27*** 
chi2(2)  
= 1.557 
F(1, 9710)  
= 2.04 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Satisfaction with health F(3, 9709) = 323.27*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.300 
F(1, 9710)  
= 0.54 
Good IVs 
OLS 
Depressive symptomatology     
Feeling depressed for two 
weeks or more during the 
past year or being on anti-
depressant medication  
F(3, 9723) 
= 326.20*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.973 
chi2(1)  
= 0.22 
Good IVs 
Probit 
CES-D score F(3, 9666) = 332.28*** 
chi2(2)  
= 1.957 
F(1, 9667)  
= 0.68 
Good IVs 
OLS 
CES-D number of items 
checked  ≥ 4 
F(3, 9666) 
= 332.28*** 
chi2(2)  
= 2.204 
chi2(1)  
= 0.02 
Good IVs 
Probit 
CES-D score ≥ 10 F(3, 9666) = 332.28*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.899 
chi2(1)  
= 0.03 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Body pain     
Having pain affecting daily 
activities 
F(3, 9709) 
= 323.27*** 
chi2(2)  
= 3.168 
chi2(1)  
= 0.01 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Self-rated health     
Fair to poor F(3, 9709) = 323.27*** 
chi2(2)  
= 2.235 
chi2(1)  
= 1.31 
Good IVs 
Probit 
Outpatient care use     
Any outpatient care use F(3, 9684) = 323.14*** 
chi2(2)  
= 2.210 
chi2(1)  
= 1.79 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(out-of-pocket costs) if any F(3, 6032) = 200.57*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.694 
F(1, 6033)  
= 8.48*** 
Good IVs 
IV-2SLS 
Prescription drug use     
Any prescription drug use  F(3, 9684) = 323.14*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.127 
chi2(1)  
= 0.08 
Good IVs 
Probit 
ln(out-of-pocket costs if any F(3, 3851) = 112.66*** 
chi2(2)  
= 0.029 
F(1, 3852)  
= 4.22** 
Good IVs 
IV-2SLS 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. ** Statistically significant 
at the 5% level *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. aDecisions are based on statistical significance 
of p<0.05. The instruments used were (1) whether father-in-law has any ADL limitation; (2) whether 
mother-in-law has any ADL limitation; and (3) whether parent(s) have any ADL limitation. 
 
 
 
 
   
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
 
Effects of Informal Care on Caregivers’ Labor Market Outcomes 
Fixed effects estimation 
Hausman specification test comparing estimation results between random-effects 
LPM and fixed-effects LPM suggested that the fixed-effects estimates are preferred. I 
also present estimation results of fixed-effects logit model. In both estimated models, 
providing more hours of parental informal care is found to decrease caregiver’s labor 
force participation (Tables 5.1-5.2). More intensive caregivers have lower probabilities of 
participating in the labor force, regardless of which cutoff point was used (Table 5.2). 
Interestingly, less intensive caregivers show no lower likelihood of labor force 
participation than non-caregivers. If informal caregiving were purely correlated with 
unobserved lower employability shared within sibling-groups, then fixed-effects 
estimates would be insignificant. The results suggest that, even after controlling for 
sibling-group effects, parental informal caregiving has negative effects on caregiving 
child’s labor force participation. 
 
Instrumental variables estimation 
For men, the effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes are 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level in most analyses (Tables 5.3-5.17), except for 
two models (Table 5.6, Table 5.14). For women, providing informal care appears to have 
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negative effects on caregivers’ labor market outcomes, but statistical significance varies 
by subsample and specification of care intensity. In the Adult Child sample, all four 
regression models using the specification of ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) produce 
statistically significant Probit or IV Probit estimates (Tables 5.3-5.6). When the amount 
of informal care takes the functional form of two dummy variables (Tables 5.7-5.8), 
caregiving intensity does not have statistically significant effects on labor force 
participation among female caregivers. 
In the Respondent sample, however, models using the specification of ln(1+ 
weekly hours of informal care) mostly produce statistically insignificant results at the 5% 
level (Tables 5.10-5.14), with one exception (Table 5.9). Results using the dummy 
variable specification show statistically significant estimates at the 5% level among 
female caregivers (Tables 5.15-5.17). The three tables show coefficient estimates for the 
two dummy-variable specification with different cutoffs for more intensive caregiving. 
These results suggest that more intensive caregiving and less intensive caregiving may 
have different effects in the extensive/intensive margin adjustments for labor market 
outcomes. For example, in Panel C of Table 5.15 and Table 5.16, more intensive 
caregivers, defined as caregivers providing informal care at least 20 hours per week, are 
less likely to be participate in Any work (coefficient: −0.597, p<0.01) or Any paid work 
(coefficient: −0.373, p<0.1), while less intensive caregivers do not show such effects at 
the extensive margin. However, among those participating in Any work or Any paid work, 
less intensive caregivers also experience a diminish in weekly hours worked and income. 
For those currently in Any work, being a less intensive caregiver decreases her weekly 
work hours by about 20.5% (coefficient: −0.205, p<0.1). Less intensive caregivers in Any 
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paid work earn less by about 56.7% (coefficient: −0.567, p<0.05). Taken together, more 
intensive caregivers are less likely to be in the labor force altogether. Less intensive 
caregivers may still participate in the labor force but experience a penalty in labor market 
outcomes. Table 5.17 presents results of Any employed work and conditional hourly wage 
rate for employed workers. More intensive female caregivers appear to have wage 
penalty even when they are employed, but these effects are statistically significant only at 
the 10% level. 
These results from the Respondent sample suggest that threshold effects exist for 
care intensity. Based on these findings, I present summarized results using the dummy 
variable specification. Table 5.18 shows bootstrapped incremental effects of providing 
less intensive and more intensive care on labor market outcomes. Again, the results 
suggest that the effects of caregiving on labor market outcomes are concentrated among 
more intensive caregivers. Caregivers providing care more than 20 hours per week are 
less likely to participate in Any work by 17.4% points. Moreover, even when participating 
in employed work, they earn much less than otherwise similar non-caregivers. 
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Table 5.1. Fixed-effects LPM and logit model of LFP in the Adult Child sample, extra-residential 
Independent var. FE LPM FE Logit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) −0.062 −0.502 
 (0.025)* (0.255)* 
Demographics and socioeconomics   
Female −0.474 −2.685 
 (0.010)** (0.078)** 
Age (year) 0.022 0.224 
 (0.007)** (0.048)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.028 −0.282 
 (0.007)** (0.053)** 
Education (ref. Any graduate)   
Less than middle school −0.177 −1.282 
 (0.041)** (0.347)** 
Any middle school −0.130 −0.927 
 (0.038)** (0.328)** 
Any high school −0.087 −0.587 
 (0.034)* (0.302) 
Any college 0.015 0.082 
 (0.033) (0.292) 
Marital status (ref. Married)   
Widow/separated/divorced 0.017 −0.070 
 (0.031) (0.180) 
Never married 0.048 0.268 
 (0.020)* (0.140) 
Owns a house 0.150 1.098 
 (0.012)** (0.097)** 
Number of own children −0.015 −0.111 
 (0.006)* (0.044)* 
Constant 0.485 - 
 (0.154)**  
Number of observations 
(number of sibling-groups) 
13,568 
(4,597) 
8,837 
(2,332) 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-64 who do not co-reside with their parent(s). * 
p<0.05. ** p<0.01. LPM is linear probability model. 
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Table 5.2. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in fixed-effects LPM and 
logit model of LFP in the Adult Child sample, extra-residential 
Independent var. FE LPM FE Logit 
Any care (vs. No care hour) −0.035 −0.155 
 (0.038) (0.301) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)    
Care < 5 hours/week 0.000 0.081 
 (0.040) (0.318) 
Care ≥ 5 hours/week −0.276 −2.139 
 (0.084)** (0.933)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)   
Care < 7.5 hours/week −0.009 −0.001 
 (0.040) (0.311) 
Care ≥ 7.5 hours/week −0.253 −1.995 
 (0.089)** (0.994)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)   
   
Care < 10 hours/week −0.013 −0.004 
 (0.039) (0.311) 
Care ≥ 10 hours/week −0.301 −2.556 
 (0.105)** (1.302)* 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-64 who do not co-reside with their parent(s). 
*p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the same as in each corresponding model above. 
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Table 5.3. Probit and IV Probit of LFP in the Younger Adult Child sample (extra-residential 
subsample), by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) −0.022 0.439 −0.436 −1.120 
 (0.345) (2.158) (0.185)* (0.632) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) 0.465 0.467 −0.012 −0.010 
 (0.067)** (0.068)** (0.056) (0.056) 
Age-squared/100 −0.645 −0.648 0.022 0.021 
 (0.096)** (0.097)** (0.078) (0.078) 
Education (ref. Any graduate)     
Less than middle school 0.176 0.179 −0.467 −0.465 
 (0.234) (0.235) (0.180)** (0.181)* 
Any middle school −0.056 −0.054 −0.206 −0.201 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.158) (0.158) 
Any high school 0.414 0.411 −0.270 −0.263 
 (0.137)** (0.137)** (0.137)* (0.138) 
Any college 0.370 0.368 0.075 0.083 
 (0.130)** (0.131)** (0.135) (0.135) 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced −0.747 −0.749 0.597 0.588 
 (0.157)** (0.158)** (0.153)** (0.153)** 
Never married −0.646 −0.645 0.951 0.951 
 (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.078)** (0.078)** 
Owns a house 0.592 0.594 0.516 0.521 
 (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.053)** (0.054)** 
Number of own children −0.052 −0.053 −0.107 −0.110 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.027)** (0.027)** 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married −0.093 −0.092 −0.153 −0.147 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.048)** (0.048)** 
At least middle school 0.034 0.036 −0.021 −0.023 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.048) (0.048) 
Owns a house −0.063 −0.063 −0.107 −0.103 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.083) (0.084) 
Constant −7.010 −7.050 0.067 0.032 
 (1.188)** (1.203)** (0.997) (1.002) 
N 4,190 4,475 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44, extra-residential subsample only. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01.  Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are 
included but not shown. 
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Table 5.4. Probit and IV Probit of LFP in the Younger Adult Child sample (co-residential 
subsample), by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) −0.074 0.271 −0.204 −0.071 
 (0.096) (0.225) (0.094)* (0.189) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) 0.559 0.561 0.239 0.243 
 (0.087)** (0.087)** (0.117)* (0.118)* 
Age-squared/100 −0.770 −0.776 −0.368 −0.377 
 (0.130)** (0.130)** (0.178)* (0.179)* 
Education (ref. Any graduate)     
Less than middle school −0.954 −0.966 0.442 0.339 
 (0.380)* (0.381)* (0.558) (0.578) 
Any middle school −0.699 −0.747 −0.180 −0.188 
 (0.306)* (0.311)* (0.423) (0.425) 
Any high school −0.076 −0.090 0.394 0.385 
 (0.239) (0.240) (0.251) (0.252) 
Any college −0.079 −0.090 0.815 0.804 
 (0.231) (0.233) (0.239)** (0.240)** 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced −0.336 −0.344 0.389 0.413 
 (0.218) (0.219) (0.267) (0.269) 
Never married −0.387 −0.421 0.185 0.224 
 (0.185)* (0.187)* (0.222) (0.231) 
Owns a house 0.463 0.452 0.150 0.145 
 (0.147)** (0.148)** (0.209) (0.210) 
Number of own children 0.168 0.167 0.007 0.013 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.090) (0.093) 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married 0.000 0.013 0.065 0.078 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.129) (0.131) 
At least middle school −0.044 −0.041 0.050 0.040 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.120) (0.121) 
Owns a house 0.130 0.130 0.154 0.175 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.221) (0.222) 
Constant −8.908 −8.887 −4.048 −4.157 
 (1.489)** (1.497)** (1.943)* (1.956)* 
N 1,586 895 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 25-44, co-residential subsample only. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are 
included but not shown. 
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Table 5.5. Probit and IV Probit of LFP in the Younger Adult Child sample (both co- and extra-
residential), by gender 
Male Female Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) −0.088 0.377 −0.206 −0.409 
 (0.089) (0.433) (0.080)** (0.290) 
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.196 −0.220 0.148 0.173 
 (0.051)** (0.055)** (0.064)* (0.073)* 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) 0.508 0.504 0.024 0.027 
 (0.051)** (0.051)** (0.047) (0.047) 
Age-squared/100 −0.702 −0.697 −0.031 −0.035 
 (0.074)** (0.074)** (0.066) (0.067) 
Education (ref. Any graduate)     
Less than middle school −0.153 −0.155 −0.310 −0.301 
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.165) (0.165) 
Any middle school −0.208 −0.217 −0.087 −0.084 
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.141) (0.141) 
Any high school 0.296 0.293 −0.118 −0.114 
 (0.119)* (0.119)* (0.119) (0.120) 
Any college 0.268 0.265 0.242 0.246 
 (0.114)* (0.114)* (0.117)* (0.117)* 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced −0.553 −0.556 0.679 0.681 
 (0.124)** (0.124)** (0.128)** (0.128)** 
Never married −0.600 −0.609 0.849 0.840 
 (0.075)** (0.075)** (0.071)** (0.072)** 
Owns a house 0.561 0.558 0.505 0.508 
 (0.070)** (0.070)** (0.051)** (0.052)** 
Number of own children −0.016 −0.016 −0.093 −0.095 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.025)** (0.026)** 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married −0.055 −0.050 −0.126 −0.128 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.045)** (0.045)** 
At least middle school 0.006 0.008 −0.023 −0.022 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) 
Owns a house −0.028 −0.028 −0.070 −0.073 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.078) (0.078) 
Constant −7.767 −7.673 −0.672 −0.733 
 (0.895)** (0.902)** (0.838) (0.843) 
N 5,776 5,370 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64. Preferred models are in bold. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are 
included but not shown. 
 
  115
Table 5.6. Probit and IV Probit of LFP in the Midlife Adult Child sample (1), by gender 
Male Female Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of parental care) −0.015 0.802 −0.087 −0.983 
 (0.071) (0.319)* (0.079) (0.398)* 
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.110 −0.327 0.551 1.107 
 (0.082) (0.118)** (0.139)** (0.282)** 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) 0.577 0.647 0.352 0.326 
 (0.127)** (0.133)** (0.129)** (0.132)* 
Age-squared/100 −0.587 −0.661 −0.389 −0.361 
 (0.119)** (0.126)** (0.124)** (0.127)** 
Education (ref. Any graduate)     
Less than middle school −1.044 −0.993 −1.129 −1.089 
 (0.352)** (0.353)** (0.427)** (0.438)* 
Any middle school −0.727 −0.682 −1.247 −1.208 
 (0.352)* (0.352) (0.427)** (0.437)** 
Any high school −0.671 −0.626 −1.256 −1.216 
 (0.345) (0.345) (0.423)** (0.433)** 
Any college −0.621 −0.585 −0.893 −0.809 
 (0.346) (0.346) (0.425)* (0.436) 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced −0.791 −0.828 0.403 0.427 
 (0.119)** (0.124)** (0.113)** (0.117)** 
Never married −0.684 −0.704 0.198 −0.006 
 (0.162)** (0.167)** (0.184) (0.210) 
Owns a house 0.655 0.656 0.637 0.659 
 (0.073)** (0.074)** (0.059)** (0.061)** 
Number of own children 0.019 0.017 −0.068 −0.077 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036)* 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married −0.104 −0.127 −0.082 −0.097 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064) 
At least middle school −0.033 −0.025 −0.187 −0.211 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.078)* (0.081)** 
Owns a house 0.064 0.045 −0.212 −0.261 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.094)* (0.099)** 
Constant −12.273 −13.973 −7.327 −6.696 
 (3.391)** (3.532)** (3.364)* (3.452) 
N 2,910 2,726 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** 
p<0.01. *** p<0.001. Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are included but not shown. 
 
 
  116
Table 5.7. Probit and IV Probit of LFP in the Midlife Adult Child sample (2), by gender 
Male Female Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
Dummy for care intensity (ref. none)     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 5 −0.103 0.408 −0.185 −1.956 
 (0.165) (0.935) (0.202) (2.948) 
Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 5 0.170 2.698 −0.150 −1.739 
 (0.231) (1.619) (0.266) (4.672) 
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.117 −0.326 0.533 0.886 
 (0.082) (0.117)** (0.140)** (0.756) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Age (year) 0.586 0.671 0.353 0.349 
 (0.127)** (0.143)** (0.129)** (0.151)* 
Age-squared/100 −0.596 −0.684 −0.390 −0.384 
 (0.120)** (0.136)** (0.124)** (0.148)** 
Education (ref. Any graduate)     
Less than middle school −1.054 −1.033 −1.130 −1.095 
 (0.354)** (0.355)** (0.428)** (0.436)* 
Any middle school −0.737 −0.732 −1.247 −1.196 
 (0.353)* (0.356)* (0.427)** (0.438)** 
Any high school −0.681 −0.680 −1.256 −1.215 
 (0.346)* (0.350) (0.423)** (0.432)** 
Any college −0.628 −0.621 −0.894 −0.826 
 (0.347) (0.348) (0.425)* (0.438) 
Marital status (ref. Married)     
Widow/separated/divorced −0.793 −0.829 0.404 0.433 
 (0.119)** (0.124)** (0.113)** (0.130)** 
Never married −0.689 −0.708 0.202 0.049 
 (0.162)** (0.173)** (0.184) (0.307) 
Owns a house 0.658 0.658 0.638 0.668 
 (0.073)** (0.076)** (0.059)** (0.069)** 
Number of own children 0.019 0.018 −0.068 −0.072 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.038) 
Parents’ characteristics     
Currently married −0.105 −0.131 −0.083 −0.102 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064) 
At least middle school −0.036 −0.033 −0.187 −0.197 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.078)* (0.095)* 
Owns a house 0.060 0.025 −0.212 −0.264 
 (0.118) (0.122) (0.094)* (0.100)** 
Constant −12.476 −14.522 −7.351 −7.279 
 (3.394)** (3.755)** (3.364)* (3.940) 
N 2,910 2,726 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents’ adult children aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** 
p<0.01. *** p<0.001. Parental total assets dummies and regional dummies are included but not shown. 
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Table 5.8. Coefficient estimates in Probit/IV Probit of LFP in the Midlife Adult Child sample 
Male (N=2, 910) Female (N=2, 726) Dependent var. & 
Key explanatory dummy var. Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Panel A: cutoff at 5 hours per week     
Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 5 0.103 (0.165) −0.185 (0.202) 
Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 5 0.170 (0.268) −0.150 (0.266) 
IV Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 5 0.408 (0.935) −1.956 (2.948) 
   Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 5 2.698 (1.619) −1.739 (4.672) 
Panel B: cutoff at 7.5 hours per week     
Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care <7.5 0.075 (0.158) −0.170 (0.196) 
   Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 7.5 −0.318 (0.275) −0.179 (0.278) 
IV Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 7.5 0.305 (1.000) −3.666 (2.740) 
   Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 7.5 4.827 (3.513) 1.348 (4.792) 
Panel C: cutoff at 10 hours per week     
Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 10 0.060 (0.154) −0.119 (0.190) 
   Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 10 −0.338 (0.301) −0.308 (0.297) 
IV Probit of LFP     
0 < Weekly hours of parental care < 10 0.332 (0.987) −3.159 (2.043) 
   Weekly hours of parental care ≥ 10 5.936 (4.600) 0.708 (3.896) 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Preferred estimates are in bold, but none are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5.9. Probit and IV Probit of Any work in the Respondent sample, by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −0.059 0.212 −0.110 0.062 
 (0.072) (0.200) (0.046)* (0.124) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.137 −0.174 0.280 0.244 
 (0.081) (0.085)* (0.075)** (0.078)** 
Age (year) −0.023 −0.029 −0.036 −0.034 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.085) (0.085) 
Age-squared/100 −0.052 −0.047 −0.013 −0.016 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.078) (0.078) 
Currently married 0.591 0.594 −0.246 −0.252 
 (0.111)** (0.112)** (0.068)** (0.069)** 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.051 −0.051 0.043 0.036 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
Middle school 0.085 0.088 0.024 0.015 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104) 
High school 0.054 0.055 −0.063 −0.067 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.094) (0.095) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  −0.402 −0.410 0.189 0.175 
 (0.166)* (0.166)* (0.125) (0.126) 
Quintile 2  −0.177 −0.180 0.258 0.249 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.085)** (0.086)** 
Quintile 3  −0.075 −0.079 0.225 0.220 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.076)** (0.077)** 
Quintile 4  −0.141 −0.136 0.132 0.129 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.073) (0.073) 
Owns a house  −0.131 −0.140 −0.036 −0.037 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.098) (0.098) 
Disability −0.617 −0.620 −0.367 −0.378 
 (0.107)** (0.108)** (0.137)** (0.138)** 
Poor self-rated health −0.790 −0.799 −0.269 −0.275 
 (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.061)** (0.062)** 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together 0.313 0.304 0.027 0.024 
 (0.142)* (0.143)* (0.085) (0.086) 
Parent(s) owns a house −0.086 −0.097 −0.150 −0.150 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.073)* (0.073)* 
Parent(s) no formal education −0.061 −0.064 0.062 0.063 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.053) (0.053) 
Constant 3.407 3.607 1.933 1.870 
 (3.102) (3.115) (2.290) (2.300) 
N 2,728 3,366 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.10. OLS and IV-2SLS models for logged weekly hours worked in the Respondent 
sample, by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −0.005 0.043 −0.017 −0.133 
 (0.032) (0.085) (0.037) (0.092) 
Demographics and socioeconomics     
Co-reside with parent(s) 0.060 0.056 −0.047 −0.027 
 (0.027)* (0.028)* (0.046) (0.049) 
Age (year) 0.038 0.037 0.062 0.069 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.059) (0.059) 
Age-squared/100 −0.041 −0.040 −0.066 −0.072 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.054) (0.055) 
Currently married 0.013 0.011 0.003 0.002 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.029 −0.029 0.163 0.161 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.071)* (0.071)* 
Middle school 0.040 0.040 0.209 0.214 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.068)** (0.069)** 
High school 0.060 0.061 0.186 0.185 
 (0.026)* (0.026)* (0.063)** (0.063)** 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  0.009 0.009 0.025 0.024 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.086) (0.086) 
Quintile 2  0.053 0.053 0.013 0.012 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.059) (0.060) 
Quintile 3  0.043 0.043 0.062 0.061 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.054) (0.054) 
Quintile 4  0.053 0.055 0.049 0.048 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.052) 
Owns a house  0.015 0.014 −0.014 −0.015 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.065) (0.065) 
Disability −0.110 −0.109 −0.230 −0.227 
 (0.051)* (0.051)* (0.105)* (0.105)* 
Poor self-rated health 0.013 0.012 0.066 0.069 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043) 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together 0.065 0.064 0.034 0.040 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.056) (0.056) 
Parent(s) owns a house −0.048 −0.049 0.006 0.004 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.049) (0.049) 
Parent(s) no formal education 0.044 0.043 0.014 0.018 
 (0.022)* (0.022)* (0.036) (0.037) 
Constant 2.886 2.917 2.191 1.983 
 (1.007)** (1.009)** (1.574) (1.588) 
N 2,035 1,169 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, Any work subsample only. Standard errors in parentheses. * 
p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.11. Probit and IV Probit of Any paid work in the Respondent sample, by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −0.085 0.177 −0.064 0.110 
 (0.073) (0.197) (0.046) (0.127) 
Demographics     
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.147 −0.183 0.134 0.099 
 (0.080) (0.085)* (0.077) (0.081) 
Age (year) −0.070 −0.076 0.029 0.031 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.088) (0.088) 
Age-squared/100 −0.010 −0.005 −0.079 −0.081 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.081) (0.082) 
Currently married 0.584 0.586 −0.422 −0.428 
 (0.111)** (0.112)** (0.069)** (0.069)** 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.040 −0.039 −0.054 −0.061 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.109) 
Middle school 0.065 0.068 −0.096 −0.105 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.105) (0.105) 
High school 0.040 0.041 −0.148 −0.152 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  −0.460 −0.468 0.214 0.199 
 (0.165)** (0.166)** (0.128) (0.129) 
Quintile 2  −0.180 −0.184 0.271 0.262 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.088)** (0.089)** 
Quintile 3  −0.087 −0.091 0.247 0.241 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.079)** (0.079)** 
Quintile 4  −0.153 −0.148 0.110 0.107 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.076) (0.076) 
Owns a house  −0.159 −0.167 −0.047 −0.049 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.100) (0.100) 
Disability −0.603 −0.606 −0.264 −0.275 
 (0.107)** (0.108)** (0.140) (0.140) 
Poor self-rated health −0.789 −0.797 −0.224 −0.230 
 (0.080)** (0.081)** (0.063)** (0.064)** 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together 0.304 0.296 −0.048 −0.051 
 (0.141)* (0.142)* (0.087) (0.087) 
Parent(s) owns a house −0.079 −0.089 −0.098 −0.099 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.075) (0.075) 
Parent(s) no formal education −0.072 −0.075 0.012 0.013 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.055) (0.055) 
Constant 4.763 4.948 0.487 0.439 
 (3.087) (3.100) (2.372) (2.380) 
N 2,728 3,366 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.12. OLS and IV-2SLS models for logged monthly income in the Respondent sample, by 
gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −0.050 −0.147 −0.111 −0.212 
 (0.084) (0.216) (0.083) (0.203) 
Demographics     
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.067 −0.058 0.107 0.127 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.115) (0.121) 
Age (year) 0.147 0.149 0.241 0.247 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.143) (0.144) 
Age-squared/100 −0.172 −0.174 −0.252 −0.257 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.133) (0.134) 
Currently married 0.166 0.169 −0.040 −0.041 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.101) (0.101) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.475 −0.476 −0.338 −0.337 
 (0.103)** (0.103)** (0.167)* (0.167)* 
Middle school −0.286 −0.288 −0.343 −0.337 
 (0.090)** (0.090)** (0.160)* (0.161)* 
High school −0.284 −0.286 −0.144 −0.145 
 (0.071)** (0.071)** (0.147) (0.147) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  −0.808 −0.807 −0.520 −0.524 
 (0.143)** (0.143)** (0.199)** (0.199)** 
Quintile 2  −0.501 −0.502 −0.282 −0.284 
 (0.098)** (0.098)** (0.143)* (0.143)* 
Quintile 3  −0.277 −0.277 −0.298 −0.300 
 (0.082)** (0.082)** (0.129)* (0.129)* 
Quintile 4  −0.251 −0.255 −0.114 −0.115 
 (0.078)** (0.078)** (0.127) (0.127) 
Owns a house −0.136 −0.134 −0.275 −0.276 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.149) (0.149) 
Disability −0.093 −0.097 −0.183 −0.181 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.235) (0.235) 
Poor self-rated health −0.300 −0.299 −0.123 −0.121 
 (0.101)** (0.101)** (0.103) (0.103) 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together 0.043 0.046 0.037 0.045 
 (0.098) (0.099) (0.132) (0.132) 
Parent(s) owns a house 0.201 0.203 0.196 0.194 
 (0.080)* (0.080)* (0.113) (0.113) 
Parent(s) no formal education −0.018 −0.016 −0.065 −0.062 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.086) (0.086) 
Constant 2.600 2.537 −0.603 −0.762 
 (2.689) (2.693) (3.819) (3.833) 
N 1,950 951 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, Any paid work subsample only. Standard errors in 
parentheses. p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.13. Probit and IV Probit of Any employed work in the Respondent sample, by gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −0.022 −0.097 −0.065 0.003 
 (0.073) (0.164) (0.052) (0.149) 
Demographics     
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.074 −0.064 0.130 0.119 
 (0.071) (0.074) (0.084) (0.088) 
Age (year) 0.123 0.125 −0.033 −0.031 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099) 
Age-squared/100 −0.149 −0.151 −0.022 −0.023 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091) 
Currently married 0.163 0.163 −0.190 −0.192 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.076)* (0.076)* 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.171 −0.171 −0.012 −0.015 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.119) (0.119) 
Middle school −0.222 −0.224 −0.037 −0.041 
 (0.086)* (0.086)** (0.114) (0.115) 
High school −0.258 −0.258 −0.196 −0.196 
 (0.069)** (0.069)** (0.105) (0.105) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  0.168 0.170 0.487 0.483 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.143)** (0.143)** 
Quintile 2  0.053 0.054 0.429 0.425 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.100)** (0.100)** 
Quintile 3  0.176 0.177 0.374 0.371 
 (0.081)* (0.081)* (0.090)** (0.090)** 
Quintile 4  −0.015 −0.016 0.202 0.200 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.087)* (0.087)* 
Owns a house  0.131 0.134 0.065 0.066 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110) 
Disability −0.359 −0.357 −0.268 −0.273 
 (0.113)** (0.113)** (0.160) (0.160) 
Poor self-rated health −0.552 −0.550 −0.188 −0.190 
 (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.071)** (0.072)** 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together 0.140 0.143 −0.007 −0.008 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.094) (0.094) 
Parent(s) owns a house 0.017 0.018 −0.085 −0.086 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.082) (0.082) 
Parent(s) no formal education 0.066 0.067 −0.031 −0.030 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) 
Constant −2.525 −2.576 1.375 1.334 
 (2.563) (2.566) (2.646) (2.649) 
N 2,728 3,366 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.14. OLS and IV-2SLS models for logged hourly wage rate in the Respondent sample, by 
gender 
Male Female 
Independent variables 
OLS IV-2SLS OLS IV-2SLS 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.060 0.030 −0.037 −0.016 
 (0.028)* (0.071) (0.020) (0.046) 
Demographics     
Co-reside with parent(s) −0.015 −0.012 0.030 0.026 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Age (year) 0.086 0.086 0.023 0.022 
 (0.034)* (0.034)* (0.034) (0.034) 
Age-squared/100 −0.089 −0.089 −0.023 −0.022 
 (0.032)** (0.032)** (0.032) (0.032) 
Currently married 0.100 0.101 −0.035 −0.035 
 (0.042)* (0.042)* (0.024) (0.024) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school −0.329 −0.331 −0.360 −0.359 
 (0.035)** (0.036)** (0.039)** (0.040)** 
Middle school −0.331 −0.333 −0.364 −0.365 
 (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.037)** (0.037)** 
High school −0.272 −0.274 −0.300 −0.298 
 (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.035)** (0.035)** 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1  −0.258 −0.257 −0.165 −0.165 
 (0.050)** (0.050)** (0.047)** (0.047)** 
Quintile 2  −0.177 −0.177 −0.094 −0.094 
 (0.035)** (0.035)** (0.035)** (0.035)** 
Quintile 3  −0.143 −0.142 −0.036 −0.037 
 (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.032) (0.032) 
Quintile 4  −0.086 −0.087 −0.060 −0.062 
 (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.031) (0.032) 
Owns a house −0.027 −0.027 −0.037 −0.036 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) 
Disability 0.036 0.035 −0.056 −0.057 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.056) (0.057) 
Poor self-rated health −0.093 −0.092 −0.041 −0.042 
 (0.036)** (0.036)* (0.024) (0.024) 
Other parental characteristics     
Both parents live together −0.034 −0.033 −0.005 −0.008 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) 
Parent(s) owns a house 0.073 0.074 0.018 0.019 
 (0.027)** (0.028)** (0.026) (0.026) 
Parent(s) no formal education −0.037 −0.036 −0.024 −0.024 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant −1.072 −1.087 0.356 0.374 
 (0.922) (0.923) (0.904) (0.906) 
N 1,044 582 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64, Any employed work subsample only. Standard errors in 
parentheses. p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.15. Coefficient estimates in Probit models of Any work and OLS models of conditional 
logged weekly hours worked in the Respondent sample 
Male Female Dependent var. & 
Key explanatory dummy var. Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Panel A: cutoff at 10 hours per week     
Any work     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.024 (0.267) 0.167 (0.184) 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.304 (0.268) −0.506 (0.184)** 
ln(weekly work hours) if any work     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.102 (0.088) −0.273 (0.119)* 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.029 (0.124) −0.018 (0.144) 
Panel B: cutoff at 15 hours per week     
Any work     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 −0.044 (0.243) 0.118 (0.168) 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 −0.279 (0.298) −0.597 (0.207)** 
ln(weekly work hours) if any work     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 0.107 (0.083) −0.175 (0.110) 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 −0.081 (0.141) −0.158 (0.169) 
Panel C: cutoff at 20 hours per week     
Any work     
0 < Informal care hours <20 −0.122 (0.229) 0.068 (0.162) 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.166 (0.326) −0.597 (0.218)** 
ln(weekly work hours) if any work     
0 < Informal care hours < 20 0.117 (0.082) −0.205 (0.108)† 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.138 (0.149) −0.072 (0.179) 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Conditional hours models used Any work subsample only. 
† Statistically significant at the 10% level. p<0.05. ** p<0.01. 
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Table 5.16. Coefficient estimates in Probit models of Any paid work and OLS models of 
conditional logged monthly income in the Respondent sample 
Male Female Dependent var. & 
Key explanatory dummy var. Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Panel A: cutoff at 10 hours per week     
Any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.064 (0.267) 0.309 (0.185)† 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.411 (0.272) −0.375 (0.187)* 
ln(monthly income) if any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.048 (0.229) −0.411 (0.265) 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.272 (0.322) −0.400 (0.333) 
Panel B: cutoff at 15 hours per week     
Any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 −0.010 (0.243) 0.202 (0.169) 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 −0.412 (0.304) −0.381 (0.206)† 
ln(monthly income) if any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 0.034 (0.217) −0.548 (0.253)** 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 −0.327 (0.367) −0.110 (0.363) 
Panel C: cutoff at 20 hours per week     
Any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 20 −0.084 (0.229) 0.156 (0.163) 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.333 (0.331) −0.373 (0.216)† 
ln(monthly income) if any paid work     
0 < Informal care hours < 20 0.010 (0.214) −0.567 (0.246)* 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 −0.286 (0.387) −0.009 (0.384) 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Conditional income models used Any paid work subsample 
only. † p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
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Table 5.17. Coefficient estimates in Probit models of Any employed work and OLS models of 
conditional logged hourly wage rate in the Respondent sample 
Male Female Dependent var. & 
Key explanatory dummy var. Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Panel A: cutoff at 10 hours per week     
Any employed work     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 −0.140 (0.233) 0.207 (0.201) 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 −0.065 (0.272) −0.437 (0.226)† 
ln(hourly wage rate) if employed     
0 < Informal care hours < 10 0.168 (0.086)† −0.014 (0.062) 
Informal care hours ≥ 10 0.099 (0.105) −0.151 (0.085)† 
Panel B: cutoff at 15 hours per week     
Any employed work     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 −0.095 (0.217) 0.064 (0.191) 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 −0.136 (0.308) −0.336 (0.235) 
ln(hourly wage rate) if employed     
0 < Informal care hours < 15 0.123 (0.080) −0.014 (0.062) 
Informal care hours ≥ 15 0.180 (0.120) −0.151 (0.085)† 
Panel C: cutoff at 20 hours per week     
Any employed work     
0 < Informal care hours < 20 −0.157 (0.211) 0.049 (0.184) 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 0.011 (0.325) −0.362 (0.251) 
ln(hourly wage rate) if employed     
0 < Informal care hours < 20 0.123 (0.080) −0.016 (0.060) 
Informal care hours ≥ 20 0.180 (0.120) −0.176 (0.094)† 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Conditional income models used Any paid work subsample 
only. † p<0.10 
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Table 5.18. Bootstrapped incremental effects of informal care on labor market outcomes in the 
Respondent sample 
 Male [95% C.I.] Female [95% C.I.] 
Panel A1: 0 < Weekly care hours < 10     
Pr(Any work) 0.010 [−0.163, 0.149] 0.060 [−0.075, 0.206] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) 5.458 [−3.390, 15.34] −12.23 [−27.21, 3.598] 
E(weekly hours worked) 4.551 [−5.936, 14.00] −1.645 [−11.91, 6.203] 
Pr(Any employed work) −0.025 [−0.184, 0.148] 0.060 [−0.041, 0.194] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.415 [−0.147, 1.300] −0.034 [−0.202, 0.182] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.127 [−0.206, 0.439] 0.029 [−0.040, 0.109] 
Panel A2: Weekly care hours ≥ 10     
Pr(Any work) −0.117 [−0.307, 0.036] −0.152* [−0.238, −0.050] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) −1.437 [−16.89, 12.66] −0.833 [−14.82, 20.67] 
E(weekly hours worked) −6.671 [−20.83, 3.786] −7.660 [−15.58, 0.284] 
Pr(Any employed work) 0.004 [−0.181, 0.188] −0.082* [−0.142, −0.007] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.367 [−0.237, 1.243] −0.165* [−0.265, −0.066] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.144 [−0.306, 0.506] −0.077* [−0.127, −0.033] 
Panel B1: 0 < Weekly care hours < 20     
Pr(Any work) −0.028 [−0.175, 0.094] 0.025 [−0.084, 0.154] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) 6.312 [−2.965, 13.95] −10.38 [−22.82, 4.813] 
E(weekly hours worked) 3.406 [−6.897, 11.34] −2.368 [−10.29, 4.508] 
Pr(Any employed work) −0.031 [−0.185, 0.121] 0.016 [−0.065, 0.118] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.317 [−0.167, 0.914] −0.035 [−0.179, 0.152] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.082 [−0.222, 0.346] 0.004 [−0.063, 0.067] 
Panel B1: Weekly care hours ≥ 20     
Pr(Any work) −0.093 [−0.286, 0.080] −0.174* [−0.266, −0.041] 
E(weekly hours worked | hours > 0) −6.312 [−22.24, 11.01] −3.363 [−19.02, 19.93] 
E(weekly hours worked) −9.294 [−29.65, 2.687] −9.638* [−18.66, −0.985] 
Pr(Any employed work) 0.032 [−0.183, 0.248] −0.069 [−0.149, 0.031] 
E(hourly wage rate | wage > 0) 0.591 [−0.246, 1.789] −0.187* [−0.292, −0.079] 
E(hourly wage rate) 0.262 [−0.296, 0.654] −0.073* [−0.120, −0.010] 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents aged 45-64. Conditional models only used observations with positive 
outcome values. Reference category is no informal care for all estimations. Bias-corrected bootstrapped 
95% confidence intervals derived from 1,000 repetitions are shown in brackets. * Incremental effects are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Effects of Informal Care on Caregivers’ Health 
Overall, the results show that providing more informal care leads to poorer health 
outcomes, regardless of type of outcomes, functional forms of informal care and whether 
or not the models include the thirteen health condition indicators. Below I will describe 
key findings for each of the six outcome groups. For each outcome group, I present the 
results in two tables. The first table for each outcome group presents estimation results 
when the main explanatory variable is specified as the natural logarithm of (1+weekly 
hours of informal care). The second table for each outcome group has a summary of 
estimated coefficients for four different specifications of care intensity. All the four 
specification involves one or two dummy variables with the reference category being No 
care hour (non-caregiver). Because endogeneity was detected only for the conditional 
models of out-of-pocket costs of outpatient care use and out-of-pocket costs of 
prescription drug use, I do not repeat the endogeneity issue for other outcomes. 
Satisfaction with health and satisfaction with quality of life decrease by informal 
caregiving (Tables 5.19-5.20). These results can be interpreted directly and more 
intuitively than results in other models because the two dependent variables are 
continuous on a scale of 0 to 100. For example, a 100% increase in weekly hours of 
informal care (e.g., 4 to 8 hours or 10 to 20 hours) leads to a decease in the score of 
satisfaction with quality of life by 1.994 (first column) and a decease in the score of 
satisfaction with health by 1.039 (third column). Much greater impact on these outcomes 
is observed when caregiver groups are compared with non-caregiver groups (Table 5.20). 
Compared between the two outcomes of satisfaction, satisfaction of quality of life 
appears to respond more sensitively than satisfaction with health for any given amount of 
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informal caregiving. Although providing any care shows statistically significant effects 
(first row, Table 5.20), other results of the three two-dummy specifications suggest that 
the effects for overall caregivers arise mainly from intensive caregiving. Most of the 
coefficient estimates for less intensive caregivers are statistically insignificant, and their 
effect magnitudes are also relatively small (second to last rows, Table 5.20). The negative 
effect of intensive caregiving is substantial, compared with other coefficient estimates. 
For example, being an intensive caregiver providing 20 or more hours of care per week 
has a greater negative effect on satisfaction with quality of life (−7.362, last row and third 
column, Table 5.20) than having disability or any of the 13 disease indicators (third 
column, Table 5.20). (Other coefficient estimates remained virtually the same between 
Table 5.19 and Table 5.20.)  Moreover, this reduction in satisfaction with quality of life is 
comparable to the effect of being placed in the second lowest quintile of total assets 
(−7.728, compared with the highest quintile), or the effect of having had only middle 
school education (−6.292, compared with college education). 
Caregiving also appears to increase depressive symptoms among caregivers. 
Longer hours of informal care lead to higher CES-D scores, and higher probabilities of 
being depressed for the three different definitions in the study sample (Table 5.21). Such 
findings do not change qualitatively after changing the functional form of informal care 
from logged hours of informal care to different sets of dummy variables (Table 5.22). 
Consistent with these findings, more intensive caregivers experience more severe 
depressive symptoms as shown by their larger coefficient estimates than those of less 
intensive caregivers (second to last rows, Table 5.22), with only one exception. 
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Furthermore, even providing any informal care is found to affect caregiver’s depressive 
symptoms (first row, Table 5.22). 
Pain affecting daily activities is more likely to be reported as the amount of 
informal care provided increases (Tables 5.23-5.24). The coefficient estimates of 
informal care change little depending on whether or not the model includes the thirteen 
disease indicators, although the estimates in the full model are consistently smaller than 
the reduced model.  
Self-rated health is poorer as caregiving intensity increases. In the ordered probit 
model of self-rated health measured in a five-category scale, an increase in informal care 
hours is found to increase the probability of being placed in less favorable self-rated 
health categories (first and second columns, Table 5.25). When the dependent variable is 
defined as a binary variable, the results show that more caregiving hours will increase the 
probability of rating one’s health as Fair to Poor (third and fourth columns, Table 5.25). 
However, when caregiving is specified as a set of two dummy variables with the 
reference being non-caregiver, less intensive caregivers do not appear to have statistically 
significant negative effects for their self-rated health (Table 5.26). More intensive 
caregiving has negative and statistically significant effects on their self-rated health. 
Informal caregiving does not appear to increase the probability of using any 
outpatient care in the past 12 months (Tables 5.27-5.28), while increasing out-of-pocket 
costs from outpatient care use among those who used any outpatient care (Table 5.29). A 
10% increase in weekly hours of informal care leads to a 2.7 to 3.18 percentage increase 
in out-of-pocket costs (second and fourth columns, Table 5.29). Because endogeneity was 
detected in the conditional regressions, the preferred models are IV-2SLS models 
  131
presented in the second and fourth columns of Table 5.29. When dummy variable 
specifications are used, none of the coefficient estimates in the preferred models is 
statistically significant, although they all have a positive sign with a relatively large 
magnitude (Table 5.30). 
Prescription drug use shows similar patterns to outpatient care use. Informal 
caregiving does not have statistically significant effects on any regular prescription drug 
use (Tables 5.31-5.32). However, out-of-pocket costs related to prescription drug use 
increase with caregiving intensity (Table 5.33). A 10% increase in weekly hours of 
informal care leads to a 1.99 to 2.30 percentage increase in out-of-pocket costs from 
prescription drug use (second and fourth columns, Table 5.33).  
Lastly, I present estimation results when informal care hours are split into three 
variables depending on care recipient’s relation to the caregiver (Table 5.35). The most 
prominent is from the coefficient estimates on care for parent-in-law (third row in each 
panel, Table 5.35). While caregiving for in-laws may result in a higher average score of 
satisfaction with quality of life, the estimation results for other outcome measures suggest 
that they have poorer self-rated health (third and fourth columns, Panel A), an increased 
probability of being depressed (third column, Panel B), and a higher propensity of regular 
prescription drug use and related out-of-pocket costs (third and fourth columns, Panel D). 
Among people who reported any regular prescription drug use in the past 12 months, a 
10% increase in weekly hours of parent-in-law care leads to a 1.65% increase in out-of-
pocket costs from prescription drug use (coefficient: 0.165, p<0.01). Results for other two 
types of informal caregiving are less conclusive. Providing spousal care increases the 
probability of being depressed for one definition of depression based on CES-D score 
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(coefficient: 0.582, p<0.05) but not for other outcome measures of depressive 
symptomatology. Care for one’s own parent appears to have some effects on depressive 
symptomatology, but the results are inconsistent depending on how to define depression 
(third and fourth columns, Panel B, Table 5.35). 
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Table 5.19. OLS regression analyses of satisfaction with quality of life and satisfaction with 
health  
Dependent var.
Independent var. 
Satisfaction with  
quality of life (0-100) 
Satisfaction with  
health (0-100) 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) −1.994 −2.087 −1.039 −1.285 
 (0.432)** (0.426)** (0.430)* (0.448)** 
Demographics     
Female 1.944 1.294 −2.757 −4.158 
 (0.437)** (0.417)** (0.493)** (0.491)** 
Age (year) −0.130 −0.380 0.082 −0.861 
 (0.203) (0.201) (0.230) (0.234)** 
Age-squared/100 0.118 0.291 −0.169 0.465 
 (0.161) (0.160) (0.182) (0.186)* 
Currently married 4.659 4.830 1.485 2.127 
 (0.608)** (0.610)** (0.664)* (0.683)** 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  −9.796 −10.348 −9.714 −10.961 
 (0.740)** (0.741)** (0.829)** (0.859)** 
Middle school −6.292 −6.559 −6.101 −6.688 
 (0.744)** (0.748)** (0.822)** (0.854)** 
High school −3.644 −3.691 −3.542 −3.638 
 (0.653)** (0.654)** (0.710)** (0.732)** 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 −17.695 −17.870 −15.334 −15.980 
 (1.014)** (1.023)** (1.103)** (1.154)** 
Quintile 2 −7.728 −7.837 −7.551 −7.889 
 (0.661)** (0.661)** (0.742)** (0.768)** 
Quintile 3 −4.555 −4.699 −3.685 −4.116 
 (0.567)** (0.567)** (0.662)** (0.685)** 
Quintile 4 −3.352 −3.434 −2.277 −2.528 
 (0.543)** (0.544)** (0.628)** (0.655)** 
Owns a house 0.163 0.397 −2.792 −2.192 
 (0.836) (0.847) (0.880)** (0.931)* 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed −4.745 −5.883 −10.509 −13.403 
 (1.007)** (0.993)** (1.138)** (1.138)** 
Hypertension 0.763  −2.496  
 (0.466)  (0.522)**  
Diabetes −2.418  −7.619  
 (0.645)**  (0.717)**  
Cancer −5.309  −13.068  
 (1.489)**  (1.759)**  
Chronic lung disease −2.811  −10.403  
 (1.437)  (1.555)**  
Liver disease −0.537  −7.591  
 (1.544)  (1.835)**  
Heart disease −2.677  −8.069  
 (1.003)**  (1.089)**  
Stroke  −3.560  −9.448  
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 (1.251)**  (1.463)**  
Psychiatric problem −4.901  −8.805  
 (1.529)**  (1.601)**  
Arthritis −3.412  −7.996  
 (0.605)**  (0.665)**  
Injury due to traffic accident −1.603  −1.849  
 (0.720)*  (0.798)*  
Fall in the last two years 0.617  −3.203  
 (1.139)  (1.243)**  
Prostate disease −0.294  −2.856  
 (1.294)  (1.314)*  
Urinary incontinence −2.159  −3.696  
 (0.762)**  (0.835)**  
N 9,753 9,753 9,753 9,753 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large administrative areas were 
included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. 
 
 
Table 5.20. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in OLS regression 
analyses of satisfaction with quality of life and satisfaction with health 
Dependent var.
 
Satisfaction with  
quality of life (0-100) 
Satisfaction with  
health (0-100) 
Key independent var. (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) −4.834 −5.143 −2.647 −3.348 
 (1.235)** (1.229)** (1.288)* (1.367)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week −0.571 −0.950 −1.261 −1.866 
 (1.645) (1.641) (2.044) (2.149) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week −7.532 −7.797 −3.524 −4.286 
 (1.680)** (1.673)** (1.638)* (1.753)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week −0.941 −1.263 −1.600 −2.183 
 (1.517) (1.514) (1.870) (1.982) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week −8.452 −8.754 −3.620 −4.433 
 (1.853)** (1.844)** (1.746)* (1.862)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week −2.641 −3.034 −1.874 −2.589 
 (1.516)† (1.511)* (1.741) (1.855) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week −7.362 −7.578 −3.537 −4.225 
 (1.958)** (1.950)** (1.881)† (1.995)* 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.1 * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the 
same as in each corresponding model above. (1) Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included; (2) 
Thirteen disease indicator dummies were not included. 
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Table 5.21. Probit and OLS regression analyses of depressive symptomatology 
Model estimation Probit OLS Probit Probit 
Dependent var.
Independent var. 
(1) CES-D score (2) (3) 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.076 0.389 0.137 0.110 
 (0.029)** (0.086)** (0.026)** (0.026)** 
Demographics     
Female 0.267 0.398 0.161 0.141 
 (0.041)** (0.080)** (0.030)** (0.035)** 
Age (year) 0.014 −0.006 0.013 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.042) (0.014) (0.016) 
Age-squared/100 −0.013 0.035 −0.001 −0.009 
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) 
Currently married −0.295 −1.266 −0.246 −0.344 
 (0.046)** (0.130)** (0.038)** (0.040)** 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  0.291 1.082 0.487 0.561 
 (0.079)** (0.126)** (0.057)** (0.071)** 
Middle school 0.116 0.481 0.344 0.349 
 (0.081) (0.122)** (0.058)** (0.073)** 
High school −0.080 0.184 0.117 0.14 
 (0.077) (0.100) (0.054)* (0.070)* 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 0.332 1.847 0.569 0.576 
 (0.086)** (0.198)** (0.069)** (0.078)** 
Quintile 2 0.23 0.863 0.342 0.401 
 (0.064)** (0.130)** (0.049)** (0.057)** 
Quintile 3 −0.017 0.321 0.219 0.202 
 (0.064) (0.105)** (0.046)** (0.056)** 
Quintile 4 0.019 0.180 0.193 0.195 
 (0.063) (0.097) (0.045)** (0.055)** 
Owns a house −0.058 0.042 −0.029 −0.035 
 (0.069) (0.162) (0.057) (0.063) 
Disability diagnosed 0.377 1.303 0.348 0.377 
 (0.068)** (0.210)** (0.059)** (0.062)** 
Constant −1.761 5.838 −1.626 −2.426 
 (0.575)** (1.268)** (0.452)** (0.503)** 
N 9,754 9,697 9,697 9,697 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large administrative areas 
were included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. CES-D=Center for Epidemiologic Study 
Depression scale.  
(1): Feeling depressed for two weeks or more during the past year or being on anti-depressant medication 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
(2): CES-D number of items ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 
(3): CES-D score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Table 5.22. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in OLS and probit 
regression analyses of depressive symptomatology 
Model estimation Probit OLS Probit Probit 
Dependent var.
Key independent var. 
(1) CES-D score (2) (3) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.244 1.084 0.392 0.330 
 (0.093)** (0.243)** (0.077)** (0.082)** 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.179 0.641 0.250 0.266 
 (0.155) (0.329)† (0.122)* (0.136)† 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.281 1.370 0.482 0.368 
 (0.115)* (0.334)** (0.100)** (0.101)** 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.227 0.655 0.207 0.218 
 (0.137)† (0.288)* (0.108)† (0.122)† 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week 0.259 1.494 0.563 0.422 
 (0.125)* (0.380)** (0.111)** (0.110)** 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.313 0.815 0.293 0.270 
 (0.123)* (0.285)** (0.104)** (0.116)* 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week 0.169 1.392 0.503 0.390 
 (0.138) (0.400)** (0.115)** (0.114)** 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the same as in each corresponding 
model above. 
 (1): Feeling depressed for two weeks or more during the past year or being on anti-depressant medication 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
(2): CES-D number of items checked ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no) 
(3): CES-D score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Table 5.23. Probit regression analyses of having pain affecting daily activities 
Independent var. (1) (2) 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.067 0.073 
 (0.027)* (0.026)** 
Demographics   
Female 0.369 0.533 
 (0.039)** (0.036)** 
Age (year) 0.014 0.078 
 (0.017) (0.016)** 
Age-squared/100 0.005 −0.040 
 (0.013) (0.012)** 
Currently married 0.013 −0.023 
 (0.042) (0.040) 
Education (ref. College)   
Elementary school  0.631 0.711 
 (0.078)** (0.075)** 
Middle school 0.357 0.416 
 (0.081)** (0.078)** 
High school 0.123 0.145 
 (0.079) (0.076) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)   
Quintile 1 0.451 0.483 
 (0.081)** (0.078)** 
Quintile 2 0.299 0.306 
 (0.057)** (0.055)** 
Quintile 3 0.112 0.126 
 (0.055)* (0.053)* 
Quintile 4 0.038 0.049 
 (0.056) (0.054) 
Owns a house 0.120 0.103 
 (0.067) (0.065) 
Disability and health condition indicator   
Disability diagnosed 0.568 0.706 
 (0.064)** (0.061)** 
Hypertension 0.135  
 (0.036)**  
Diabetes 0.170  
 (0.048)**  
Cancer 0.345  
 (0.096)**  
Chronic lung disease 0.392  
 (0.099)**  
Liver disease 0.392  
 (0.117)**  
Heart disease 0.121  
 (0.069)  
Stroke  0.439  
 (0.093)**  
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Psychiatric problem 0.156  
 (0.104)  
Arthritis 0.809  
 (0.041)**  
Injury due to traffic accident 0.377  
 (0.051)**  
Fall in the last two years 0.460  
 (0.074)**  
Prostate disease 0.167  
 (0.098)  
Urinary incontinence 0.351  
 (0.053)**  
N 9,731 9,731 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large administrative areas were 
included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. Thirteen disease indicator dummies were 
included (1), and not included (2). 
 
 
 
Table 5.24. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in probit regression 
analyses of having pain affecting daily activities 
Key independent var. (1) (2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.249 0.280 
 (0.083)** (0.082)** 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)    
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.264 0.305 
 (0.143)† (0.132)* 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.241 0.265 
 (0.101)* (0.102)** 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)   
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.305 0.358 
 (0.125)* (0.120)** 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week 0.202 0.214 
 (0.109)† (0.108)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)   
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.261 0.324 
 (0.118)* (0.114)** 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week 0.237 0.234 
 (0.115)* (0.114)* 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the same as in each corresponding 
model above. Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included (1), and not included (2). 
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Table 5.25. Ordered probit and probit regression analyses of self-rated health 
Model estimation Ordered probit Probit 
Dependent var.
Independent var. 
Self-rated health: 
1 Excellent; 2 Very good;  
3 Good; 4 Fair; 5 Poor 
Self-rated health:  
being  
Fair to Poor (y=1) 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.053 0.068 0.061 0.078 
 (0.022)* (0.021)** (0.028)* (0.027)** 
Demographics     
Female 0.205 0.270 0.228 0.285 
 (0.026)** (0.024)** (0.034)** (0.030)** 
Age (year) 0.023 0.086 0.019 0.090 
 (0.012) (0.012)** (0.015) (0.015)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.003 −0.045 0.002 −0.047 
 (0.009) (0.009)** (0.012) (0.012)** 
Currently married 0.041 −0.012 0.022 −0.035 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.041) (0.039) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  0.527 0.562 0.611 0.64 
 (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.058)** (0.055)** 
Middle school 0.280 0.302 0.382 0.405 
 (0.044)** (0.044)** (0.059)** (0.057)** 
High school 0.111 0.113 0.19 0.189 
 (0.039)** (0.039)** (0.055)** (0.052)** 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 0.419 0.432 0.416 0.428 
 (0.061)** (0.060)** (0.074)** (0.071)** 
Quintile 2 0.224 0.229 0.267 0.268 
 (0.040)** (0.039)** (0.051)** (0.049)** 
Quintile 3 0.116 0.135 0.162 0.180 
 (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.047)** (0.045)** 
Quintile 4 0.049 0.062 −0.002 0.016 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.046) (0.044) 
Owns a house 0.049 0.012 0.041 0.006 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.060) (0.058) 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed 0.652 0.800 0.684 0.849 
 (0.060)** (0.056)** (0.073)** (0.069)** 
Hypertension 0.266  0.301  
 (0.028)**  (0.035)**  
Diabetes 0.510  0.524  
 (0.041)**  (0.049)**  
Cancer 1.084  1.056  
 (0.113)**  (0.111)**  
Chronic lung disease 0.937  0.986  
 (0.092)**  (0.130)**  
Liver disease 0.703  0.788  
 (0.101)**  (0.129)**  
Heart disease 0.687  0.663  
 (0.066)**  (0.081)**  
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Stroke  0.815  0.801  
 (0.091)**  (0.119)**  
Psychiatric problem 0.705  0.944  
 (0.107)**  (0.144)**  
Arthritis 0.553  0.577  
 (0.037)**  (0.045)**  
Injury due to traffic accident 0.204  0.248  
 (0.042)**  (0.051)**  
Fall in the last two years 0.403  0.432  
 (0.068)**  (0.086)**  
Prostate disease 0.32  0.381  
 (0.073)**  (0.096)**  
Urinary incontinence 0.297  0.253  
 (0.046)**  (0.056)**  
/cut1 0.013 1.956   
/cut2 1.044 2.962   
/cut3 2.400 4.237   
/cut4 3.426 5.144   
N 9,731 9,731 9,731 9,731 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large administrative areas were 
included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. 
 
Table 5.26. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in ordered probit and 
probit regression analyses of self-rated health 
Model estimation Ordered probit Probit 
Dependent var.
 
1 Excellent; 2 Very good;  
3 Good; 4 Fair; 5 Poor 
Self-rated health being  
Fair to Poor (y=1 vs. 0) 
Key independent var. (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.059 0.107 0.102 0.146 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.085) (0.081)† 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week −0.099 −0.048 −0.040 −0.002 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.160 0.207 0.186 0.238 
 (0.082)† (0.081)* (0.107)† (0.101)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week −0.107 −0.052 −0.046 0.007 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.109) (0.107) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week 0.219 0.260 0.236 0.275 
 (0.091)* (0.090)** (0.119)* (0.113)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week −0.091 −0.030 −0.058 0.004 
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.103) (0.101) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week 0.237 0.269 0.280 0.312 
 (0.098)* (0.095)** (0.129)* (0.122)* 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the same as in each corresponding 
model above. Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included (1), and not included (2).
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Table 5.27. Probit and IV probit regression analyses of Any outpatient care use 
Independent var. Probit IVP Probit IVP 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.023 0.132 0.028 0.160 
 (0.026) (0.086) (0.026) (0.085) 
Demographics     
Female 0.299 0.294 0.323 0.316 
 (0.031)** (0.032)** (0.029)** (0.030)** 
Age (year) 0.054 0.054 0.090 0.090 
 (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.037 −0.037 −0.061 −0.061 
 (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
Currently married 0.069 0.061 0.043 0.033 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  0.101 0.102 0.131 0.133 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)* (0.052)* 
Middle school 0.133 0.133 0.151 0.151 
 (0.054)* (0.054)* (0.054)** (0.053)** 
High school 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.068 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 −0.259 −0.263 −0.239 −0.243 
 (0.069)** (0.069)** (0.069)** (0.069)** 
Quintile 2 −0.120 −0.124 −0.110 −0.115 
 (0.048)* (0.048)** (0.047)* (0.047)* 
Quintile 3 −0.082 −0.084 −0.067 −0.070 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Quintile 4 −0.088 −0.090 −0.079 −0.081 
 (0.043)* (0.043)* (0.043) (0.043) 
Owns a house −0.110 −0.111 −0.122 −0.123 
 (0.057) (0.056)* (0.056)* (0.056)* 
Medical Security     
Statutory (ref. National Health Insurance)     
MedicalAid Type 1 0.044 0.023 0.116 0.090 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.078) (0.080) 
MedicalAid Type 2 −0.072 −0.080 −0.041 −0.050 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) 
Voluntary private health insurance 0.182 0.181 0.173 0.171 
 (0.034)** (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.033)** 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed 0.08 0.082 0.171 0.172 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.060)** (0.061)** 
Hypertension 0.257 0.257   
 (0.033)** (0.033)**   
Diabetes 0.310 0.311   
 (0.046)** (0.046)**   
Cancer 0.073 0.066   
 (0.091) (0.091)   
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Chronic lung disease 0.254 0.255   
 (0.099)* (0.098)**   
Liver disease 0.556 0.549   
 (0.121)** (0.120)**   
Heart disease 0.194 0.191   
 (0.072)** (0.068)**   
Stroke  0.202 0.204   
 (0.098)* (0.095)*   
Psychiatric problem 0.407 0.404   
 (0.116)** (0.112)**   
Arthritis 0.236 0.237   
 (0.041)** (0.041)**   
Injury due to traffic accident 0.085 0.081   
 (0.048) (0.048)   
Fall in the last two years 0.098 0.095   
 (0.076) (0.074)   
Prostate disease 0.281 0.278   
 (0.090)** (0.090)**   
Urinary incontinence 0.097 0.092   
 (0.053) (0.053)   
N 9,731 9,731 9,731 9,731 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies were included but are not shown here. 
 
Table 5.28. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in probit and IV probit 
regression analyses of Any outpatient care use 
Key independent var. 
Probit 
(1) 
IV Regressa 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
IV Regressa 
 (2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.092 0.250 0.107 0.301 
 (0.080) (0.185) (0.079) (0.184) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.049 0.594 0.057 0.569 
 (0.044) (0.379) (0.044) (0.374) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.022 −0.317 0.028 −0.238 
 (0.034) (0.366) (0.035) (0.360) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.053 0.485 0.062 0.476 
 (0.039) (0.299) (0.039) (0.297) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week 0.014 −0.462 0.018 −0.374 
 (0.037) (0.494) (0.038) (0.487) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.056 0.451 0.063 0.449 
 (0.037) (0.277) (0.037)† (0.276) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week 0.006 −0.432 0.011 −0.354 
 (0.039) (0.475) (0.040) (0.471) 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the same as in each corresponding 
model above. Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included (1), and not included (2). aLinear IV 
regression was used because IV probit did not converge. 
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Table 5.29. OLS and IV-2SLS regression analyses of logged out-of-pocket costs from outpatient 
care use if Any 
Independent var. OLS IV-2SLS  OLS IV-2SLS 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.000 0.273 0.009 0.318 
 (0.028) (0.104)** (0.029) (0.106)** 
Demographics     
Female 0.183 0.165 0.227 0.207 
 (0.037)** (0.038)** (0.036)** (0.037)** 
Age (year) 0.110 0.111 0.152 0.153 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** (0.017)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.091 −0.092 −0.119 −0.120 
 (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.013)** 
Currently married 0.084 0.061 0.052 0.027 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  −0.163 −0.155 −0.131 −0.123 
 (0.067)* (0.067)* (0.067) (0.068) 
Middle school −0.137 −0.135 −0.12 −0.119 
 (0.067)* (0.067)* (0.068) (0.068) 
High school −0.148 −0.145 −0.146 −0.144 
 (0.061)* (0.062)* (0.062)* (0.063)* 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 −0.087 −0.098 −0.057 −0.070 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
Quintile 2 −0.107 −0.120 −0.097 −0.113 
 (0.057) (0.058)* (0.058) (0.059) 
Quintile 3 −0.115 −0.120 −0.103 −0.109 
 (0.052)* (0.052)* (0.053) (0.053)* 
Quintile 4 −0.093 −0.099 −0.089 −0.097 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) 
Owns a house 0.072 0.071 0.058 0.058 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Medical Security     
Statutory (ref. National Health Insurance)     
MedicalAid Type 1 −1.091 −1.148 −0.990 −1.055 
 (0.098)** (0.102)** (0.093)** (0.098)** 
MedicalAid Type 2 −0.363 −0.377 −0.32 −0.336 
 (0.108)** (0.108)** (0.111)** (0.111)** 
Voluntary private health insurance 0.053 0.048 0.025 0.019 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed 0.139 0.148 0.252 0.258 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.079)** (0.080)** 
Hypertension 0.288 0.292   
 (0.038)** (0.038)**   
Diabetes 0.219 0.223   
 (0.051)** (0.051)**   
Cancer 0.300 0.290   
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 (0.128)* (0.128)*   
Chronic lung disease 0.289 0.293   
 (0.121)* (0.121)*   
Liver disease 0.278 0.249   
 (0.128)* (0.131)   
Heart disease 0.26 0.251   
 (0.075)** (0.075)**   
Stroke  0.319 0.319   
 (0.111)** (0.111)**   
Psychiatric problem 0.294 0.287   
 (0.112)** (0.113)*   
Arthritis 0.325 0.328   
 (0.047)** (0.047)**   
Injury due to traffic accident 0.053 0.031   
 (0.055) (0.056)   
Fall in the last two years 0.158 0.146   
 (0.091) (0.092)   
Prostate disease 0.354 0.336   
 (0.105)** (0.105)**   
Urinary incontinence 0.142 0.126   
 (0.059)* (0.059)*   
N 6,079 6,079 6,079 6,079 
Notes: KLoSA (2006) respondents, excluding persons with any ADL limitation. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large administrative areas were 
included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. 
 
Table 5.30. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in OLS and IV-2SLS 
regression analyses of logged out-of-pocket costs from outpatient care use if Any 
Key independent var. 
OLS 
(1) 
IV-2SLS  
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IV-2SLS 
(2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.033 0.122 0.039 0.150 
 (0.027) (0.069)† (0.028) (0.071)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.304 0.247 0.312 0.122 
 (0.136)* (0.830) (0.136)* (0.892) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week −0.035 1.044 −0.004 1.338 
 (0.109) (0.724) (0.114) (0.763)† 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.257 0.377 0.276 0.317 
 (0.121)* (0.614) (0.122)* (0.649) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week −0.056 1.130 −0.031 1.479 
 (0.120) (0.912) (0.125) (0.965) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.238 0.418 0.259 0.369 
 (0.114)* (0.595) (0.116)* (0.631) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week −0.071 1.079 −0.048 1.416 
 (0.127) (0.900) (0.133) (0.952) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Thirteen disease indicator 
dummies were included (1), and not included (2). 
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Table 5.31. Probit and IV probit regression analyses of Any regular prescription drug use 
Independent var. Probit IVP Probit IVP 
ln(weekly hours of informal care) 0.014 −0.015 0.025 0.106 
 (0.032) (0.109) (0.025) (0.086) 
Demographics     
Female 0.201 0.203 0.187 0.182 
 (0.040)** (0.042)** (0.030)** (0.031)** 
Age (year) 0.104 0.104 0.227 0.226 
 (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.015)** (0.015)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.069 −0.069 −0.153 −0.153 
 (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
Currently married −0.018 −0.016 −0.090 −0.096 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.038)* (0.038)* 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  0.111 0.111 0.111 0.112 
 (0.068) (0.072) (0.054)* (0.055)* 
Middle school 0.043 0.044 0.084 0.084 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.056) (0.057) 
High school 0.02 0.019 0.007 0.008 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.052) (0.053) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 −0.056 −0.055 0.014 0.011 
 (0.090) (0.088) (0.070) (0.070) 
Quintile 2 −0.071 −0.070 −0.028 −0.031 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.048) (0.048) 
Quintile 3 −0.075 −0.075 0.011 0.009 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.045) (0.045) 
Quintile 4 −0.058 −0.058 −0.014 −0.015 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044) 
Owns a house 0.008 0.008 −0.020 −0.021 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.057) (0.057) 
Medical Security     
Statutory (ref. National Health Insurance)     
MedicalAid Type 1 0.392 0.398 0.405 0.389 
 (0.111)** (0.102)** (0.081)** (0.080)** 
MedicalAid Type 2 0.328 0.331 0.288 0.282 
 (0.133)* (0.113)** (0.093)** (0.092)** 
Voluntary private health insurance −0.062 −0.061 −0.081 −0.082 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.034)* (0.034)* 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed 0.290 0.289 0.383 0.384 
 (0.084)** (0.076)** (0.062)** (0.060)** 
Hypertension 2.120 2.120   
 (0.055)** (0.044)**   
Diabetes 1.738 1.738   
 (0.093)** (0.065)**   
Cancer 0.889 0.891   
 (0.132)** (0.102)**   
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Chronic lung disease 0.604 0.604   
 (0.162)** (0.109)**   
Liver disease 0.773 0.776   
 (0.189)** (0.132)**   
Heart disease 1.030 1.032   
 (0.136)** (0.092)**   
Stroke  0.689 0.689   
 (0.182)** (0.127)**   
Psychiatric problem 1.129 1.131   
 (0.183)** (0.129)**   
Arthritis 0.759 0.759   
 (0.058)** (0.049)**   
Injury due to traffic accident 0.042 0.043   
 (0.064) (0.059)   
Fall in the last two years 0.012 0.013   
 (0.104) (0.089)   
Prostate disease 0.880 0.881   
 (0.126)** (0.110)**   
Urinary incontinence 0.056 0.057   
 (0.067) (0.064)   
N 9,731 9,731 9,731 9,731 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large 
administrative areas were included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. 
 
Table 5.32. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in probit and IV probit 
regression analyses of Any regular prescription drug use 
Key independent var. 
Probit 
(1) 
IVP 
(1) 
Probit 
(2) 
IVP 
(2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.072 −0.056 0.054 0.186 
 (0.097) (0.253) (0.077) (0.191) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.022 −0.02 0.016 −0.113 
 (0.032) (0.217) (0.042) (0.291) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.018 0.032 0.022 0.256 
 (0.028) (0.205) (0.035) (0.274) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.043 −0.004 0.039 −0.044 
 (0.029) (0.174) (0.038) (0.242) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week −0.003 0.024 0.002 0.274 
 (0.031) (0.276) (0.038) (0.387) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.045† 0.007 0.034 −0.009 
 (0.027) (0.164) (0.036) (0.228) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week −0.010 0.007 0.003 0.225 
 (0.033) (0.270) (0.041) (0.375) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the 
same as in each corresponding model above. (1) Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included; (2) 
Thirteen disease indicator dummies were not included. 
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Table 5.33. OLS and IV-2SLS regression analyses of logged out-of-pocket costs from 
prescription drug use if Any 
Independent var. OLS IV-2SLS  OLS IV-2SLS 
ln(1+ weekly hours of informal care) 0.020 0.199 0.022 0.230 
 (0.034) (0.090)* (0.034) (0.094)* 
Demographics     
Female −0.070 −0.084 −0.040 −0.055 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) 
Age (year) 0.066 0.065 0.096 0.096 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** 
Age-squared/100 −0.06 −0.060 −0.083 −0.082 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** 
Currently married 0.155 0.138 0.142 0.123 
 (0.054)** (0.055)* (0.055)** (0.056)* 
Education (ref. College)     
Elementary school  −0.181 −0.177 −0.121 −0.117 
 (0.090)* (0.090)* (0.091) (0.091) 
Middle school −0.138 −0.140 −0.098 −0.102 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) 
High school −0.142 −0.138 −0.129 −0.126 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
Total assets quintile (ref. Quintile 5)     
Quintile 1 0.153 0.146 0.155 0.148 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.111) 
Quintile 2 0.015 0.003 0.023 0.009 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) 
Quintile 3 0.052 0.051 0.070 0.068 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) 
Quintile 4 −0.028 −0.036 −0.01 −0.018 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) 
Owns a house 0.252 0.255 0.209 0.214 
 (0.091)** (0.091)** (0.092)* (0.092)* 
Medical Security     
Statutory (ref. National Health Insurance)     
MedicalAid Type 1 −1.879 −1.906 −1.835 −1.866 
 (0.109)** (0.110)** (0.106)** (0.108)** 
MedicalAid Type 2 −0.816 −0.835 −0.804 −0.826 
 (0.130)** (0.131)** (0.128)** (0.130)** 
Voluntary private health insurance 0.020 0.017 0.001 −0.002 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
Disability and health condition indicator     
Disability diagnosed 0.061 0.067 0.122 0.126 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
Hypertension 0.038 0.040   
 (0.043) (0.043)   
Diabetes 0.306 0.310   
 (0.047)** (0.047)**   
Cancer 0.407 0.397   
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 (0.132)** (0.131)**   
Chronic lung disease 0.104 0.111   
 (0.122) (0.121)   
Liver disease 0.261 0.244   
 (0.148) (0.149)   
Heart disease 0.386 0.384   
 (0.073)** (0.073)**   
Stroke  0.305 0.308   
 (0.101)** (0.100)**   
Psychiatric problem 0.240 0.231   
 (0.114)* (0.114)*   
Arthritis 0.270 0.276   
 (0.049)** (0.049)**   
Injury due to traffic accident 0.001 −0.007   
 (0.069) (0.069)   
Fall in the last two years 0.152 0.151   
 (0.104) (0.104)   
Prostate disease 0.137 0.125   
 (0.113) (0.112)   
Urinary incontinence 0.080 0.071   
 (0.067) (0.068)   
N 3,898 3,898 3,898 3,898 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Fourteen regional dummies for 15 large 
administrative areas were included in the regression analyses but are not shown here. 
 
Table 5.34. Estimated coefficients on dummy variables of informal care in OLS and IV-2SLS 
regression analyses of logged out-of-pocket costs from prescription drug use if Any 
Key independent var. 
OLS 
(1) 
IV-2SLS  
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IV-2SLS 
(2) 
Any care (vs. No care hour) 0.187 0.533 0.202 0.619 
 (0.103)† (0.248)* (0.104)† (0.260)* 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)      
Care < 10 hrs/week 0.417 0.373 0.453 0.542 
 (0.169)* (0.967) (0.164)** (1.025) 
Care ≥ 10 hrs/week 0.063 0.621 0.068 0.661 
 (0.126) (0.529) (0.130) (0.559) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 15 hrs/week 0.349 0.463 0.373 0.601 
 (0.140)* (0.767) (0.140)** (0.814) 
Care ≥ 15 hrs/week 0.047 0.629 0.054 0.643 
 (0.144) (0.981) (0.147) (1.032) 
Dummy variables (ref. No care hour)     
Care < 20 hrs/week 0.392 0.462 0.409 0.595 
 (0.134)** (0.672) (0.133)** (0.714) 
Care ≥ 20 hrs/week −0.030 0.638 −0.019 0.654 
 (0.150) (0.893) (0.154) (0.946) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. Covariates included are the 
same as in each corresponding model above. (1) Thirteen disease indicator dummies were included; (2) 
Thirteen disease indicator dummies were not included. 
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Table 5.35. Estimated coefficients on variables of informal care for spouse/own parent/parent-in-
law in regression analyses 
Panel A: Satisfaction  Satisfaction  
Model estimation OLS OLS   
Dependent var.
Key independent var. 
QOL (0-100) Health (0-100)   
ln(1+weekly hours of care for spouse) −2.676 1.361   
 (2.469) (2.230)   
ln(1+weekly hours of care for own parent) 1.655 0.598   
 (1.777) (1.810)   
ln(1+weekly hours of care for parent-in-law) 2.501 1.474   
 (1.238)* (1.112)   
Panel B: Depressive symptomatology     
Model estimation Probit OLS Probit Probit 
Dependent var.
Key independent var. 
(1) CES-D score (2) (3) 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for spouse) −0.205 0.087 −0.116 0.582 
 (0.246) (0.321) (0.180) (0.257)* 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for own parent) 0.176 0.013 0.256 −0.397 
 (0.197) (0.148) (0.143)† (0.229)† 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for parent-in-law) −0.052 0.236 0.209 0.162 
 (0.151) (0.248) (0.093)* (0.111) 
Panel C: Body pain and Self-rated health   
Body pain  Self-rated health 
Model estimation Probit  Ordered probit Probit 
Dependent var.
Key independent var. 
1=yes, 0=no  1 Exc.~5 Poor Fair to Poor 
(1=yes, 0=no)
ln(1+weekly hours of care for spouse) −0.025  −0.010 0.180 
 (0.153)  (0.145) (0.227) 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for own parent) 0.077  0.023 −0.112 
 (0.129)  (0.110) (0.198) 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for parent-in-law) 0.089  0.152 0.167 
 (0.100)  (0.057)** (0.101)† 
Panel D: Health care use Outpatient care use Prescription drug use 
Model estimation Probit OLS Probit OLS 
Dependent var.
Key independent var. 
Any use=1 ln(OOP) if Any Any use=1 ln(OOP) if Any
ln(1+weekly hours of care for spouse) 0.038 −0.071 −0.176 −0.018 
 (0.174) (0.220) (0.224) (0.208) 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for own parent) −0.084 0.154 0.285 0.204 
 (0.143) (0.196) (0.192) (0.172) 
ln(1+weekly hours of care for parent-in-law) 0.156 0.130 0.248 0.165 
 (0.119) (0.092) (0.119)* (0.052)** 
Notes: Covariates are the same as in each corresponding model in previous analyses with 13 disease 
indicators dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. † p<0.1. * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. (1): Feeling 
depressed for two weeks or more during the past year or being on anti-depressant medication (1=yes, 
0=no), (2): CES-D number of items ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no), (3): CES-D score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no).  
 
  
 
   
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
 
The results support the first main hypothesis that informal caregiving has negative 
effects on caregivers’ labor market outcomes, but only among women. Furthermore, the 
negative effects among female caregivers are found only for more intensive caregivers 
providing at least 10 hours of care per week. The negative effects on labor market 
outcomes are found at both extensive and intensive margins (Table 6.1). Compared with 
otherwise similar non-caregivers, female caregivers providing at least 10 hours of 
informal care per week are at an increased risk of being out of the labor force by 15.2 
percent points. For employed work, the effect magnitude is rather small (8.2 percent point 
reduction), partly because of the relatively lower employment rate among midlife women 
in South Korea. Among employed workers, more intensive caregivers appear to receive 
lower wage by 1.65K KRW (≈ 1.65 USD) than otherwise similar non-caregivers.  
For less intensive caregivers providing less than 10 hours per week, the estimated 
effects vary by model. In some models, the effects show opposite directions between 
extensive and intensive margins. That is, less intensive caregivers appear to be more 
likely to be in the labor force, while those remaining in the labor force may reduce work 
hours and experience lower wage rates. Such a finding has also been reported in 
Carmichael and Charles (1998). The negative effects of informal care hours on female 
caregivers’ labor force participation are largely consistent across different age groups of 
adult child samples, lending support to the robustness of the results. For men, negative 
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effects of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes do not reach statistical 
significance. 
These gender differences can be explained in several ways. First, the income 
effect of caregiving will be stronger among men than among women, because men are 
primarily responsible for bringing in household income. Second, the point where the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect may be higher among men than among 
women. Third, married caregiving men will be able to adjust their care hours to maintain 
their jobs, in which case their wives might have to give up their market work to be the 
primary caregiver in the home. Fourth, larger magnitudes of the negative effects of 
caregiving among women are also attributable to the lower quality of their jobs in the 
labor market. Many women participate in the informal sector of the labor market, such as 
unpaid family work, as studied earlier in the Japanese context (Hill, 1983). Work in the 
informal sector could be more easily replaced with informal family care when needed, 
compared with employed work the formal sector. The negative effects of informal 
caregiving on labor force participation are much more pronounced for Any work than for 
Any employed work (Table 6.1). Finally, in the Adult Child sample, there is a 
measurement issue of informal care hours. When KLoSA respondents provide their 
responses on which child provides how many hours of informal care to them, it is quite 
possible that a son’s care hours come partly or almost entirely from the son’s wife (the 
respondent’s daughter-in-law). This is all the more likely because sons come before 
daughters-in-law in the order of possible responses in KLoSA survey. To the extent this 
is the case, sons’ care hours reported by their parents will have less negative impacts on 
the sons’ employment.  
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The results also provide some evidence for the threshold effect of care hours 
discussed in the previous literature (Ettner, 1995; Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Only 
more intensive caregivers are more likely to be out of the labor force, while less intensive 
caregivers may still be able to combine work and care. Up to a certain point of care hours, 
caregivers may even be more likely to be in the labor force than otherwise similar non-
caregivers because the income effect dominates the substitution effect. One relevant 
research implication here is that caution should be made about using a continuous 
variable of informal care hours, which implicitly assumes the monotonicity of the effects. 
This study shows that, when the continuous variable of logged care hours is used, most 
coefficient estimates fail to capture statistically significant effects that emerge in models 
using the dummy variable specification of more intensive and less intensive care. 
Compared with recent studies from other regions, the main results of this study 
produce interesting findings. First, gender differences in caregivers’ labor market 
outcomes are much more pronounced in South Korea than in other regions (Carmichael 
and Charles, 2003; Bolin et al., 2008). Second, female caregivers experience wage 
penalty even when participating in the labor force. This finding is consistent with 
findings in Carmichael and Charles (1998) and Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) but not 
findings in Bolin et al. (2008) Third, the endogeneity between informal caregiving and 
labor market outcomes is weak, varying by statistical model. 
This study attempts to control for multiple sources of endogeneity. Before 
estimating the main models, this study tested for the endogeneity between 
intergenerational co-residence and labor force participation by gender and age group. The 
endogeneity of co-residence and labor force participation has important policy 
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implications, particularly for cultures such as South Korea. Many intergenerational 
households are formed with the co-residence of the eldest son and his wife (parent’s 
daughter-in-law) on their marriage. For example, suppose a new daughter-in-law who 
decided to co-reside with her parents-in-law taking into account her lower attachments to 
the labor force. She may be more likely to take on the role of caregiving. In such a case, 
supporting formal long-term care would achieve little success in increasing her likelihood 
of labor force participation. The degree of substitution between informal and formal long-
term care might be small due to the relative stability of living arrangements. Furthermore, 
even if the substitution were elastic, it would be less likely that the co-residential 
caregiver develops increased attachments to the labor force just because of the reduction 
in their care hours. The results of the bivariate probit model estimation suggest that 
current younger generations in South Korea make their decisions on co-residence jointly 
with decisions on labor force participation, whereas older generations did not. 
Intergenerational co-residence is increasingly becoming a matter of choice rather than a 
family obligation.  
To control for the endogeneity between informal care and labor market outcomes, 
this study employed two approaches. Results of the sibling group fixed-effects estimation 
using the Adult Child sample indicate that more intensive caregiving is associated with a 
lower likelihood of labor force participation. Interestingly, fixed-effects estimators have a 
larger effect magnitude than OLS and random-effects estimators. This finding contradicts 
the assumption that informal caregiving occurs predominantly among disadvantaged 
families. Rather, it supports that the marginal caregiver in South Korea may be better-off 
children with higher employability. Again, this fixed-effects estimation only controls for 
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one source of endogeneity bias that might arise from the correlation between unobserved 
sibling group factors and labor force participation. 
In IV estimation results, endogeneity of informal care hours is detected for both 
men and women in the Midlife Adult Child sample aged 45-64. Interestingly, the two IV 
probit estimates are opposite in direction. Among men, the IV probit estimate on informal 
care hours has a positive sign, whereas a negative sign among women. Both are 
statistically significant. The standard probit estimates are statistically insignificant and 
their effect magnitudes are also small. Thus, the probit estimate has downward bias for 
men and upward bias for women. This finding is particularly interesting because the 
marginal caregiver might differ by gender in South Korea. Among men, caregivers are 
more likely to come from people with lower employability. Once men take on the 
parental caregiving role, they are more likely to work due to the income effect. This is 
probably because male caregivers may be poorer, and they are more likely to be 
unmarried. In contrast, women caring for their parents are more likely to have higher 
employability. The results show that not correcting for this endogeneity bias 
underestimates the negative effect of caregiving on female labor force participation. The 
same pattern is observed for the Younger Adult Child sample, although the endogeneity 
is not supported by statistical tests. 
 
The study on caregiver health effects has confirmed negative effects of caregiving 
across four different health outcomes: satisfaction with quality of life and with health, 
depressive symptomatology, pain affecting daily activities, and self-rated health (H2a). 
Results also support the hypothesis (H2b) that informal caregiving increases caregivers’ 
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outpatient care use and regular prescription drug use in the previous 12 months, although 
only the estimates in the models of conditional out-of-pocket spending reaches statistical 
significance at the 5% level. I summarize the effects of informal care on caregivers’ 
health based on the results using the specification of the main independent variable as 
logged weekly care hours (Table 6.2). 
No coefficient estimates on less intensive caregivers support the dominance of 
beneficial effects of caregiving over negative caregiver health effects. However, some 
evidence suggests the threshold effects (H2c). When examining coefficient estimates on 
less intensive care, many estimates in the models of satisfaction, depressive symptoms, 
and pain are statistically significant and have effect magnitude smaller than their 
corresponding coefficients on more intensive caregivers. By contrast, many coefficient 
estimates in the models of self-rated health, outpatient care use, and prescription drug use 
do not reach statistical significance and have very small magnitudes. These empirical 
findings may suggest that negative health effects of less intensive caregiving are more 
pronounced for psychological outcomes than for physical health outcomes. For physical 
health outcomes, results are suggestive of threshold effects. One plausible explanation for 
this difference is that psychological health outcomes may reflect the effects of 
anticipatory bereavement and emotional contagion more directly than physical health 
outcomes do. The effects of anticipatory bereavement and emotional contagion may 
occur even at relatively low care hours once upon being a caregiver, whereas the effects 
of providing daily care on physical health outcomes may take a certain level of 
commitment to caregiving. 
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The results provide some evidence that negative effects of caregiving differ 
among spousal care, own parental care, and parent-in-law care (H2d). Splitting informal 
care hours into three variables in the models may have reduced their statistical power 
considerably. Many coefficient estimates do not reach statistical significance even at the 
10% level, so F-tests do not work well to test for the potential heterogeneous treatment 
effects. Nevertheless, some interesting findings emerge. Daughter-in-law caregivers 
report even higher satisfaction with quality of life and health, while at the same time 
showing an increased risk of being depressed and using more prescription drugs. This 
study cannot examine further these puzzling results, but several possible explanations are: 
first, their higher satisfaction has to do with the issue of social desirability in surveys; 
second, somatization of their poorer psychological health due to constantly repressed 
symptom expressions may lead to higher prescription drug use; and third, endogeneity 
may exist that inherently happier daughters-in-law provide informal care to their parents-
in-law. Future research could investigate these issues. 
One methodological contribution of this study is to test for selection into 
caregiving. Endogeneity was not detected in most statistical models. In only two models 
(conditional out-of-pocket spending for outpatient care use and prescription drug use), 
informal care hours is found to be endogenous. The IV estimation results in the two 
conditional outcome models indicate upward bias in the respective standard OLS models. 
These findings suggest that, in the general population, the issue of selection into 
caregiving based on health status is not significant. However, when focused only on a 
certain group, such as users of outpatient care and regular prescription drugs, health 
status may affect their decisions on taking on caregiving roles. As posited in the 
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conceptual framework, poor health status can represent revealed ineligibility for informal 
caregiving. Among individuals using outpatient care and prescription drugs regularly, 
less healthy individuals could be exempt from the role of caregiving, and healthier 
individuals may be more likely to take on the caregiving role. However, this selection is 
unlikely to occur at the general population level, particularly for subjective health 
outcomes. In other words, it is unlikely that people will choose whether or not to take on 
caregiving responsibilities based on their expected subjective health outcomes. 
 
Two major limitations should be noted. First, limitations of using cross-sectional 
data preclude the possibility of accounting for temporal sequence of key events or effects 
of duration-related variables. For example, the temporal precedence of caregiving over 
changes in labor market outcomes cannot be known from the data. Moreover, such 
information as the duration of caregiving and previous history of caregiving is not 
available from the data. Likewise, information on baseline health status prior to 
caregiving does not exist in the current data. The IV methods employed can address part 
of these issues regarding reverse causality. For every model of the caregiver health 
outcomes, sensitivity was checked as to whether inclusion of common disease indicators 
changes estimation results considerably. Nevertheless, using longitudinal data with long 
duration would provide better opportunities to enhance the two studies. 
Second, both studies include fewer context-specific variables in the statistical 
models, in part because such information is not available from the data and in part 
because the studies focus more on external validity. For example, the study on caregiver 
health effects does not take into account whether or not the care recipient had Alzheimer 
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dementia, and whether the care recipient showed problem behavior, although these are 
known to greatly affect caregiver’s stress. Different types of caregiving tasks, such as 
assisting with daily living and providing companionship (Van Houtven et al., 2005), are 
not taken into account in the two studies of this dissertation, although different types of 
tasks may have different effects on caregiver’s health and even labor market outcomes. 
One attempt I made about accounting for context-specific factors is to examine possible 
heterogeneous effects on caregiver health outcomes depending on caregiver-recipient 
dyad (spousal care, own parental care, and parent-in-law care). There may be a great deal 
of heterogeneity arising from not accounting for such context-specific factors. Both 
studies use care hours as the basic metric of informal care. While the metric may capture 
much of the graveness of caregiving responsibilities, the advantage of using the 
generalizable metric should be weighed against the disadvantage of failing to reflect 
different contexts of caregiving. It is not clear, however, to what extent these factors 
might affect the overall picture of the results both studies present in this dissertation. 
Future studies might be able to exploit more context-specific information to examine 
subgroup differences and to improve overall analysis. 
 
Despite these limitations, the two studies in this dissertation have several major 
strengths. First, the study on caregivers’ labor market outcomes has produced an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of informal caregiving on labor market outcomes in South Korea. I 
account for gender differences as well as age group differences explicitly, by constructing 
relevant samples. Furthermore, for each gender/age group, multiple statistical models 
were run by combining different functional forms of informal care with labor market 
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outcomes at both extensive and intensive margin. By doing so, the study revealed a 
number of interesting findings showing a complex interplay between gender, intensity of 
care, and different patterns of adjustments, as discussed above. Second, using a variety of 
caregiver health outcomes allows for not only checking for the robustness of negative 
health effects but also examining interesting differences in the effects by study outcome. 
Most notably, psychological health outcomes are found to worsen even at a low level, 
where physical health outcomes may show some threshold effects. Third, I conduct a 
careful examination of the issue of endogeneity in both studies. Cultural and institutional 
settings of informal caregiving in South Korea allow for exploiting strong and valid 
family-level IVs. IV estimation has played a critical role in revealing gender differences 
in the marginal caregiver and hence in the effects of informal caregiving on labor market 
outcomes. In the caregiver health effects study, IV estimation results shed light on what 
kind of health outcomes may suffer most from the issue of selection into caregiving. 
 
I propose two directions for future research. First, longitudinal data would provide 
more opportunities for improved study designs as well as allow for examining long-term 
effects of caregiving on labor market outcomes and health outcomes. One particularly 
interesting and policy-relevant area of research is to investigate the effects of South 
Korea’s new public long-term care insurance on such outcomes as living arrangements, 
formal and informal care use, labor market outcomes, and caregiver health outcomes. 
Such studies will add to the literature produced from Japan’s recent experience with 
transition in elderly long-term care (Oura et al., 2007; Shimizutani et al., 2008; Hanaoka 
and Norton, 2008). 
  160
Second, comparative studies, either cross-national or cross-cultural, would make 
meaningful contributions to the literature. The importance of cross-national research on 
aging has been increasingly emphasized, because international comparison may often 
provide interesting insights to individual behaviors concerning informal care and related 
family decisions (National Research Council, 2001). Moreover, developing countries 
experiencing rapid population aging need to better exploit the potential of cross-cultural 
research (Zimmer and Martin, 2007). Such comparative studies could exploit 
accumulating data from internationally comparable studies, such as HRS, SHARE, and 
KLoSA. Although a north-south gradient in Europe has recently received attention from 
the field of aging and long-term care (Viitanen, 2005; Crespo, 2006; Bolin et al., 2007; 
Bolin et al., 2008), such empirical comparative studies are scant outside of Europe. One 
immediate possibility is to conduct comparative studies between Japan and South Korea 
focusing on their experience with long-term care insurance. Some outcomes of interest 
could include living arrangements, formal and informal care use, labor market outcomes, 
and caregiver health outcomes. Further, cross-cultural studies would provide much 
broader ranges of interesting research questions. How do informal caregiving interact 
with economic behaviors, such as intergenerational transfers and lifetime savings 
(Norton, 2000)? How are caregiver health effects different by culture? What contributes 
to negative health effects of caregiving, among lack of support from formal care, cultural 
settings for care, and cultural differences in symptom expressions? 
 
The main policy implication of this dissertation is that informal caregiving is 
already an important economic and public health issue in South Korea even before the 
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full effects of rapid population aging in the recent decades appear. Embedded in 
traditional culture, family-centered elderly care has often been touted as a great asset to 
support the welfare state of South Korea. However, the results of this study suggest that 
the current elderly care system has its own costs as well. Caregivers are less likely to 
participate in the labor force. Even though they may remain in the labor force, they 
reduce work hours and earn less than non-caregivers. Furthermore, because of the 
increasing prevalence of caregiving and its negative effects on health, caregiving should 
now be viewed as a public health issue. 
The projected demographic transition in South Korea foretells that these costs of 
informal care will grow rapidly. These costs may go beyond individuals, in such forms as 
reduced income tax revenues or increased health care expenditures. Moreover, these costs 
may aggravate socioeconomic and gender inequalities in income and last into later life. 
Public policies on elderly care should take into account the costs of informal care. While 
South Korea introduced public long-term care insurance in 2008, informal care will serve 
as the mainstay of elderly long-term care in the foreseeable future, according to 
experiences in advanced countries. Thus, the role of public policy should be to pursue the 
optimal mix of formal and informal care. In this context, the study identifies a priority 
group for policy attention: female caregivers providing at least more than 10 hours per 
week. They are most likely to experience negative labor market outcomes and health 
consequences of caregiving. Potential policy measures might span multiple policy areas, 
including formal long-term care, financial incentives, and labor market policy. 
Public long-term care insurance, if well implemented, may potentially improve 
labor market and health outcomes among caregiver populations. Recent studies from 
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other countries provide some evidence. Publicly provided long-term care is found to 
increase female labor force participation in Japan (Shimizutani et al., 2008) and Canada 
(Stabile et al., 2006). However, dementia caregivers’ depression has little improved with 
the introduction of Japanese public long-term care insurance (Oura et al., 2007). Through 
the substitution between formal care and informal care among more intensive caregivers, 
labor market outcomes may improve among women. Caregivers’ health, particularly 
psychological health outcomes, may not show marked improvements, because caregiving 
involves more than performing daily tasks. Policy measures should take a more 
comprehensive approach to caregiving than implementing public long-term care 
insurance alone. 
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Table 6.1. Summary of the effects of providing informal care of 10 hours per week or more on 
female labor market outcomes 
Effect on labor market outcomes Magnitude 
Probability of labor force participation in any work  15.2% point reduction 
Probability of labor force participation in employed work 8.2% point reduction 
Hourly wage rate among employed women 1.65K KRW reduction 
Unconditional hourly wage rate among women 0.77K KRW reduction 
 
 
Table 6.2. Summary of estimated coefficients and marginal effects in caregiver health effects 
 Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal effect of a 100% increase in care hours
Satisfaction    
Satisfaction with quality of life (0-100) −1.994 (0.432)** −1.994 
Satisfaction with health (0-100) −1.039 (0.430)** −1.039 
Depressive symptomatology    
(1) Depression 0.076 (0.029)** 1.04% pointsa 
CES-D summary score 0.389 (0.086)** 0.389 
(2) Depression 0.137 (0.026)** 4.28% pointsa 
(3) Depression 0.110 (0.026)** 2.50% pointsa 
Body pain    
Pr(Pain affecting daily activities) 0.067 (0.027)* 1.54% pointsa 
Self-rated health    
Pr(Self-rated health being Fair to Poor) 0.061 (0.028)* 1.82% pointsa 
Outpatient care use    
Pr(Outpatient care use) 0.023 (0.026) Statistically insignificant 
  E(out-of-pocket costs) if any use 0.273 (0.104)** 27.3% 
Prescription drug use    
Pr(Prescription drug use) 0.014 (0.032) Statistically insignificant 
  E(out-of-pocket costs) if any use 0.199 (0.090)** 19.9% 
Notes: * p<0.05. ** p<0.01. (1): Feeling depressed for two weeks or more during the past year or being on 
anti-depressant medication (1=yes, 0=no), (2): CES-D number of items ≥ 4 (1=yes, 0=no), (3): CES-D 
score ≥ 10 (1=yes, 0=no). aMean of the probabilities method 
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Figure 6.1. Effects of informal care on caregivers’ labor market outcomes and health 
 
(a) Labor market outcomes (midlife female) 
 
 
(b) Health outcomes 
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